Barackface: Operation Sindoor: The Details

Tuesday, May 27, 2025

Operation Sindoor: The Details

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Operation Sindoor was a significant Indian military operation launched on May 7, 2025, in response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack on April 22, 2025, which killed 26 civilians, mostly Hindu tourists, in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Below is a detailed analysis based on available information, with a critical examination of the sources and their implications.

Details of Operation Sindoor

Operation Sindoor was a series of precision missile and air strikes targeting nine terrorist infrastructure sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PoK). The operation was executed by the Indian Armed Forces, involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force, using Rafale aircraft armed with SCALP missiles and AASM Hammer glide bombs, alongside long-range drones and loitering munitions. The strikes occurred over a 23-minute period starting around 1:00 AM on May 7, 2025. Key details include:

Targets: Nine sites were hit, five in PoK (e.g., Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Barnala camp in Bhimber, Abbas camp, Mehmoona Joya) and four in Pakistan’s Punjab province (e.g., Bahawalpur, Muridke, Shakar Garh, a village near Sialkot). These were identified as operational hubs and training camps of terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM). Notable targets included Markaz-e-Taiba in Muridke (LeT’s headquarters) and Jamia Masjid Subhan Allah in Bahawalpur (JeM’s base).
Casualties: India claimed over 100 terrorists were killed, including high-value targets like Yusuf Azhar, Abdul Malik Rauf, and Mudasir Ahmed, linked to past attacks like the 1999 IC814 hijacking and the 2019 Pulwama bombing. Pakistan reported at least 31 civilian deaths, including women and children, and 57 injuries, claiming strikes hit civilian areas like mosques.
Execution: The operation was described as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory,” avoiding Pakistani military or civilian infrastructure to minimize escalation risks. India used stand-off weapons to strike from its own territory, exposing gaps in Pakistan’s air defense systems.
Symbolism: The name “Sindoor” (vermilion, a red pigment used by married Hindu women) referenced the Pahalgam attack, where gunmen targeted Hindu men, leaving their wives widowed. This was a deliberate nod to the cultural and emotional impact of the attack.

What Makes Operation Sindoor Stand Out?

Operation Sindoor marks a significant evolution in India’s counterterrorism strategy, distinguishing it from previous operations like the 2016 Uri surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot airstrike:

Depth and Scope: Unlike Uri (ground-based, limited to PoK) and Balakot (a single airstrike), Sindoor involved deep strikes into mainland Pakistan, including Punjab, a region previously considered untouchable due to escalation risks. Targeting LeT and JeM headquarters in Muridke and Bahawalpur signaled a willingness to hit high-value terrorist infrastructure directly.
Material Impact: Sindoor aimed to degrade terrorist capabilities, not just send a symbolic message. The reported deaths of key figures, including ten members of JeM chief Masood Azhar’s family, and the destruction of operational hubs disrupted terrorist networks significantly.
Strategic Shift: It established a new doctrine of “deterrence by punishment,” moving away from restraint to proactive, calibrated retaliation. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s May 12 speech framed Sindoor as a “new benchmark,” rejecting Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship as a deterrent.
Global Narrative: Unlike past conflicts where India faced calls for restraint, Sindoor garnered support from major powers for its anti-terrorism stance, reframing the Kashmir issue as a terrorism problem rather than a bilateral dispute.
Technological Precision: The use of advanced weaponry and India’s Akashteer Air Defence System (which intercepted Pakistani drones and missiles) showcased technological superiority, enhancing India’s global military credibility.

Comparison to American and Israeli Operations Against Terrorism

Operation Sindoor shares similarities with U.S. and Israeli counterterrorism operations but also has distinct differences due to India’s geopolitical context and constraints:

Similarities with U.S. Operations:
- Precision Strikes: Like U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Yemen (e.g., targeting al-Qaeda leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022), Sindoor used stand-off weapons for precision, minimizing collateral damage. India’s use of SCALP missiles mirrors U.S. reliance on Hellfire missiles for targeted killings.
- Intelligence-Driven: Both rely heavily on intelligence to identify high-value targets. U.S. operations often involve SIGINT (signals intelligence) and HUMINT (human intelligence), while India likely used similar methods to pinpoint terror camps.
- Global Messaging: The U.S. frames its strikes as part of a global war on terror, a narrative India adopted by emphasizing zero tolerance for terrorism, gaining international support.
Similarities with Israeli Operations:
- “Mowing the Grass” Doctrine: Israel’s strategy of regular, preemptive strikes against Hamas or Hezbollah to degrade capabilities closely resembles Sindoor’s aim to attrite terrorist infrastructure. India’s operation mirrors Israel’s focus on disrupting operational cycles, forcing adversaries to prioritize evasion over aggression.
- Deep Strikes: Israel’s strikes deep into Lebanon or Syria (e.g., targeting Hezbollah commanders) parallel India’s willingness to hit Punjab, challenging Pakistan’s sense of impunity.
- Leadership Decapitation: Sindoor’s reported near-miss on Masood Azhar and deaths of his family members echo Israel’s targeted killings of militant leaders to sow fear and disrupt command structures.
Differences:
- Geopolitical Constraints: Unlike the U.S., which operates globally with less risk of retaliation, India faces a nuclear-armed neighbor, requiring careful calibration to avoid escalation. Israel’s operations also occur in a less nuclearized context, though it faces similar regional tensions.
- Scale and Frequency: U.S. and Israeli operations are more frequent and sustained (e.g., U.S. drone campaigns in Pakistan’s FATA region from 2004–2018 or Israel’s near-weekly strikes in Gaza). Sindoor was a one-off, large-scale operation, reflecting India’s cautious approach.
- Domestic Pressure: India’s strikes were driven by public outrage over the Pahalgam attack, unlike the U.S., where operations are often less tied to domestic sentiment. Israel shares India’s public-driven urgency but has more institutional continuity in its approach.

What Does PM Modi Mean by “Operation Sindoor Is Not Over Yet”?

When PM Modi stated that Operation Sindoor is “not over yet,” he likely signaled a sustained, multi-phase approach to counterterrorism, not necessarily implying immediate further strikes. This could mean:

Continued Operations: Phase 1 of Sindoor targeted infrastructure; future phases could involve additional strikes, covert operations, or diplomatic pressure, depending on Pakistan’s response. Sources suggest India is prepared for further action if Pakistan escalates.
Long-Term Doctrine: Modi’s statement reflects a new “normal” where India defaults to military responses against terrorism, as articulated in his May 12 speech. This could include proactive measures like intelligence-driven strikes or economic sanctions.
Domestic Messaging: The statement reinforces Modi’s image as a strong leader committed to eradicating terrorism, maintaining public support amid heightened tensions.

Will India Keep Striking Pakistan-Based Terror Groups? Inside Pakistan? Outside Pakistan?

India’s future actions depend on strategic, political, and operational factors:

Inside Pakistan: India is likely to continue targeting terror groups in Pakistan and PoK if credible intelligence confirms imminent threats. Sindoor’s success in penetrating Pakistani air defenses and hitting mainland targets suggests India has the capability and willingness to strike again, especially if groups like LeT or JeM plan further attacks. However, nuclear risks and international pressure may limit the frequency and scale.
Outside Pakistan: India may pursue terrorists beyond Pakistan, particularly in third countries where groups like LeT have networks (e.g., Bangladesh, UAE, or Southeast Asia). This could involve covert operations, extradition requests, or cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, though such actions are less likely to be publicized.
Policy Shift: Sindoor’s doctrine of “deterrence by punishment” suggests India will prioritize preemptive or retaliatory strikes over restraint, but only with precise intelligence to avoid escalation. The operation’s success may embolden India to act more frequently, though calibrated to avoid all-out war.

Indian Intelligence Capabilities

India’s intelligence capabilities, critical to operations like Sindoor, are robust but face challenges:

Agencies Involved: The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) handles external intelligence, while the Intelligence Bureau (IB) focuses on domestic threats. The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) provides SIGINT and satellite imagery, and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) supports military operations.
Strengths:
- HUMINT and SIGINT: India has extensive HUMINT networks in Pakistan and PoK, as evidenced by precise targeting of terror camps. NTRO’s satellite and drone surveillance capabilities supported Sindoor’s target selection.
- Coordination: The operation’s success reflects improved inter-agency coordination, with RAW, IB, and DIA likely working together to identify high-value targets like Masood Azhar’s family.
- Global Reach: India’s cooperation with agencies like the CIA, MI6, and Mossad enhances its ability to track terrorists abroad, though less effectively than in South Asia.
Weaknesses:
- Anticipation Failures: The Pahalgam attack exposed gaps in predictive intelligence, as India failed to anticipate the assault despite increased tourism in Kashmir.
- Dynamic Targeting: Sindoor hit known, static targets like Muridke and Bahawalpur. Tracking mobile terrorists or hidden cadres requires enhanced real-time intelligence, an area where India lags behind the U.S. and Israel.
Small-Scale Strike Capabilities:
- India has limited experience with small-team, super-precise strikes (e.g., Mossad-style assassinations). The 2016 Uri surgical strikes involved special forces, but Sindoor relied on air and missile strikes, suggesting a preference for stand-off operations.
- RAW and special forces units like the Para SF could conduct covert targeted killings, but this requires exceptional HUMINT and real-time tracking, areas where India is improving but not yet at Israel’s level. The lack of publicized covert operations suggests limited current capability or a preference for secrecy.

Where Does the Pakistani State Stand?

The Pakistani state’s role in terrorism is complex, with the military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) playing central roles:

State Complicity: Sindoor exposed Pakistan’s military-terror nexus, with viral images of army officers attending LeT terrorists’ funerals reinforcing India’s claims of state sponsorship. Pakistan’s denial of involvement in the Pahalgam attack lacks credibility, given historical support for groups like LeT and JeM.
ISI as a “State Within a State”: The ISI operates with significant autonomy, often described as a state within a state due to its influence over politics, media, and terrorism. It has a history of supporting militant groups for strategic depth against India, as seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and 2019 Pulwama bombing. While the civilian government, led by PM Shehbaz Sharif, may not directly control ISI operations, it is unlikely to be entirely unaware of major actions.
Pahalgam Attack Orchestration:
- ISI Involvement: India alleges the Pahalgam attack was executed by The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT proxy, with Pakistani support. The ISI’s history of facilitating such groups, including training and logistics, makes its involvement plausible. Sources suggest the ISI used Pakistan’s Special Services Group to train terrorists at camps targeted in Sindoor.
- Asim Munir’s Role: No definitive evidence links General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Army Chief, directly to orchestrating the Pahalgam attack. However, his provocative speech endorsing the two-nation theory and calling Kashmir Pakistan’s “jugular vein” was seen as incitement. As a former ISI chief, Munir likely has knowledge of or influence over such operations, but direct orchestration remains speculative.
- Civilian Government’s Knowledge: It is possible the ISI acted independently, given its autonomy, but Sharif’s public denial and call for a neutral investigation suggest either ignorance or strategic posturing. The ISI’s history of operating without full civilian oversight supports the former, though high-profile attacks typically involve some level of military alignment.

Best Intelligence on the Pahalgam Attack

The best available intelligence, drawn from open sources, suggests:

Perpetrators: The Resistance Front (TRF), an LeT offshoot, initially claimed responsibility but later retracted, a common tactic to obscure Pakistan’s role. India’s claim of Pakistani nationals among the attackers aligns with historical patterns of cross-border infiltration.
ISI’s Role: The ISI’s logistical support, including training at camps like Syedna Bilal in Muzaffarabad, is likely, given India’s targeting of these sites. The presence of Pakistani military personnel at terrorist funerals further implicates the state.
Munir’s Involvement: No concrete evidence ties Munir directly to the attack, but his leadership and past ISI role make indirect involvement plausible. His promotion to Field Marshal on May 20, 2025, and PM Sharif’s praise suggest military approval of his actions during the conflict, though not necessarily the attack itself.
Uncertainties: The lack of a transparent investigation, as demanded by Pakistan, and India’s reliance on unverified claims (e.g., targeting 21 terror camps) leave gaps. Al Jazeera noted that neither country’s claims could be independently verified, highlighting the challenge of ascertaining precise responsibility.

Critical Analysis and Limitations

Source Bias: Indian sources (e.g., Times of India, PIB) emphasize precision and success, while Pakistani claims (e.g., via ISPR) highlight civilian casualties, reflecting nationalistic narratives. Both sides engage in misinformation, with Indian media reporting unverified claims like strikes on Pakistani nuclear bases.
Nuclear Risks: Sindoor’s deep strikes risk escalation, given Pakistan’s lack of a formal nuclear doctrine. India’s “no first use” policy contrasts with Pakistan’s flexibility, increasing the stakes of future operations.
Intelligence Gaps: India’s failure to prevent Pahalgam suggests limitations in real-time threat assessment, a critical area for future small-scale strikes.

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor represents a bold shift in India’s counterterrorism strategy, prioritizing material damage to terrorist infrastructure over symbolic gestures, akin to Israeli but less frequent than U.S. operations. Modi’s statement that it is “not over” signals a long-term commitment to proactive strikes, likely within Pakistan and PoK, though constrained by escalation risks. India’s intelligence capabilities are strong for static targets but need enhancement for dynamic, covert operations. The Pakistani state, via the ISI, likely supported the Pahalgam attack, though Munir’s direct role is unproven. The ISI’s autonomy suggests plausible deniability for the civilian government, but the military’s complicity is evident. Future Indian actions will hinge on intelligence quality and Pakistan’s response, with diplomacy and global support playing critical roles in preventing escalation.