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Showing posts with label us dollar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label us dollar. Show all posts

Friday, August 01, 2025

De-Dollarization: Inevitable

De-Dollarization Is Inevitable. The World Isn’t Prepared

Here’s a concise summary of the World Politics Review article “De-Dollarization Is Inevitable. The World Isn’t Prepared” (World Politics Review):


๐Ÿงญ Key takeaways

⚠️ U.S. fiscal crisis and foundational fragility

  • The article argues that the United States faces an emerging fiscal crisis threatening the post‑Bretton Woods international monetary system. This system underpins the dollar’s roles as the global reserve currency, issuer of safe‑haven Treasury assets, and guarantor of global consumption through U.S. deficits (World Politics Review).

๐Ÿ”„ Momentum toward de‑dollarization

  • Several factors—including U.S. budget deficits, sanctions (“dollar weaponization”), political unpredictability, and erosion of global trust—have accelerated efforts by countries and blocs (e.g. BRICS, EU, ASEAN, and African nations) to reduce dependence on the dollar.

  • Initiatives include direct currency settlement mechanisms (e.g. yuan-rupee, rupee-ruble) and regional alternatives like an African “Eco” currency (The Guardian).

๐Ÿ› Toward a multipolar currency architecture

๐Ÿšง Risk of erosion from overleveraging its power

  • Overusing the dollar as a geopolitical tool (e.g. sanctioning sovereign reserves) may be undermining long-term dollar strength. Competition is rising from alternatives like gold, yuan, regional settlement systems, and potentially, IMF SDRs or a common Afro-BRICS currency (Investopedia).

๐Ÿงฉ Tension between domestic policy and global responsibilities

  • The article invokes the Triffin dilemma: to serve global demand, the U.S. must run trade deficits—but that same approach exacerbates domestic fiscal vulnerabilities and heightens currency stability risks (Wikipedia).


๐Ÿ“‰ Bottom line

  • The world is undergoing a structural shift toward monetary multipolarity. While the dollar remains dominant, it faces serious challenges—from geopolitical reactions to U.S. policy, from shrinking global trust, and from coordinated economic alternatives.

  • The article warns: if Washington does not adapt—by reforming fiscal policy, limiting heavy-handed financial coercion, and embracing more inclusive international monetary governance—it risks losing not only monetary leverage but also long-standing global influence.





เคฏเคนाँ World Politics Review เค•े เคฒेเค– “De-Dollarization Is Inevitable. The World Isn’t Prepared” เค•ा เคนिंเคฆी เคฎें เคธाเคฐांเคถ เคช्เคฐเคธ्เคคुเคค เคนै:


๐Ÿงญ เคฎुเค–्เคฏ เคฌिंเคฆु

⚠️ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ा เคฐाเคœเค•ोเคทीเคฏ เคธंเค•เคŸ เค”เคฐ เคช्เคฐเคฃाเคฒी เค•ी เคจाเคœुเค•เคคा

  • เคฏเคน เคฒेเค– เคคเคฐ्เค• เคฆेเคคा เคนै เค•ि เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เคเค• เค‰เคญเคฐเคคे เคนुเค เคฐाเคœเค•ोเคทीเคฏ เคธंเค•เคŸ เค•ा เคธाเคฎเคจा เค•เคฐ เคฐเคนा เคนै เคœो เคฌ्เคฐेเคค्เคคเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ เค•े เคฌाเคฆ เค•ी เค…ंเคคเคฐเคฐाเคท्เคŸ्เคฐीเคฏ เคฎौเคฆ्เคฐिเค• เคช्เคฐเคฃाเคฒी เค•ो เค–เคคเคฐे เคฎें เคกाเคฒ เคธเค•เคคा เคนै। เคฏเคน เคช्เคฐเคฃाเคฒी เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ी เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ो เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคฐिเคœเคฐ्เคต เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा, เคธुเคฐเค•्เคทिเคค เคŸ्เคฐेเคœเคฐी เคธंเคชเคค्เคคिเคฏों เค•े เคธ्เคฐोเคค, เค”เคฐ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•े เค˜ाเคŸे เค•े เคœ़เคฐिเค เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เค–เคชเคค เค•ो เคฌเคจाเค เคฐเค–เคจे เคตाเคฒे เค‰เคชเค•เคฐเคฃ เค•े เคฐूเคช เคฎें เคธ्เคฅाเคชिเคค เค•เคฐเคคी เคนै।

๐Ÿ”„ เคกॉเคฒเคฐ-เคฎुเค•्เคคि เค•ी เคฌเคข़เคคी เค—เคคि

  • เค•เคˆ เค•ाเคฐเคฃ—เคœैเคธे เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•े เคฌเคœเคŸ เค˜ाเคŸे, เคช्เคฐเคคिเคฌंเคงों (เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ा “เคนเคฅिเคฏाเคฐเค•เคฐเคฃ”), เคฐाเคœเคจीเคคिเค• เค…เคธ्เคฅिเคฐเคคा เค”เคฐ เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคตिเคถ्เคตाเคธ เคฎें เค•เคฎी—เคจे เคฆेเคถों เค”เคฐ เคฌ्เคฒॉเค•ों (เคœैเคธे BRICS, เคฏूเคฐोเคชीเคฏ เคธंเค˜, ASEAN เค”เคฐ เค…เคซ्เคฐीเค•ी เคฐाเคท्เคŸ्เคฐों) เค•ो เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เคชเคฐ เคจिเคฐ्เคญเคฐเคคा เค•เคฎ เค•เคฐเคจे เค•े เคฒिเค เคช्เคฐेเคฐिเคค เค•िเคฏा เคนै।

  • เคช्เคฐเคฏाเคธों เคฎें เคถाเคฎिเคฒ เคนैं: เคช्เคฐเคค्เคฏเค•्เคท เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคตिเคจिเคฎเคฏ เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅाเคँ (เคœैเคธे เคฏुเค†เคจ-เคฐुเคชเคฏा, เคฐुเคชเคฏा-เคฐूเคฌเคฒ) เค”เคฐ เค•्เคทेเคค्เคฐीเคฏ เคตिเค•เคฒ्เคช เคœैเคธे เค…เคซ्เคฐीเค•ी “เคˆเค•ो” เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा।

๐Ÿ› เคฌเคนुเคง्เคฐुเคตीเคฏ เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคธंเคฐเคšเคจा เค•ी เค“เคฐ

  • เค…เคฌ เค•िเคธी เคเค• เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เค•े เคช्เคฐเคญुเคค्เคต เค•ी เคฌเคœाเคฏ, เคนเคฎ เคฌเคนुเคง्เคฐुเคตीเคฏ เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅा เค•ी เค“เคฐ เคฌเคข़ เคฐเคนे เคนैं—เคœเคนाँ เคกॉเคฒเคฐ “เคธเคฎाเคจों เคฎें เคช्เคฐเคฅเคฎ” เคฌเคจा เคฐเคนेเค—ा, เคฒेเค•िเคจ เค…เคจ्เคฏ เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐाเค“ं เค•े เคธाเคฅ เคธเคน-เค…เคธ्เคคिเคค्เคต เคฎें เคฐเคนेเค—ा เคœिเคจ्เคนें เคธंเคธ्เคฅाเค—เคค, เคคเค•เคจीเค•ी เค”เคฐ เคจेเคŸเคตเคฐ्เค• เคธเคฎเคฐ्เคฅเคจ เคช्เคฐाเคช्เคค เคนै।

๐Ÿšง เค…เคค्เคฏเคงिเค• เคถเค•्เคคि เค‰เคชเคฏोเค— เคธे เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ी เคธ्เคฅिเคคि เค•เคฎเคœोเคฐ

  • เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ो เคเค• เคญू-เคฐाเคœเคจीเคคिเค• เคนเคฅिเคฏाเคฐ เค•े เคฐूเคช เคฎें เค…เคคि-เคช्เคฐเคฏोเค— เค•เคฐเคจा (เคœैเคธे เคธंเคช्เคฐเคญु เคญंเคกाเคฐों เคชเคฐ เคช्เคฐเคคिเคฌंเคง เคฒเค—ाเคจा) เค‡เคธเค•ी เคฆीเคฐ्เค˜เค•ाเคฒिเค• เคตिเคถ्เคตเคธเคจीเคฏเคคा เค•ो เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ เคชเคนुँเคšा เคธเค•เคคा เคนै। เค…เคฌ เคช्เคฐเคคिเคธ्เคชเคฐ्เคงा เคฌเคข़ เคฐเคนी เคนै—เคธोเคจे, เคฏुเค†เคจ, เค•्เคทेเคค्เคฐीเคฏ เคตिเคจिเคฎเคฏ เคช्เคฐเคฃाเคฒिเคฏों, IMF เค•े SDRs, เค”เคฐ เคธंเคญाเคตिเคค Afro-BRICS เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เค•े เคฐूเคช เคฎें।

๐Ÿงฉ เค˜เคฐेเคฒू เคจीเคคिเคฏों เค”เคฐ เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคœिเคฎ्เคฎेเคฆाเคฐिเคฏों เค•े เคฌीเคš เคคเคจाเคต

  • เคฒेเค– เคŸ्เคฐिเคซ़िเคจ เคฆुเคตिเคงा (Triffin Dilemma) เค•ा เคœ़िเค•्เคฐ เค•เคฐเคคा เคนै: เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคฎांเค— เค•ो เคชूเคฐा เค•เคฐเคจे เค•े เคฒिเค เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค˜ाเคŸा เคฌเคจाเค เคฐเค–เคจा เคนोเคคा เคนै—เคฒेเค•िเคจ เคฏเคนी เคคเคฐीเค•ा เค˜เคฐेเคฒू เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เค•เคฎเคœोเคฐिเคฏों เค•ो เคฌเคข़ाเคคा เคนै เค”เคฐ เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ी เคธ्เคฅिเคฐเคคा เค•ो เค–เคคเคฐे เคฎें เคกाเคฒเคคा เคนै।


๐Ÿ“‰ เคจिเคท्เค•เคฐ्เคท

  • เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เคเค• เคธंเคฐเคšเคจाเคค्เคฎเค• เคฌเคฆเคฒाเคต เคธे เค—ुเคœเคฐ เคฐเคนी เคนै เคœिเคธเคฎें เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคฎौเคฆ्เคฐिเค• เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅा เคฌเคนुเคง्เคฐुเคตीเคฏ เคฌเคจ เคฐเคนी เคนै। เคนाเคฒांเค•ि เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค…เคญी เคญी เคช्เคฐเคฎुเค– เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคนै, เคฏเคน เค•เคˆ เคšुเคจौเคคिเคฏों เค•ा เคธाเคฎเคจा เค•เคฐ เคฐเคนा เคนै—เคœैเคธे เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ी เคจीเคคिเคฏों เค•ी เคช्เคฐเคคिเค•्เคฐिเคฏा เคธ्เคตเคฐूเคช เคฌเคข़เคคे เค…เคตिเคถ्เคตाเคธ เค”เคฐ เคธเคฎเคจ्เคตिเคค เคตिเค•เคฒ्เคชों เค•ा เค‰เคญเคฐเคจा।

  • เคšेเคคाเคตเคจी เคฏเคน เคนै: เคฏเคฆि เคตॉเคถिंเค—เคŸเคจ เค–ुเคฆ เค•ो เค…เคจुเค•ूเคฒिเคค เคจเคนीं เค•เคฐเคคा—เคฐाเคœเค•ोเคทीเคฏ เคธुเคงाเคฐ เคจเคนीं เค•เคฐเคคा, เคตिเคค्เคคीเคฏ เคฆเคฌाเคต เค•ो เคธीเคฎिเคค เคจเคนीं เค•เคฐเคคा เค”เคฐ เค…เคงिเค• เคธเคฎाเคตेเคถी เคฎौเคฆ्เคฐिเค• เคถाเคธเคจ เค•ो เคจเคนीं เค…เคชเคจाเคคा—เคคो เคตเคน เค•ेเคตเคฒ เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ा เคช्เคฐเคญाเคต เคนी เคจเคนीं, เคฌเคฒ्เค•ि เค…เคชเคจी เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคฐाเคœเคจीเคคिเค• เคคाเค•เคค เคญी เค–ो เคธเค•เคคा เคนै।





The Triffin Dilemma is a paradox in international economics that arises when a country’s national currency also serves as the world’s reserve currency—like the U.S. dollar does today.


๐Ÿ” Simple Explanation:

To fulfill global demand for dollars—for trade, investment, and as a reserve currency—the U.S. must export dollars to the rest of the world.

But how does it do that?

By importing more than it exports, i.e., running trade deficits. This sends dollars abroad and satisfies global demand.

However, this same process creates a problem at home:

  • Constant trade deficits mean U.S. industries may weaken.

  • The national debt grows due to higher borrowing.

  • Eventually, global trust in the stability of the dollar may decline.

This is the Triffin Dilemma:

What the world needs (more dollars through U.S. trade deficits) is at odds with what the U.S. economy needs (fiscal balance, currency stability).


๐Ÿ” Summary:

Global Need U.S. Domestic Need The Dilemma
More dollars (liquidity) Balanced budgets, strong exports Trade deficits help the world, but hurt the U.S. long-term

๐Ÿ“‰ Why It Matters Today:

  • As more countries diversify away from the dollar (de-dollarization), the strain of this dilemma is increasing.

  • The U.S. faces a tipping point: either reform its economic model or risk losing the dollar’s supremacy.


เคŸ्เคฐिเคซ़िเคจ เคฆुเคตिเคงा (Triffin Dilemma) เค…ंเคคเคฐเคฐाเคท्เคŸ्เคฐीเคฏ เค…เคฐ्เคฅเคถाเคธ्เคค्เคฐ เคฎें เคเค• เคเคธा เคตिเคฐोเคงाเคญाเคธ เคนै เคœो เคคเคฌ เค‰เคค्เคชเคจ्เคจ เคนोเคคा เคนै เคœเคฌ เค•िเคธी เคฆेเคถ เค•ी เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा—เคœैเคธे เค•ि เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ी เคกॉเคฒเคฐ—เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เค•ी เคช्เคฐเคฎुเค– เคฐिเคœ़เคฐ्เคต เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคนोเคคी เคนै।


๐Ÿ” เคธเคฐเคฒ เคต्เคฏाเค–्เคฏा:

เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เคญเคฐ เคฎें เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ, เคจिเคตेเคถ เค”เคฐ เคตिเคฆेเคถी เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคญंเคกाเคฐ เค•े เคฒिเค เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ी เคฎांเค— เคฌเคจी เคฐเคนเคคी เคนै
เค‡เคธ เคฎांเค— เค•ो เคชूเคฐा เค•เคฐเคจे เค•े เคฒिเค เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เคฎें เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เคญेเคœเคจे เคชเคก़เคคे เคนैं

เคฏเคน เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ैเคธे เค•เคฐเคคा เคนै?

เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เค…เคงिเค• เค†เคฏाเคค เค”เคฐ เค•เคฎ เคจिเคฐ्เคฏाเคค เค•เคฐเคจा เคชเคก़เคคा เคนै, เคฏाเคจी เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค˜ाเคŸा (Trade Deficit) เคฌเคจाเค เคฐเค–เคจा เคชเคก़เคคा เคนै।
เคœเคฌ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เคœ़्เคฏाเคฆा เค†เคฏाเคค เค•เคฐเคคा เคนै, เคคो เคตเคน เคฌाเค•ी เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เค•ो เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เคฆेเคคा เคนै—เค‡เคธเคธे เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคฎांเค— เคชूเคฐी เคนोเคคी เคนै।

เคฒेเค•िเคจ เคฏเคนीं เคธเคฎเคธ्เคฏा เคถुเคฐू เคนोเคคी เคนै:

  • เคฒเค—ाเคคाเคฐ เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค˜ाเคŸे เคธे เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ी เค‰เคฆ्เคฏोเค— เค•เคฎเคœोเคฐ เคนो เคธเค•เคคे เคนैं।

  • เคฐाเคท्เคŸ्เคฐीเคฏ เค‹เคฃ (National Debt) เคฌเคข़เคคा เคนै।

  • เค”เคฐ เค…ंเคคเคคः, เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ी เคธ्เคฅिเคฐเคคा เคชเคฐ เคตिเคถ्เคตाเคธ เค•เคฎ เคนो เคธเค•เคคा เคนै।

เค‡เคธी เค•ो เค•เคนเคคे เคนैं เคŸ्เคฐिเคซ़िเคจ เคฆुเคตिเคงा:

เคœो เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เคšाเคนเคคी เคนै (เค…เคงिเค• เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค”เคฐ เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค˜ाเคŸा), เคตเคน เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ी เค†ंเคคเคฐिเค• เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เคฎเคœเคฌूเคคी เค•े เคตिเคฐुเคฆ्เคง เคœाเคคा เคนै।


๐Ÿ” เคธाเคฐांเคถ เคคाเคฒिเค•ा:

๐ŸŒ เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เค†เคตเคถ्เคฏเค•เคคा ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ी เค˜เคฐेเคฒू เค†เคตเคถ्เคฏเค•เคคा ⚠️ เคฆुเคตिเคงा
เค…เคงिเค• เคกॉเคฒเคฐ (เคคเคฐเคฒเคคा) เคธंเคคुเคฒिเคค เคฌเคœเคŸ, เคฎเคœเคฌूเคค เคจिเคฐ्เคฏाเคค เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค˜ाเคŸा เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เค•ी เคฎเคฆเคฆ เค•เคฐเคคा เคนै, เคชเคฐ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เค•เคฎเคœोเคฐ เค•เคฐเคคा เคนै

๐Ÿ“‰ เค†เคœ เค•े เคธंเคฆเคฐ्เคญ เคฎें เคฎเคนเคค्เคต:

  • เคœैเคธे-เคœैเคธे เค…เคจ्เคฏ เคฆेเคถ เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เคชเคฐ เคจिเคฐ्เคญเคฐเคคा เค•เคฎ เค•เคฐ เคฐเคนे เคนैं (De-Dollarization), เคฏเคน เคฆुเคตिเคงा เค”เคฐ เค—เคนเคฐी เคนोเคคी เคœा เคฐเคนी เคนै।

  • เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เค…เคฌ เคตिเค•เคฒ्เคช เคšुเคจเคจा เคนोเค—ा:

    • เคฏा เคคो เค…เคชเคจी เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เคจीเคคि เคฎें เคธुเคงाเคฐ เค•เคฐे,

    • เคฏा เคซिเคฐ เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ी เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคธ्เคฅिเคคि เค–ोเคจे เค•ा เคœोเค–िเคฎ เค‰เค ाเค।



It is absolutely in the U.S.'s strategic interest to help convene a new Bretton Woods‐style reordering of global trade and finance. When done thoughtfully, such a foundational reform can align global demand for dollars with America's long-term fiscal and currency stability. Here’s how:


๐Ÿ— Why the U.S. Should Lead a New Bretton Woods Moment

1. Addressing Global Imbalances & the Triffin Dilemma

  • In the original system, the U.S. had to run perpetual trade deficits to supply the world with dollars—resolving global liquidity needs at the cost of domestic fiscal strain (Wikipedia).

  • A redesigned system could decouple global reserve provision from U.S. trade deficits through shared institutions, coordinated currency mechanisms, or enhanced use of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)—reducing pressure on the U.S. economy.

2. Embedding Values: Justice, Sustainability, and Inclusivity

  • Rethinking Trade: A Blueprint for a Just and Thriving Global Economy argues for redesigning trade rules around labor rights, environmental justice, and equitable growth instead of extraction, dominance, and short‑term efficiency (Amazon).

  • This aligns with recent U.S. trade policy shifts toward worker-centered, sustainable frameworks seen in administrations today (Financial Times).

3. Reforming Bretton Woods Institutions for Legitimacy & Effectiveness

  • Calls for reforming the IMF and World Bank are gaining momentum—centering on governance overhaul to give emerging economies fair voting power, expand SDR allocations, and sharpen focus on macroeconomic stability over non-core issues (The Guardian).

  • A U.S.-led restructuring can restore institutional legitimacy while ensuring these bodies support broader global stability rather than perpetuating unequal hierarchies (Atlantic Council).

4. Managing Geopolitical Change with Multilateral Cooperation

  • U.S. policymakers like Janet Yellen, Katherine Tai, and Jake Sullivan have invoked the spirit of Bretton Woods to justify inclusive multilateral architecture that addresses geopolitical fragmentation, climate risk, and AI governance—while preserving U.S. leadership (Carnegie Endowment).

  • A new framework could buffer economic nationalism and systemic shocks by embedding a broader coalition of “like‑minded” economies around shared norms and mutual accountability (Carnegie Endowment, Institute for New Economic Thinking).


๐Ÿ” How Rethinking Trade Fits In

The Rethinking Trade blueprint advocates fundamentally remaking trade governance to prioritize justice and shared prosperity:

  • Its core vision extends beyond tweaking existing treaties—arguing for structural transformation of international trade—from tariff frameworks to currency coordination, supply-chain fairness, and local empowerment (Amazon).

  • These ideas parallel Sime Miran’s proposals under the Trump‑era “Mar‑a‑Lago Accord” and broader reform programs that link trade rules with national security, industrial policy, and exchange‑rate adjustment (sprott.carleton.ca).

  • When integrated into the governance reforms of Bretton Woods institutions (like rebalancing IMF voting weight, universal SDR access), the blueprint becomes part of a coherent, equitable global order.


⚠️ Risks and Challenges

  • Historical experience shows that reforming monetary and trade architecture is hard—requiring trust, credibility, and shared strategic purpose. The original Bretton Woods flourished in a U.S.-led postwar consensus; today’s geopolitical fragmentation complicates similar coordination (American Affairs Journal, Carnegie Endowment).

  • There are competing visions: some actors see Bretton Woods as a legacy of inequality and seek fundamentally new institutions rather than reform (Carnegie Endowment).

  • The "Mar‑a‑Lago Accord" model faces skepticism: critics warn that aggressive nationalistic realignment could destabilize alliances and undermine multilateralism (Wikipedia, El Paรญs).


✅ Bottom Line

Goal Why U.S. Should Lead a New Bretton Woods Moment
Serve global dollar demand Reduce need for U.S. trade deficits; mitigate Triffin Dilemma
Promote fairness and sustainability Embed labor, climate, and equity standards in trade rules
Modernize institutions Reform IMF/World Bank for legitimacy, SDR use, and governance parity
Manage geopolitical change Establish rules-based multilateralism addressing modern shocks

Leading such a renewal would allow the U.S. to redefine globalization in a way that balances global liquidity with domestic fiscal health, protects the dollar’s role, and promotes a more stable, equitable, and sustainable global economy.





เคฏเคน เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•े เคฆीเคฐ्เค˜เค•ाเคฒिเค• เคนिเคค เคฎें เคนै เค•ि เคตเคน เคเค• เคจเค เคฌ्เคฐेเคŸเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ (Bretton Woods) เคœैเคธे เคธเคฎ्เคฎेเคฒเคจ เค•ी เค…เค—ुเคตाเคˆ เค•เคฐे เค”เคฐ เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เคช्เคฐเคฃाเคฒी เค•ी เคฌुเคจिเคฏाเคฆी เคชुเคจเคฐ्เคฐเคšเคจा เคฎें เคจेเคคृเคค्เคต เค•เคฐे। เคฏเคฆि เคฏเคน เค•ाเคฎ เคธเคฎเคเคฆाเคฐी เคธे เค•िเคฏा เคœाเค, เคคो เคฏเคน เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ी เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคธ्เคฅिเคฐเคคा เค”เคฐ เคตिเคค्เคคीเคฏ เคธ्เคตाเคธ्เคฅ्เคฏ เค•ो เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เค†เคตเคถ्เคฏเค•เคคाเค“ं เค•े เคธाเคฅ เคธंเคคुเคฒिเคค เค•เคฐ เคธเค•เคคा เคนै। เคจीเคšे เค‡เคธเค•ा เคตिเคถ्เคฒेเคทเคฃ เคช्เคฐเคธ्เคคुเคค เคนै:


๐Ÿ— เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เคเค• เคจเคฏा เคฌ्เคฐेเคŸเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ เคธเคฎ्เคฎेเคฒเคจ เค•्เคฏों เค†เคฏोเคœिเคค เค•เคฐเคจा เคšाเคนिเค?

1. เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เค…เคธंเคคुเคฒเคจों เค”เคฐ เคŸ्เคฐिเคซ़िเคจ เคฆुเคตिเคงा เค•ा เคธเคฎाเคงाเคจ

  • เคฎौเคœूเคฆा เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅा เคฎें เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เคญเคฐ เค•ो เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค•ी เคœ़เคฐूเคฐเคค เคนोเคคी เคนै, เค”เคฐ เค‡เคธे เคชूเคฐा เค•เคฐเคจे เค•े เคฒिเค เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เคฒเค—ाเคคाเคฐ เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค˜ाเคŸा เคšเคฒाเคจा เคชเคก़เคคा เคนै।

  • เคฏเคน เค˜เคฐेเคฒू เคฐूเคช เคธे เค‹เคฃ เค”เคฐ เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐाเคธ्เคซीเคคि เค•ो เคฌเคข़ाเคคा เคนै।

  • เคเค• เคจเคฏा เคธिเคธ्เคŸเคฎ IMF เค•े SDRs เคฏा เคธाเคा เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐाเค“ं เคœैเคธी เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅाเค“ं เค•े เคœ़เคฐिเค เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคคเคฐเคฒเคคा เคธुเคจिเคถ्เคšिเคค เค•เคฐ เคธเค•เคคा เคนै, เคœिเคธเคธे เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เคชเคฐ เคเค•เคฎाเคค्เคฐ เคญाเคฐ เค•เคฎ เคนोเค—ा।

2. เคฎूเคฒ्เคฏों เค•ो เค•ेंเคฆ्เคฐ เคฎें เคฒाเคจा: เคจ्เคฏाเคฏ, เคธ्เคฅिเคฐเคคा เค”เคฐ เคธเคฎाเคตेเคถिเคคा

  • Rethinking Trade เคจाเคฎเค• เคชुเคธ्เคคเค• เคเค• เคเคธे เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เคฎॉเคกเคฒ เค•ी เคตเค•ाเคฒเคค เค•เคฐเคคी เคนै เคœो เคถ्เคฐเคฎ เค…เคงिเค•ाเคฐों, เคชเคฐ्เคฏाเคตเคฐเคฃीเคฏ เคจ्เคฏाเคฏ เค”เคฐ เคธเคฎाเคจ เคตिเค•ाเคธ เค•ो เคช्เคฐाเคฅเคฎिเค•เคคा เคฆे।

  • เคฏเคน เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ी เคนाเคฒिเคฏा “worker-centered trade policy” เค•े เคธाเคฅ เคฎेเคฒ เค–ाเคคी เคนै।

3. เคฌ्เคฐेเคŸเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ เคธंเคธ्เคฅाเคจों เคฎें เคธुเคงाเคฐ

  • IMF เค”เคฐ เคตिเคถ्เคต เคฌैंเค• เคœैเคธी เคธंเคธ्เคฅाเค“ं เคฎें เค…เคฌ เคธुเคงाเคฐ เค•ी เคฎाँเค— เคฌเคข़ เคฐเคนी เคนै—เคœैเคธे เคตिเค•ाเคธเคถीเคฒ เคฆेเคถों เค•ो เค…เคงिเค• เคตोเคŸिंเค— เค…เคงिเค•ाเคฐ, SDR เค•ा เคตिเคธ्เคคाเคฐ, เค”เคฐ เค‹เคฃ เค•ी เค…เคงिเค• เคจ्เคฏाเคฏเคชूเคฐ्เคฃ เคถเคฐ्เคคें।

  • เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค‡เคธ เคธुเคงाเคฐ เค•ी เค…เค—ुเคตाเคˆ เค•เคฐเค•े เค…เคชเคจी เคจेเคคृเคค्เคต เค•ी เคตैเคงเคคा เคซिเคฐ เคธे เคธ्เคฅाเคชिเคค เค•เคฐ เคธเค•เคคा เคนै เค”เคฐ เค‡เคจ เคธंเคธ्เคฅाเค“ं เค•ो 21เคตीं เคธเคฆी เค•े เค…เคจुเค•ूเคฒ เคฌเคจा เคธเค•เคคा เคนै।

4. เคญू-เคฐाเคœเคจीเคคिเค• เค…เคธ्เคฅिเคฐเคคा เค•े เคฏुเค— เคฎें เคฌเคนुเคชเค•्เคทीเคฏ เคธเคนเคฏोเค— เค•ी เค†เคตเคถ्เคฏเค•เคคा

  • เคฌ्เคฐेเคŸเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ เค•ी “เค†เคค्เคฎा” เค•ो เค†เคงुเคจिเค• เคธंเคฆเคฐ्เคญों เคฎें เคฒाเค•เคฐ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा AI, เคœเคฒเคตाเคฏु เคธंเค•เคŸ, เค”เคฐ เคตिเคค्เคคीเคฏ เคตिเค–ंเคกเคจ เคœैเคธे เคฎुเคฆ्เคฆों เค•ा เคธเคฎाเคงाเคจ เค•เคฐเคจे เคฎें เคธเคนเคฏोเค—ी เค—เค เคฌंเคงเคจ เคฌเคจा เคธเค•เคคा เคนै।


๐Ÿ” Rethinking Trade เคชुเคธ्เคคเค• เค•ी เคช्เคฐाเคธंเค—िเค•เคคा

  • เคฏเคน เคชुเคธ्เคคเค• เค•ेเคตเคฒ เคธเคฎเคौเคคों เคฎें เคธंเคถोเคงเคจ เค•ी เคฌाเคค เคจเคนीं เค•เคฐเคคी, เคฌเคฒ्เค•ि เคชूเคฐी เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐिเค• เคช्เคฐเคฃाเคฒी เค•ो เคชुเคจเคฐ्เคตिเคšाเคฐिเคค เค•เคฐเคจे เค•ी เค†เคตเคถ्เคฏเค•เคคा เค•ो เคธाเคฎเคจे เคฐเค–เคคी เคนै।

  • เค‡เคธเค•े เคฆृเคท्เคŸिเค•ोเคฃ เคฎें เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เคธเคฎเคจ्เคตเคฏ, เคจिเคท्เคชเค•्เคท เค†เคชूเคฐ्เคคि เคถ्เคฐृंเค–เคฒा, เค”เคฐ เคธ्เคฅाเคจीเคฏ เคธเคถเค•्เคคिเค•เคฐเคฃ เคœैเคธे เคฌिंเคฆु เคถाเคฎिเคฒ เคนैं।

  • เคœเคฌ เค‡เคธे IMF เค”เคฐ เค…เคจ्เคฏ เคธंเคธ्เคฅाเคจों เค•े เคธुเคงाเคฐों เค•े เคธाเคฅ เคœोเคก़ा เคœाเคคा เคนै, เคคो เคฏเคน เคเค• เคธเคฎाเคตेเคถी เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅा เค•ा เค–ाเค•ा เคฌเคจ เคœाเคคा เคนै।


⚠️ เคšुเคจौเคคिเคฏाँ

  • เค‡เคธ เคคเคฐเคน เค•ा เคฎौเคฒिเค• เคชुเคจเคฐ्เค—เค เคจ เคฌเคนुเคค เค•เค िเคจ เคนोเคคा เคนै—เค‡เคธเค•े เคฒिเค เคตिเคถ्เคตाเคธ, เคธเคนเคฏोเค— เค”เคฐ เคฐเคฃเคจीเคคिเค• เคเค•เคคा เค•ी เคœ़เคฐूเคฐเคค เคนोเคคी เคนै।

  • เค•ुเค› เคฆेเคถ เคฌ्เคฐेเคŸเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ เค•ो เคเค• เค”เคชเคจिเคตेเคถिเค• เค…เคตเคถेเคท เคฎाเคจเคคे เคนैं เค”เคฐ เคชूเคฐी เคคเคฐเคน เคจเคˆ เคธंเคธ्เคฅाเค“ं เค•ी เคฎाँเค— เค•เคฐเคคे เคนैं।

  • เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•े เคญीเคคเคฐ เคธे เคญी "เคฐाเคท्เคŸ्เคฐीเคฏ เคนिเคค เคชเคนเคฒे" เคตाเคฒी เคธोเคš เค‡เคธ เคธเคนเคฏोเค— เค•ो เค•เค िเคจ เคฌเคจा เคธเค•เคคी เคนै।


✅ เคจिเคท्เค•เคฐ्เคท: เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เคจेเคคृเคค्เคต เค•्เคฏों เค•เคฐเคจा เคšाเคนिเค?

เคฒเค•्เคท्เคฏ เคจเคฏा เคฌ्เคฐेเคŸเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ เค•्เคฏों?
เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เคฎांเค— เค•ो เคชूเคฐा เค•เคฐเคจा เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค˜ाเคŸे เค•ी เค†เคตเคถ्เคฏเค•เคคा เค•เคฎ เคนोเค—ी, เคŸ्เคฐिเคซिเคจ เคฆुเคตिเคงा เค•ा เคธเคฎाเคงाเคจ
เคจ्เคฏाเคฏเคชूเคฐ्เคฃ เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เคถ्เคฐเคฎ, เคชเคฐ्เคฏाเคตเคฐเคฃ เค”เคฐ เคธเคฎाเคจเคคा เค•े เคฎूเคฒ्เคฏों เค•ो เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เคฎें เคถाเคฎिเคฒ เค•เคฐเคจा
เคธंเคธ्เคฅाเค“ं เค•ा เค†เคงुเคจिเค•ीเค•เคฐเคฃ IMF/เคตिเคถ्เคต เคฌैंเค• เคฎें เคธुเคงाเคฐ เค”เคฐ เค…เคงिเค• เคช्เคฐเคคिเคจिเคงिเคค्เคต
เคญू-เคฐाเคœเคจीเคคिเค• เคธ्เคฅिเคฐเคคा เคฌเคนुเคชเค•्เคทीเคฏ เคธเคนเคฏोเค— เคฆ्เคตाเคฐा เคจเคˆ เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅा เค•ा เคจिเคฐ्เคฎाเคฃ

เคเค• เคจเคฏा เคฌ्เคฐेเคŸเคจ เคตुเคก्เคธ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ो เคฏเคน เคฎौเค•ा เคฆेเค—ा เค•ि เคตเคน เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เคต्เคฏเคตเคธ्เคฅा เค•ो เคจ्เคฏाเคฏเคชूเคฐ्เคฃ, เคธ्เคฅाเคฏी เค”เคฐ เคธเคฎाเคตेเคถी เคฆिเคถा เคฎें เคชुเคจเคฐ्เคชเคฐिเคญाเคทिเคค เค•เคฐे—เค”เคฐ เคธाเคฅ เคนी เค…เคชเคจी เคฎुเคฆ्เคฐा เค•ी เค•ेंเคฆ्เคฐीเคฏ เคญूเคฎिเค•ा เค”เคฐ เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เคจेเคคृเคค्เคต เค•ो เคธुเคฐเค•्เคทिเคค เคฐเค–े।





De-Dollarization Is Inevitable. The World Isn’t Prepared In late May, yields on U.S. Treasury bonds jumped to their highest level since 2023, after the House of Representatives passed sweeping tax cuts as part of President Donald Trump’s proposed budget. The higher effective interest rate on U.S. government borrowing reflected investors’ concerns over the fiscal impact of the bill, which if passed by the Senate and signed into law would add $3.8 trillion to the federal debt—currently at $36.2 trillion—over the coming decade, according to estimates by the Congressional Budget Office. ....... The convulsions in the U.S. bond market represent more than a momentary financial hiccup. They signal the early tremors of what JPMorgan’s Jamie Dimon called an impending “crack in the bond market” that could set off a potentially catastrophic realignment in the global economic order. As yields on long-term U.S. government debt surge past 5 percent, the international community is beginning to face the uncomfortable reality that the world’s hegemon is galloping toward a sovereign debt crisis with no clear resolution in sight. ............. Unlike previous sovereign debt crises that afflicted peripheral economies or even major European nations, however, the emerging U.S. fiscal crisis threatens the very foundation of the post-Bretton Woods international monetary system. Hanging in the balance are the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency, the Treasury market’s function as the world’s safe haven and the United States’ capacity to serve as the consumer of last resort. The implications extend to every central bank, sovereign wealth fund and international institution that has built its foundations on the assumption of U.S. fiscal stability. .............. The international ramifications of a U.S. fiscal crisis would dwarf any financial contagion witnessed in modern history. U.S. Treasury bonds serve multiple critical functions in the global financial system. They are the primary reserve asset for central banks, the preferred collateral for international transactions and the benchmark “risk-free” rate against which all other assets are priced. Approximately $9 trillion in Treasuries are held by foreign governments and investors, with almost a third of that sum being held by just three countries—Japan, the U.K. and China—alone. .......... A sustained loss of confidence in U.S. fiscal management would trigger a cascade of consequences. Should the price of Treasuries, which moves inversely to yields, fall precipitously, central banks around the world would face massive paper losses on their reserve holdings, potentially destabilizing their own currencies. The global banking system, which relies on Treasuries as high-quality collateral, would experience a severe liquidity crunch. Emerging markets, whose debt is often priced at a premium over U.S. Treasuries, would see borrowing costs skyrocket regardless of their own fiscal prudence. ............

The most troubling aspect of the United States’ fiscal trajectory is the apparent inability of its political system to correct course.

.................... The geopolitical implications are equally profound. A fiscally weakened United States would struggle to maintain its global military commitments, creating power vacuums that rival powers would eagerly fill. The dollar’s weaponization through sanctions—a key tool of U.S. foreign policy—would lose its potency, as countries accelerate efforts to build alternative payment systems. Already, China’s experiments with “digital yuan” cross-border settlements and expansion of bilateral currency swap agreements signal a world preparing for reduced dollar dependence. ............... Predictions of the dollar’s demise have circulated for decades, from the 1970s stagflation crisis through the 2008 global financial crisis. Each time, the dollar emerged stronger, benefiting from what Barry Eichengreen called its “exorbitant privilege”—the U.S. government’s ability to borrow in its own currency at preferential rates while other nations hold dollars as reserves. Critics sounding alarm bells about U.S. fiscal profligacy have consistently been proven wrong. So why should anyone believe this time is different? ............. When earlier predictions of dollar decline were made, U.S. debt-to-GDP ratios were a fraction of today’s levels—under 40 percent in the 1970s and around 65 percent before the 2008 crisis. Currently, that figure sits at 121 percent, or double the 60 percent benchmark widely considered to be fiscally sustainable. .................... More critically, in these earlier periods, the U.S. political system was still capable of bipartisan compromise on fiscal matters. The Social Security reform passed in 1983 and budget agreements negotiated in the 1990s demonstrated that U.S. democracy could still make hard choices when necessary. ............ Today’s political landscape offers no such hope. The hyper-partisanship that has paralyzed Washington shows no signs of abating. Primary systems that punish fiscal moderation and reward fiscal profligacy have created political incentives that virtually guarantee continued deterioration. Meanwhile, technological alternatives to the dollar system that didn’t exist during previous crises are rapidly maturing, from China’s digital yuan trials with trading partners to sophisticated currency swap networks.

Countries seeking to insulate themselves from U.S. financial sanctions are actively building the infrastructure for a post-dollar world.

................... Japan carries a staggering 250 percent debt-to-GDP ratio and is beginning to buckle under the pressure of its crushing debt. European nations, already struggling with high debt levels, now confront the need for dramatic increases in defense spending as U.S. security guarantees become unreliable. Meeting NATO’s target of 2 percent of GDP dedicated to defense spending would require European members to find tens of billions of additional euros annually, at a time when many are already running significant deficits. Worse still, the alliance is now close to agreeing to the Trump administration’s demand that it raise the defense spending target to 5 percent of GDP. Even China is grappling with a local government debt crisis and a property sector meltdown that threatens its financial stability. When everyone is fiscally stretched, the coordination needed to manage a crisis becomes nearly impossible. ........... The feedback loop now threatening to take hold follows a familiar pattern from previous sovereign debt crises elsewhere in the world, albeit at an unprecedented scale. As markets lose confidence in a country’s fiscal sustainability, they demand higher yields to compensate for the greater risk they are taking in buying sovereign debt. These higher borrowing costs worsen the nation’s fiscal position, further eroding investor confidence and driving yields higher still.

In emerging markets, this spiral typically ends with intervention by the International Monetary Fund and painful structural adjustment. For the world’s largest economy and reserve currency issuer, no such external stabilizer exists.

......................... The Social Security pension program’s trust fund will run dry in 2033, after which benefit cuts of approximately 20 percent—considered the “third rail” of U.S. politics—automatically kick in. The Medicare low-income health insurance program confronts similar pressures three years thereafter, in 2036. Added to this is the fact that, when these crises hit, the U.S. can expect to be spending around $2 trillion annually on interest payments alone at current projections. .............. the U.S. now relies on immigration as the primary driver of population growth. However,

amid U.S. political dysfunction, societal polarization and the Trump administration’s overtly xenophobic policies, the country is likely to be increasingly unattractive to potential immigrants, meaning it will be severing this demographic lifeline just when it’s needed most. Should immigration continue to decline, the entitlement math becomes even more catastrophic.

................... While the entitlement crises of 2033-2036 represent structural breaking points, several near-term developments could trigger a crisis much sooner. As evidenced by last month’s tremors, the Treasury market is already showing signs of stress. Weak auctions, in which demand barely covers the debt on offer and yields spike to attract sufficient buyers, have become more frequent. The return of “bond vigilantes,” who sell off their Treasury holdings to register their disapproval of U.S. fiscal policy, could begin forcing yields sharply higher, requiring primary dealers—banks and securities brokers that buy Treasuries directly from the Fed to sell on to individual investors—to absorb an unusually large share. ............ The psychological threshold of 5 percent yields on 10-year Treasuries has already been breached multiple times. Should yields settle above 6 percent—a level last seen in the runup to the 2008 financial crisis—the feedback loop between higher borrowing costs and deteriorating fiscal metrics could quickly become self-reinforcing. ................... Standard & Poor’s already downgraded U.S. debt from its AAA rating back in 2011, with Fitch following suit in 2023. Moody’s completed the trifecta last month, stripping the U.S. of its last AAA rating. With all three major agencies now rating U.S. debt below perfect, forced selling by institutions mandated to own only AAA-rated securities, such as pension funds and public employee unions, has already begun. ...........

U.S. sovereign risk is now comparable to countries with BBB+ ratings like Italy and Greece

, a striking disconnect from official ratings that reveals how markets truly assess U.S. fiscal sustainability. ................ The most troubling aspect of the United States’ fiscal trajectory is the apparent inability of its political system to correct course. Any serious fiscal consolidation would require both significant tax increases and entitlement reform, a combination that has become politically radioactive. The last serious attempt at such a fiscal grand bargain came in 2011, during the administration of then-President Barack Obama, and it failed. Since then, both parties have retreated to their respective corners, with Republicans refusing to countenance tax increases and Democrats protecting entitlement programs from any meaningful reform. ............ The world’s economic architecture remains anchored to a hegemon that lacks the political capacity for fiscal self-correction. This recognition should prompt urgent consideration of how to manage an orderly transition away from dollar dependence rather than awaiting an inevitable and chaotic collapse. .............. In the face of these daunting fiscal realities, many market participants cling to scenarios that might avert catastrophe. Chief among these is the hope for a tech-driven productivity boom that could generate enough growth to outrun the debt spiral. Yet even if artificial intelligence, or AI, delivers on its most optimistic promises, the timeline for such transformation extends well beyond the 2033-2036 entitlement crisis window. .......... More troublingly, mounting evidence suggests the AI revolution may itself be a bubble. And even if it does eventually pay dividends, the historical precedents of previous “frontier” technologies—like railroads, automobiles and the dotcom bubble—suggest there will be massive over-investment, with only a few firms surviving into the mature phase of adoption. Should the current AI investment mania collapse, taking trillions of dollars in market capitalization with it, the fiscal crisis would accelerate dramatically just when the economy could least afford another shock............ the notion that the Federal Reserve could simply monetize the debt through unlimited money-printing ignores both the inflationary consequences of doing so and the damage it would do to the dollar’s reserve status. The Bank of Japan’s decades-long experiment with monetary expansion has only been possible because of Japan’s unique economic characteristics—high domestic savings, persistent deflation and current account surpluses—none of which apply to the United States. ............

The choice facing the international community is not whether to end the dollar’s privileged position but whether that end comes through careful preparation or catastrophic crisis.

.............. the pound sterling’s decline from premier reserve currency status took several decades and was managed without systemic collapse. However, that transition benefited from an obvious successor currency in the dollar and a cooperative relationship between the U.K. and U.S. as the declining and rising powers, respectively. Today’s interconnected financial system, the scale of dollar dependence and the absence of a clear alternative all suggest we may not have the luxury of such a gradual, orderly transition. ............. The challenges to de-dollarization remain formidable. Network effects make the dollar’s dominance self-reinforcing—everyone uses dollars because everyone else uses dollars. No alternative currency matches the depth and liquidity of U.S. Treasury markets. The euro suffers from structural flaws exposed during the sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s. The yuan remains hobbled by capital controls and political risk. Yet these very challenges make preparation more urgent, not less. .................. The IMF’s Special Drawing Rights—based on a basket of currencies and used as a unit of account and settlement among its member states—never achieved critical mass since their introduction in 1969, because they offered no advantages over dollars for most transactions. Regional payment systems like the Asian Clearing Union remained marginal because they couldn’t match the dollar’s convenience and acceptability. But multiple factors suggest the next attempts might succeed where others failed. .................. digital currency technology enables instantaneous, low-cost multicurrency transactions that weren’t possible in previous eras. Central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs, could enable efficient settlement systems that reduce reliance on dollar intermediation. China’s digital yuan trials demonstrate the potential for technology to accelerate monetary transformation, particularly as countries seek to insulate themselves from U.S. financial sanctions. A basket-based digital settlement system, perhaps administered by the IMF or a new international institution, could provide stability while reducing single-currency dependence. ........... the sheer scale of countries now seeking alternatives to the dollar creates momentum that didn’t exist before. The BRICS nations, representing 40 percent of the world’s population and over a third of global GDP, are actively developing alternative payment mechanisms. Their New Development Bank, while still small, provides a template for non-dollar development finance. As more countries join these initiatives, network effects could begin working against the dollar rather than for it. ............... the private sector is increasingly hedging against dollar risk. Major commodity traders are experimenting with yuan-denominated contracts. Corporate treasurers are developing multi-currency cash-management systems. All these micro-level adaptations could help accelerate macro-level change when crisis hits by providing a number of alternatives to the status quo. ............ For U.S. allies, this transition presents acute dilemmas. Countries like Japan, South Korea and the European NATO members must balance their security dependence on Washington with the need to protect their economic interests from U.S. fiscal instability. This may require uncomfortable conversations about burden-sharing and the development of regional security arrangements that could fill the vacuum left behind as the U.S. military’s capacity diminishes. With the Trump administration already undermining confidence in Washington’s security commitments, this task becomes all the more urgent. ............. The warning signs of U.S. fiscal instability are multiplying, from debt-ratings downgrades to surging yields on Treasuries. Yet the global financial architecture remains as dollar-dependent as ever, creating a dangerous mismatch between emerging risks and institutional preparedness. ........ Policymakers worldwide must begin not just planning for a post-dollar monetary order but actively constructing one. This doesn’t require abandoning the dollar immediately or indulging in wishful thinking about its demise. Rather, it demands pragmatic preparation for a transition that appears increasingly inevitable. Central banks, which are diversifying their reserves into gold at the fastest pace in decades, should do so even more aggressively. Financial institutions should stress-test for dollar disruption scenarios. International bodies should accelerate work on alternative payment and settlement mechanisms. .......... This transition need not be disorderly. With sufficient foresight and cooperation, the world could evolve toward a more balanced, multipolar monetary system that actually enhances stability. But this requires acknowledging that the current trajectory is unsustainable and that waiting for U.S. political dysfunction to self-correct is a recipe for disaster. ............. The question now is whether the international community will act on this recognition or continue moving toward a preventable catastrophe. The bond market is already beginning to vote with its feet. The rest of the world would be wise to follow suit—not in panic, but in prudent preparation for a new monetary order. .............. Nicholas Creel is an associate professor of business law and ethics at Georgia College & State University.

Monday, June 30, 2025

The US Dollar's Special Place

 



The U.S. dollar became the de facto global currency due to a mix of historical events, economic dominance, and structural advantages. Here's a breakdown of the key factors:


1. Bretton Woods System (1944)

  • After WWII, 44 Allied nations agreed to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar, which was backed by gold.

  • The U.S. held the vast majority of global gold reserves, making it the most stable and trusted currency.

  • Although the gold standard was abandoned in 1971 (Nixon Shock), the dollar's central role persisted.


2. Size and Stability of the U.S. Economy

  • The U.S. has been the world's largest or second-largest economy for over a century.

  • It boasts deep, liquid, and open capital markets, especially for U.S. Treasury bonds.

  • The U.S. political system, despite flaws, has historically offered legal predictability and property protections.


3. Dollar-Denominated Trade

  • Oil and commodities are mostly priced and traded in dollars (petrodollar system).

  • Countries need dollars to buy oil, incentivizing them to hold dollar reserves.

  • Many global contracts and loans (e.g., for developing countries) are in dollars.


4. U.S. Treasury Securities as Safe Assets

  • Central banks around the world hold U.S. Treasury bonds as a reserve asset because they’re liquid and safe.

  • The U.S. government has never defaulted on its debt (though political standoffs occasionally threaten it).

  • This makes dollar-denominated assets the global "safe haven" during crises.


5. Global Confidence and Network Effects

  • Once the dollar became dominant, it created path dependency—most people and countries use it because others already do.

  • The dollar is used in over 80% of international trade transactions.

  • It's held as reserves by most central banks (60%+ of global foreign exchange reserves).


6. U.S. Military and Geopolitical Power

  • U.S. global military reach and strategic alliances reinforce trust in its system.

  • The U.S. can enforce sanctions and control access to the dollar-based SWIFT system, giving it powerful leverage.


7. Lack of Viable Alternatives

  • The euro lacks political and fiscal unity.

  • The Chinese yuan is not fully convertible and China’s capital markets are not as open.

  • Gold and cryptocurrencies are too volatile or impractical for most global trade.


Summary:

The U.S. dollar dominates because of a historical head start, economic strength, financial infrastructure, and global trust—not because it's perfect, but because nothing better has yet emerged.


 


While the U.S. enjoys significant benefits from the dollar’s status as the de facto global currency, there are also serious disadvantages—some subtle, some structural. Here's a breakdown:


๐Ÿ”ด 1. Trade Deficits: The "Dollar Trap"

  • The global demand for dollars forces the U.S. to run persistent trade deficits—it must export dollars to the world.

  • This often means importing more than it exports, hollowing out U.S. manufacturing over decades.

  • It’s a paradox: for the world to hold dollars, the U.S. must supply them—usually by buying foreign goods.

Result: Loss of industrial base, fewer manufacturing jobs, regional economic decline.


๐Ÿ”ด 2. Strong Dollar Hurts U.S. Exports

  • Global demand for dollars often drives up its value.

  • A strong dollar makes U.S. goods more expensive abroad, hurting American exporters.

  • It also makes imports cheaper, discouraging domestic production.


๐Ÿ”ด 3. Asset Bubbles and Financialization

  • As dollars pour into U.S. capital markets, they inflate asset prices (stocks, bonds, real estate).

  • Encourages financial speculation over productive investment in infrastructure or R&D.

  • Increases wealth inequality by enriching those who own capital assets.


๐Ÿ”ด 4. Dollar Weaponization Risks Blowback

  • The U.S. uses the dollar’s dominance for sanctions and financial pressure, which can be effective short-term.

  • But it incentivizes other countries to create alternatives (e.g. BRICS payment systems, CBDCs, gold settlements).

  • Overuse could undermine long-term dollar trust.


๐Ÿ”ด 5. “Exorbitant Burden” of Responsibility

  • The U.S. Federal Reserve sets policy for domestic needs—but its decisions impact the entire global economy.

  • A rate hike to fight U.S. inflation may trigger currency collapses or debt crises in developing countries.


๐Ÿ”ด 6. Global Financial Imbalances

  • The dollar system contributes to a two-tiered global economy where rich countries control currency flows.

  • It often traps developing countries in dollar debt cycles, requiring austerity or IMF bailouts.

  • This creates moral pressure on the U.S. to act as a global lender or crisis manager.


๐Ÿ”ด 7. False Sense of Security

  • The U.S. can borrow cheaply because the world demands dollars.

  • This may encourage fiscal irresponsibility, growing the national debt without immediate consequences.

  • Eventually, that trust could erode if deficits become unsustainable or if alternatives to the dollar take hold.


Summary:

The U.S. dollar’s global role boosts U.S. financial power—but it comes at a cost to exports, industry, and stability, while inviting backlash from rivals. It’s a double-edged sword: enormous influence, but growing long-term vulnerability.




A multipolar currency world is already emerging. While the U.S. dollar remains dominant, several realistic scenarios point toward a future with multiple global currencies used for trade, reserves, and settlements.


๐Ÿ”„ SCENARIO: A Multipolar Currency System

In this world:

  • The U.S. dollar still plays a key role.

  • But the euro, yuan, and others share the stage.

  • Trade, reserves, and investment flows become more diversified.

  • Power is more balanced — both economically and politically.


๐Ÿงญ Key Drivers of Multipolarity

1. Geopolitical Realignments

  • U.S.-led sanctions (e.g., on Russia and Iran) have pushed countries to seek dollar alternatives.

  • China and Russia are actively reducing dollar dependence in bilateral trade.

  • BRICS countries are discussing a common settlement currency backed by a basket of commodities.

2. Technological Disruption (CBDCs & Blockchain)

  • Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) from China, India, and others can bypass SWIFT and reduce dollar reliance.

  • Blockchain-based stablecoins or commodity-backed tokens can settle international trade instantly without needing dollars.

3. Growing Currency Blocs

  • Euro already accounts for ~20% of global reserves.

  • The Chinese yuan is being internationalized through the Belt and Road Initiative and swap lines.

  • Gulf countries and ASEAN are exploring regional payment systems, often linked to local currencies.

4. U.S. Overreach and Trust Erosion

  • Weaponization of the dollar (e.g., freezing reserves) has made other countries wary.

  • Holding too many dollars feels risky if geopolitical tensions rise.


๐Ÿงฎ How It Might Work

Use Case USD Euro Yuan Others
Energy Trade ✓✓✓ ✓✓
Reserves ✓✓✓ ✓✓
Bilateral Deals ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓
Tourism/Travel ✓✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓
Debt Issuance ✓✓✓ ✓✓

No single currency dominates across all domains. Instead, a flexible ecosystem emerges.


⚠️ Challenges to Multipolarity

  • Network effects: Most systems, banks, and contracts are dollar-based.

  • Liquidity: Dollar markets are deep; other currencies can’t yet match.

  • Trust and convertibility: The yuan, for example, is not fully convertible and China has capital controls.

  • Political unity: The euro lacks a centralized fiscal union; BRICS lack cohesion.


๐Ÿ”ฎ Future Scenarios

  1. Gradual Decentralization

    • Dollar use shrinks slowly; others rise.

    • CBDCs reduce frictions in non-dollar trade.

  2. Regional Currency Zones

    • Africa, Latin America, and Asia develop regional currencies or stablecoin networks.

  3. Tokenized Trade & Commodities

    • Gold-, oil-, or carbon-backed tokens facilitate neutral, trustless settlement systems.


✅ Conclusion

A multipolar currency world is not only possible — it's already forming. The process will be gradual and uneven, but the dollar’s monopoly is weakening, and currency diversity is becoming a strategic imperative in a fragmented, deglobalizing world.




John Maynard Keynes's idea from 1944 may actually have been the best model for global trade: a neutral, global currency not controlled by any single country.


๐Ÿง  Keynes’s 1944 Proposal: The Bancor

At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, Keynes proposed creating an international clearing union (ICU) with a global unit of account called the bancor.

๐Ÿ“Œ Key Features:

  • The bancor would not be a national currency like the dollar or pound.

  • It would be used only for international trade settlements, not for domestic transactions.

  • Countries would hold bancor accounts at a global central bank (the ICU).

  • Trade imbalances would be automatically corrected by penalizing both surplus and deficit countries.


๐ŸŒ Why the Bancor Was a Brilliant Idea for Global Trade

1. Neutrality

  • It avoids giving disproportionate power to one country (as happened with the dollar).

  • The global economy wouldn't depend on the domestic policy or deficits of the reserve currency issuer.

2. Balanced Trade Incentives

  • Keynes didn’t just want to punish deficit countries (like IMF austerity does).

  • He also wanted surplus countries (like China today or the U.S. post-WWII) to spend more or invest abroad to rebalance trade.

  • This discourages hoarding of foreign reserves and encourages fair trade.

3. No Need for Dollar Hoarding

  • Developing countries wouldn't need to accumulate billions in dollar reserves "just in case."

  • Less pressure to run export surpluses purely to get hard currency.

4. Reduced Global Imbalances

  • The bancor system would have automatic adjustments: limits on how much surplus or deficit a country could build up.

  • That could prevent crises like the Eurozone imbalance, or the U.S.-China trade gap.


๐Ÿ”ด Why It Didn’t Happen

  • The U.S., emerging from WWII as the dominant power, rejected it.

  • It insisted on using the U.S. dollar (tied to gold) as the backbone of the new global financial system.

  • As a result, global trade became dependent on the monetary and fiscal policy of one country — the U.S.


⚖️ What’s Best for Global Trade Today?

System Pros Cons
Dollar Hegemony Deep liquidity, stability Biased, creates global imbalances
Multipolar System Flexibility, competition Complexity, fragmentation
Bancor/Neutral Currency Fair, balanced, stable Needs global governance and trust

In principle, Keynes’s idea remains the most equitable and sustainable — especially in a world of multipolar powers (U.S., China, EU, BRICS). But it would require unprecedented international cooperation and a new global institution to administer it.


๐Ÿงฉ What Could a Modern Bancor Look Like?

  • Blockchain-based token issued by a global institution (e.g. a reformed IMF or a new BRICS+ clearing union)

  • Backed by a basket of currencies or commodities

  • Used only for cross-border settlements

  • With built-in rules to automatically penalize excessive trade surpluses and deficits


✅ Conclusion

Keynes’s bancor was ahead of its time — a neutral global reserve currency that promotes balanced trade. In an age of dollar fatigue and rising economic nationalism, a modernized version of the bancor could be the ideal framework for fair, sustainable global trade.




The Trump administration's desire to:

  1. Maintain the U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency, and

  2. Simultaneously achieve balanced trade with every single country,
    is inherently self-defeating. It's a classic case of wanting to have your cake and eat it too.


๐Ÿง  Why This Is a Contradiction

๐Ÿ”ต Reserve Currency Role Requires Trade Deficits

  • For the dollar to function as the world’s primary currency, the U.S. must export dollars to the rest of the world.

  • That usually happens through running trade deficits—importing more than it exports.

  • Countries need dollars to buy oil, repay debt, and build reserves. If the U.S. insists on balanced trade with each country, where would the world get those dollars?

๐Ÿ” Global dollar demand requires a U.S. trade deficit.


๐Ÿ”ด Bilateral Trade Balancing Undermines the System

  • The Trump-era strategy of bilateral trade negotiations (vs. multilateral frameworks like the WTO) ignores the reality of multilateral trade imbalances.

  • A country like Germany may run a big surplus with the U.S., but a deficit with China. The trade system is circular, not bilateral.

  • Trying to impose 1-to-1 balance with every partner is economically incoherent in a globally networked economy.


⚖️ Example: Dollar Hegemony vs. Balanced Trade

Policy Goal Implication
Preserve global dollar role Must keep trade deficits flowing to supply global demand
Balanced trade with all nations Implies trade surpluses or zero-sum balancing, which would reduce global dollar circulation

They cancel each other out.


๐Ÿ›️ WTO Dismantling Makes It Worse

  • The WTO helps manage global trade under predictable rules. Its weakening under Trump increased trade uncertainty and undermined multilateral discipline.

  • Without a rules-based system, big countries can bully small ones, and currency manipulation and retaliation rise.

  • Ironically, this undermines trust in the dollar, especially if the U.S. itself is seen as destabilizing global trade norms.


๐ŸŽฏ Bottom Line

Yes — Trump’s trade and currency objectives are deeply at odds:

  • You can run global deficits to supply the world with dollars, or you can balance trade bilaterally, but not both.

  • You can dominate a rules-based system, or you can tear it down and go bilateral, but doing both makes the system weaker and less likely to support dollar supremacy.

In short, you can't run a global monetary system and a nationalist trade regime at the same time.






Grounded Greatness: The Case For Smart Surface Transit In Future Cities
The Garden Of Last Debates (novel)
Deported (novel)
Empty Country (novel)
Trump’s Default: The Mist Of Empire (novel)
The 20% Growth Revolution: Nepal’s Path to Prosperity Through Kalkiism
Rethinking Trade: A Blueprint for a Just and Thriving Global Economy
The $500 Billion Pivot: How the India-US Alliance Can Reshape Global Trade
Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
Formula For Peace In Ukraine
A 2T Cut
Are We Frozen in Time?: Tech Progress, Social Stagnation
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

Tuesday, April 29, 2025

The Global Push for Dedollarization

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

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The global financial landscape is undergoing a significant transformation as countries actively pursue dedollarization strategies to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. This shift is driven by geopolitical tensions, economic considerations, and technological advancements, signaling a move toward a multipolar currency system. (Tether is betting big on the U.S. dollar. Why it faces challenges from Trump's tariffs.)


๐ŸŒ The Global Push for Dedollarization

Historically, the U.S. dollar has dominated international trade and finance. However, recent developments indicate a concerted effort by various nations to diversify their currency usage:

  • China: Accelerating the internationalization of the yuan, China has expanded its currency swap agreements, promoted the use of the yuan in cross-border transactions, and enhanced its financial infrastructure to support yuan-based settlements. (China ramps up global yuan push, seizing on retreating dollar)

  • BRICS Nations: Countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are increasingly conducting trade in their local currencies. For instance, Brazil and China have initiated trade settlements in yuan and reais, reducing dependence on the dollar.

  • Europe: The European Union is exploring the development of a digital euro to enhance monetary sovereignty and reduce reliance on U.S.-based payment systems. This initiative aims to provide a secure and efficient alternative for cross-border transactions within the Eurozone. (The battle for the global payments system is under way)


๐Ÿ”„ Bilateral Currency Agreements

Several countries have established bilateral agreements to facilitate trade in their respective currencies:

  • China and Russia: In response to Western sanctions, these nations have increased the use of the yuan and ruble in bilateral trade, fostering financial cooperation and reducing exposure to the dollar.

  • India and the UAE: These countries have agreed to conduct trade in rupees and dirhams, streamlining transactions and minimizing currency conversion costs.

Such agreements enhance economic resilience and reflect a broader trend of diversifying currency usage in international trade.


๐Ÿ“ˆ Emerging Currencies Gaining Traction

As the dollar's dominance faces challenges, several currencies are poised to gain prominence over the next 10–20 years: (Digital (De)Dollarization? - Morgan Stanley)

  • Chinese Yuan (CNY): With China's growing economic influence and strategic initiatives, the yuan is increasingly used in global trade and finance.

  • Euro (EUR): The euro remains a strong contender, especially with efforts to deepen financial integration within the Eurozone.

  • Digital Currencies: Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are emerging as potential game-changers, offering efficient and secure transaction methods that could reshape global finance.


๐Ÿ’ป Technological Advancements Driving Change

Technology plays a pivotal role in facilitating dedollarization:

  • CBDCs: Over 130 countries are exploring or developing CBDCs to modernize payment systems and enhance monetary sovereignty. (Trump could spur central banks to adopt digital coins: Peacock)

  • Blockchain and Digital Platforms: Innovations like China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and the mBridge project aim to streamline international settlements, reducing reliance on traditional dollar-based systems.

These technological advancements offer alternatives to the existing financial infrastructure, enabling countries to conduct transactions more efficiently and independently.


๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ China's Digital Yuan: A Strategic Move

China's digital yuan (e-CNY) is at the forefront of its dedollarization strategy. By leveraging blockchain technology, the digital yuan facilitates secure and efficient transactions, both domestically and internationally. China's efforts to promote the e-CNY in cross-border trade and its integration into global payment systems underscore its commitment to reducing dollar dependence. (China just Launched Full De-dollarization with $1.2 ... - YouTube, US and China increasingly at odds over crypto, China ramps up global yuan push, seizing on retreating dollar)


⏳ Timeline and Outlook

While the U.S. dollar remains dominant, the momentum toward a multipolar currency system is undeniable. Over the next two decades, the combined impact of geopolitical shifts, economic strategies, and technological innovations is expected to gradually diminish the dollar's supremacy, paving the way for a more diversified and resilient global financial architecture. (de-dollarization: Trump threat of 100% tariff: Does the US have ...)


For a deeper understanding of China's dedollarization efforts, you may find the following video insightful:

(China just Launched Full De-dollarization with $1.2 Trillion Dollar E-Yuan. Ends SWIFT!)


Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

Thursday, April 17, 2025

The Currency Stalemate: How U.S. and China’s Rigid Stands Threaten Global Economic Balance

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption

The Currency Stalemate: How U.S. and China’s Rigid Stands Threaten Global Economic Balance

The global financial system is caught in a quiet but profound tug-of-war. On one side is the United States, fiercely guarding the U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s dominant reserve currency. On the other is China, aggressively pushing for dedollarization without making the structural reforms necessary for the yuan to step into that role. Both nations are clinging to contradictory and ultimately self-defeating currency policies—and the rest of the world, especially the poorest countries, may pay the price.

The Dollar’s Double-Edged Sword

America has long benefited from the dollar’s position as the de facto global currency. It allows the U.S. to borrow at lower costs, run massive deficits, and print money with relatively low inflationary consequences. More than military might, diplomacy, or even GDP, this financial supremacy is the cornerstone of American global power.

But this “exorbitant privilege” comes with an economic trade-off: chronic trade deficits. When you export your currency—because the world needs dollars for trade and reserves—you inevitably import goods and services. This structural imbalance has hollowed out parts of U.S. industry and fueled political backlash, even as it underwrites the global financial system.

China’s Currency Conundrum

Meanwhile, China aspires to chip away at dollar dominance. Through initiatives like the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), the digital yuan, and trade deals settled in renminbi (RMB), Beijing is laying the groundwork for a multipolar currency world. But there’s a fundamental contradiction at the heart of China’s ambition: the yuan is not fully convertible.

Capital controls remain tight. The value of the yuan is managed, often kept artificially low to favor exports—a cornerstone of China’s economic rise. But this very strategy undermines global trust in the yuan as a freely usable international currency. Until China opens its capital account and allows the market to determine the RMB’s value, its global aspirations will remain largely symbolic.

The Global Impasse

What we’re witnessing is a global currency system trapped by two immovable giants:

  • The U.S. won’t sacrifice dollar dominance, even though it leads to unsustainable trade imbalances and financial vulnerabilities.

  • China won’t liberalize the yuan, even though it limits the currency’s international reach and credibility.

This stalemate creates volatility in emerging markets, limits monetary policy options for poorer countries, and perpetuates an unstable, lopsided global order. In a world increasingly marked by regional blocs and shifting trade alliances, this rigidity does not serve the interests of global stability.

A Call for Reform

If neither Washington nor Beijing is willing to move, perhaps it’s time for the rest of the world—especially the Global South—to push for a more balanced system. This could include:

  • Expanded use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) through the IMF.

  • Regional currency unions.

  • Multilateral payment systems independent of dollar or yuan hegemony.

  • A diversified reserve currency basket, rather than a single dominant currency.

The world is overdue for a new currency architecture—one that reflects a more multipolar, interconnected, and equitable global economy. But until the U.S. relinquishes some control and China embraces reform, the rest of the world remains caught in a financial no-man’s-land.

And that’s a recipe for continued instability—especially for those with the least margin for error.

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption

Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption

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