The actual court ruling says nothing about the merits of Trump’s signature policy, and judges could still strike the tariffs down. (Photo: Getty Images) https://t.co/9e3eSmvdXRpic.twitter.com/SaiYT97g1a
सञ्चार माध्यममा प्रकाशित सामग्रीबारे न्यायिक निरूपण गर्ने निकाय प्रेस काउन्सिल छँदाछँदै पछिल्लो समय शक्तिको प्रभावमा फौजदारी कसूर लगाउने प्रवृत्ति झाँगिंदै गएको छ।
Advocates of "abundance" have a lot of good ideas, writes @_waleedshahid—which is why it's so important that they break with some of their billionaire, anti-labor backers.https://t.co/rda41wTRiU
Andrew Cuomo’s corruption is deep, persistent and ingrained and if he is Mayor will lead to unimaginable waste and incompetence. https://t.co/8WdbeQ7e1D
Russia’s War in Ukraine Is Now ‘Faltering’ Russian casualties reached the one million mark (killed and wounded) on June 12, 2025. .......... Russia has suffered these staggering personnel and equipment losses for minimal territorial gain, with its rate of advance in some areas slower than in World War I. ........... Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, but the war started eight years before that when they seized Crimea and parts of the Donbas, with the appearance of “little green men.” ....... While the war of attrition has stalemated both sides, the Russians insist they are winning with their propaganda releases, and the West has generally been swayed by this idea. President Trump insisted that Russia “holds all the cards.” ........ Russia has also lost 10,933 tanks, 22,786 armored fighting vehicles, 51,579 vehicles and fuel tanks, 29,063 artillery systems, 1,413 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,184 air defense systems, 416 airplanes, 337 helicopters, 40,435 drones, 3,337 cruise missiles, 28 ships and boats, and one submarine. ........ “The overall losses of the Russian occupying forces in manpower since the beginning of the full-scale invasion have reached 1 million,” The General Staff added. “More than 628,000 occurred in just the past year and a half.” ........... This year, Russia has been losing on average 1,286 soldiers per day. ...... None of the strategic objectives that Putin had set out to accomplish have been achieved. .......... Putin’s miscalculation of how the West would react has cost him a million casualties, an incredible number of vehicles, aircraft, ships, artillery, and equipment lost, and now NATO is on his border in the strategic Arctic region. ........ "The Russians were so concerned about the plan getting out and Ukraine being able to prepare that they actually didn't tell their soldiers. If you don't tell soldiers what they're about to do, they can't achieve their objective. There were actually some soldiers who thought they were there on an exercise. They didn't actually believe that a military operation was taking place. ....... Efforts to recruit new troops are slowing down, despite the government offering increased monetary incentives equal to three times the national average to join. The public is also opposed to another call-up of reserves. ......... The massive loss of tanks and armored vehicles is unsustainable. Numbers vary depending on the source, but Russia is bringing back old, obsolete Soviet stock for a reason. ........ growing numbers of Russians are unwilling to fight in the war. Some 81 percent of those aged between 18 and 30 oppose another round of mobilization to feed the “meat grinder” at the front ........ In a January 2025 poll, ending the conflict was the top priority for 68 percent of Russian respondents
Trump, on 'No Kings' Protests: 'I Don’t Feel Like a King' Ban Trump? Top genocide scholar issues dire warning He is deploying troops to occupy opposition-held cities, openly soliciting bribes from the world’s dictators and threatening to annex his democratic neighbors, all while sending people guilty of literally nothing to foreign prisons where they are expected to remain until the day they die. That’s it: that’s the case for treating President Donald Trump, the authoritarian head of an increasingly belligerent nation, like an international pariah. ......... Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, founding president of Genocide Watch, a group that aims to predict and punish targeted mass murder ........... a 10-stage guide to knowing how and when such killings are set in motion (one early sign: those in power likening members of an ostracized class to “animals, vermin, insects or disease”). ..........
Stanton insists that diplomacy with Trump is worse than a lost cause. The American president is no “ordinary adversary” who can be wined, dined and reasoned with, he said, but someone who “stands far outside the bounds of diplomacy and the rule of law between civilized nations.”
........... “He is a Nazi,” Stanton insisted. “Negotiating with Nazis didn’t prove useful in 1939. It won’t now either.” ............ The White House itself says Trump's threats are no joke, with Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt describing Canada as the “soon-to-be 51st state.” Carney’s predecessor also insisted that his American counterpart was deadly serious. ....... Justin Trudeau told business leaders earlier this year, saying he’s after the country’s mineral wealth and that his threats to annex the country are “a real thing.” .............. In 2014, after Russia illegally annexed Crimea, the world’s leading economies decided that it was no longer worth inviting Vladimir Putin to have tea and scones at the now-defunct G8; diplomacy in the decade before, clung to as the only means of preventing another armed conflict on European soil, had through the mirage of steady engagement blinded Western leaders to the possibility of an imminent war and soothed consciences as they deepened their dependence on Russian fossil fuels. ........... Trump is today lobbying for Russia’s return to the G7/G8 because, perhaps, he recognizes something that America’s erstwhile allies do not: that there is no difference, morally speaking, between the White House and the Kremlin, both of which desire a world where lip service to universal truths (and rights and wrongs) is dropped in favor of vulgar, thuggish self-interest, pursued without apology.
Is Google about to destroy the web? the current chapter of online history is careening towards its end. Welcome to the "machine web". ......... An estimated 68% of internet activity starts on search engines and about 90% of searches happen on Google. If the internet is a garden, Google is the Sun that lets the flowers grow. ....... "For those who want an end-to-end AI Search experience, we are introducing an all-new AI Mode," he said. "It's a total reimagining of Search." ......... People use Google Search five trillion times a year – it defines the shape of the internet. AI Mode is a radical departure. Unlike AI Overviews, AI Mode replaces traditional search results altogether. Instead, a chatbot effectively creates a miniature article to answer your question. As you read this, AI Mode is rolling out to users in the US, appearing as a button on the search engine and the company's app. It's optional for now, but Google's head of Search, Liz Reid, said it plainly when launching the tool: "This is the future of Google Search." ......... Here's the problem critics foresee – AI Overviews already sends much less traffic to the rest of the internet, and many fear AI Mode could supercharge that trend. If this comes to pass, it could crush the business model that's fuelled the digital content you've enjoyed for almost 30 years. ......... Google disagrees. In fact, the company tells the BBC that AI Overviews have been good for the web, and AI Mode will be no different. Google insists these features send users to "a greater diversity of websites" and the traffic is "higher quality" because people spend more time on the links they click. ......... AI Overviews and AI Mode both include links to sources ........ AI Overviews appear to cut the amount of traffic Google sends to websites – known as the "click-through rate" – by between 30% and 70% ........ some 60% of Google searches are now "zero-click", ending without the user visiting a single link. ......... the amount of content on the web has grown by 45% in the last two years, and that's excluding spam. "We see this in the data," he said. "People are still very actively clicking through to the web." ......... AI Overviews have caused impressions to rise 49% across the web, but clicks have fallen 30% ............ We may, some believe, be at the dawn of a new paradigm, a future you might call the "machine web". One where websites are built for AI to read rather than for humans, and reading summaries by chatbots becomes a primary way we consume information. ............. Demis Hassabis, head of Google DeepMind, the company's AI research lab, said in a recent interview that he believes publishers will want to feed their content directly to AI models to facilitate this and some may not bother putting that information on websites for human beings to read. ......... One possibility is direct compensation. The New York Times is licensing content to Amazon for its AI. Google pays Reddit $60m (£44m) a year to train AI on user data. Dozens of giant publishers and media conglomerates have reportedly signed similar deals with OpenAI and others. .......... HouseFresh has pivoted to YouTube. ......... "The web is still there and it's still open. If Google goes this way, some bright spark will come up with a new way of making money. ........ There is little doubt AI Mode is an impressive piece of technology. It deploys a "fan out method" where the AI breaks your question into subtopics and does multiple searches simultaneously. Google says this lets AI Mode recommends more diverse sources, produce deeper answers to more complex queries, dives deeper – and you have the ability to ask follow-up questions. ..................... Google chose to "silently update" its rules, so participating in Google Search means websites automatically give their permission to use content for AI. Publishers can opt-out – but only if they opt-out of search results altogether. .......... Some research suggests AI hallucinations are getting worse as their technical abilities improve. Even Sundar Pichai said on a podcast interview that hallucinations are "an inherent feature" of the technology – though Google is using its traditional search methods to ground AI responses, and the company says accuracy is improving. Google tells the BBC the vast majority of AI search responses are factual, and their accuracy is on par with other Search features. ............. Still, early slip ups – like the times when Google's AI Overviews told people to eat rocks and add glue to pizza recipes – linger in the public consciousness.
'A question of time': Economists explain why the worst is yet to come in Trump’s economy why prices in the U.S. haven't really soared yet but are likely to do so in the months ahead ....... They argue that the impact will be much more significant this summer." ....... consumers are fed up with inflation and aren't going to be happy to see even more of it.
Ban Trump? Top genocide scholar issues dire warning Stanton insists that diplomacy with Trump is worse than a lost cause. The American president is no “ordinary adversary” who can be wined, dined and reasoned with, he said, but someone who “stands far outside the bounds of diplomacy and the rule of law between civilized nations.” ....... “He is a Nazi,” Stanton insisted. “Negotiating with Nazis didn’t prove useful in 1939. It won’t now either.” ......... It is not easy to accept that “it” is actually happening here — that the descent into right-wing authoritarianism could be so rapid, the institutions of democracy so weak, the orchestrator of it all such an obvious and venal perversion of the American ideal — and harder still to quit one’s economic dependence on a superpower, however much it may be imploding. But, a decade from now, it might also be hard to believe that countries didn’t pursue their own rational self-interest and isolate a man who befriended their enemies, threatened their homes and sent their citizens to Guantánamo Bay. ...... “We will not allow people to enter our country who wish to do us harm,” Trump said when issuing his latest, sweeping travel ban, barring people from a dozen countries from ever setting foot in the former land of the free. The rest of the world, recognizing that fascism entails projection, might now wish to consider their own security.
The Real U.S.-China Trade Fight Isn’t About Exports U.S.-China trade talks are focused on export controls and tariffs, but at a deeper level they are about the future of the Pax Americana formed after World War II. A corporate-driven globalization emerged as businesses adapted to U.S. hegemony, currency dominance, and protectionism. At stake now is whether China can follow the same path as the U.S., even while the American public begins to rebel against that model. ............ Pax Americana transformed global commerce through a distinct form of economic integration built on foreign direct investment, transfer pricing, and intrafirm trade—the movement of components, services, and intellectual property among subsidiaries of the same corporation. As Europe and Asia rebuilt, U.S. companies found their exports threatened by a strong dollar and foreign protectionist measures. Their solution was to invest directly in foreign production facilities. Illustrating this shift, General Motors, Ford Motor, and IBM established manufacturing operations throughout Western Europe, reducing exchange rate challenges and trade barriers while maintaining corporate control. This approach prioritized ownership over traditional trade......... It also necessitated intrafirm trade. Today, about one-third of global trade flows within unified corporate networks rather than among independent entities, forming the hidden circulatory system of modern capitalism.......... GM exemplifies this trend. Components designed in Michigan are manufactured in Ontario, assembled in Mexico, and distributed throughout North America. What would have been exports in earlier eras now move invisibly within GM. This operational flexibility is a structural resilience that export-focused firms cannot fully replicate, particularly in periods of exchange-rate volatility. The champions of corporate globalization have effectively insulated themselves from currency fluctuations. ........ Most U.S. foreign direct investment flows to other advanced economies—Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada—rather than low-wage destinations. These investments prioritize proximity to customers, market access, technological ecosystems, and stability. ........ The 1985 Plaza Accord engineered a sharp appreciation of the yen against the dollar, with the exchange rate moving from 240 yen per dollar to JPY150 and reaching JPY80 a decade later. Simultaneously, the U.S. and Europe implemented export restraints, antidumping duties, and local content requirements against Japan’s imports. .......... Japanese firms responded with a massive foreign direct investment campaign. Toyota Motor, Honda Motor, and Sony Group established manufacturing operations in the U.S. and Europe, transforming from exporters into global producers with distributed networks. Like their American predecessors, Japanese companies mastered intrafirm trade and transfer pricing to maintain competitiveness despite currency and trade challenges. Their expansion was particularly strategic in its geographic targeting, establishing production hubs that could serve entire continental markets while satisfying local-content requirements. ........ Global trade governance never fully caught up. The 1947 General Agreements on Tariff and Trade focused on reducing tariffs on goods among independent economies but struggled to address the complexities of multinational networks. The World Trade Organization replaced the GATT in 1995 with a mandate covering services, IP, and investment measures—partial recognition that trade increasingly occurred within corporate structures. ......... Corporations operate globally; tax authorities regulate locally. Until that mismatch is resolved, intrafirm trade will remain a source of political and fiscal strain. This tension fuels skepticism about globalization, despite the efficiency gains and innovation that integrated production networks deliver. .............. The second involves China. The scale of its exports is destabilizing. Yet the U.S. is directly and indirectly blocking it from pursuing a comprehensive direct investment strategy. This may be a more meaningful containment of China than the more than 60 U.S. military bases in the region. .......... John Maynard Keynes opposed the economic bleeding of Germany after World War I not out of any affection for Berlin, but out of an appreciation for the likely consequences. ...... One need not believe in the Thucydides Trap to see that trying to asphyxiate China isn’t going to end well. It isn’t about ideological compatibility or strategic competitiveness, but realpolitik.
Trump Issues Grave Warning to Iran After Israeli Strikes President Donald Trump has issued a stark warning to Iran, urging the country to accept a nuclear deal to avoid further “planned attacks,” citing that “there has already been great death and destruction, but there is still time to make this slaughter… come to an end.” ........ "I told them, in the strongest of words, to ‘just do it,’ but no matter how hard they tried, no matter how close they got, they just couldn’t get it done,” Trump said. “Certain Iranian hardliners spoke bravely, but they didn’t know what was about to happen. They are all DEAD now, and it will only get worse." ...... Trump added that Iran was told how “the United States makes the best and most lethal military equipment anywhere in the World, BY FAR, and that Israel has a lot of it, with much more to come. And they know how to use it.”
The ongoing nuclear talks between the United States and Iran, aimed at addressing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program while providing sanctions relief, have been a complex and contentious issue for decades. The idea of a middle ground—where Iran pursues nuclear energy for civilian purposes under unprecedented monitoring while economic sanctions are gradually lifted—has been a focal point in recent negotiations, particularly since the collapse of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Below is an analysis of whether such a middle ground is feasible, based on current dynamics, historical context, and the positions of key stakeholders, as well as an evaluation of its potential components and challenges.
Feasibility of a Middle Ground
A middle ground in U.S.-Iran nuclear talks, as described, is theoretically possible but faces significant hurdles due to mutual distrust, conflicting red lines, and geopolitical complexities. The proposed framework—allowing Iran to enrich uranium for civilian purposes under stringent international monitoring in exchange for gradual sanctions relief—aligns with some recent proposals and past agreements like the JCPOA. However, its success depends on bridging gaps in expectations, ensuring compliance, and navigating domestic and international pressures.
Key Components of a Middle Ground
Iran’s Commitment to Non-Weaponization:
Iran has consistently claimed its nuclear program is for civilian purposes, such as energy and medical research, and denies pursuing nuclear weapons. A commitment to forgo weaponization could involve:
Limiting uranium enrichment to low levels (e.g., 3-5% purity, suitable for nuclear power but not weapons, which require ~90% purity).
Reducing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (currently at 60% purity, enough for several bombs if further enriched).
Permanently renouncing nuclear weapons development, potentially codified through a fatwa or legal commitment, as suggested by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Iran has expressed willingness to reduce enriched uranium stockpiles and limit enrichment levels in exchange for sanctions relief, as noted by Ali Shamkhani, a senior adviser to Khamenei. However, Iran insists on retaining its sovereign right to enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Unprecedented Monitoring and Verification:
The highest standards of monitoring would build on the JCPOA’s framework, which included continuous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, access to declared nuclear facilities, and the Additional Protocol for inspecting undeclared sites.
Enhancements could include:
Real-time monitoring technologies, such as advanced cameras and sensors, to track uranium enrichment and centrifuge activity.
Expanded IAEA access to Iran’s supply chain and potential covert sites, triggered by intelligence or isotope detection.
A permanent IAEA presence in Iran to ensure compliance, potentially with stricter timelines for inspections (e.g., 24-hour access to suspicious sites).
Iran has previously agreed to robust IAEA oversight under the JCPOA, and recent statements suggest openness to inspections if sanctions are lifted. However, Iran has warned that excessive pressure, such as snapback sanctions, could lead to expulsion of IAEA inspectors and withdrawal from the NPT.
Gradual Lifting of Economic Sanctions:
Iran’s economy has suffered significantly from U.S. sanctions, particularly since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, which led to currency depreciation, inflation, and reduced oil exports.
A step-by-step sanctions relief process could involve:
Initial release of frozen assets (e.g., $6 billion in Qatar from a 2023 prisoner swap).
Phased lifting of sanctions on Iran’s oil, banking, and petrochemical sectors, tied to verified nuclear compliance milestones.
A mechanism to “snap back” sanctions if Iran violates the agreement, similar to the JCPOA’s framework.
The U.S. has proposed gradual sanctions relief in recent talks, but Iran demands immediate and verifiable removal of major sanctions, including those on its central bank and oil company.
Mutual Confidence-Building Measures:
A middle ground would require confidence-building to address mutual distrust. Iran views U.S. sanctions as an attack on its sovereignty, while the U.S. and allies like Israel fear Iran’s nuclear program could be weaponized.
Iran could temporarily pause high-level enrichment (e.g., 60%) as a goodwill gesture, as suggested in recent negotiations.
The U.S. could offer temporary sanctions waivers or humanitarian exemptions to signal commitment, as seen in past negotiations.
Recent Developments Supporting a Middle Ground
U.S. Proposal for Limited Enrichment: In June 2025, the U.S. reportedly offered a deal allowing Iran to enrich uranium at low levels (around 3%) without fully dismantling its nuclear facilities, a shift from earlier demands for complete dismantlement. This aligns with Iran’s insistence on retaining enrichment rights and could form the basis for a compromise.
Iran’s Openness to Negotiation: Senior Iranian officials, including Ali Shamkhani, have indicated readiness to limit enrichment, reduce stockpiles, and allow inspections in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has emphasized a “diplomatic solution” that upholds Iran’s nuclear rights.
Progress in Talks: Indirect talks mediated by Oman in April and May 2025 have been described as “constructive” and “serious,” with both sides agreeing to continue negotiations. Omani mediators noted “some but not conclusive progress” in resolving enrichment disputes.
Economic Pressure as Leverage: Iran’s economic struggles, exacerbated by sanctions, create incentives for a deal. Chronic inflation, energy shortages, and a plummeting currency have weakened Iran’s position, making sanctions relief a priority.
Challenges to a Middle Ground
Mutual Distrust:
The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and subsequent “maximum pressure” sanctions eroded Iran’s trust in U.S. commitments. Iran demands guarantees that sanctions relief will be permanent and verifiable.
The U.S. and Israel remain skeptical of Iran’s intentions, citing its history of covert nuclear activities (revealed in 2002) and current stockpile of 60% enriched uranium.
Disagreement Over Enrichment:
The U.S. initially pushed for “zero enrichment,” a demand Iran rejected as a violation of its NPT rights. While the U.S. has softened its stance to allow low-level enrichment, Iran insists on long-term enrichment rights, complicating negotiations.
Israel, a key U.S. ally, demands complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, which conflicts with the proposed middle ground.
Sanctions Relief Mechanism:
Iran demands immediate and full sanctions relief, while the U.S. favors a phased approach tied to compliance. Disagreement over the scope and timing of relief (e.g., whether to include sanctions on Iran’s central bank) remains a sticking point.
Iran’s insistence on accessing frozen funds, like the $6 billion in Qatar, adds complexity, as the U.S. is reluctant to release funds without ironclad nuclear commitments.
Geopolitical and Domestic Pressures:
Israel’s threats of military action against Iran’s nuclear sites could derail talks, as could U.S. domestic pressure from hardliners advocating a tough stance.
Iran’s internal challenges, including economic hardship and public discontent, pressure its leadership to secure sanctions relief, but hardliners may resist concessions perceived as capitulation.
The looming expiration of the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism in October 2025 adds urgency. European powers (France, Germany, UK) may trigger snapback sanctions if no deal is reached, potentially prompting Iran to exit the NPT and expel IAEA inspectors.
Technical and Verification Challenges:
Ensuring “the highest ever standards” of monitoring requires significant resources and cooperation. Iran’s past non-compliance (e.g., covert facilities in 2002) raises concerns about verifying undeclared sites.
The IAEA has reported difficulties in monitoring Iran’s advanced centrifuges and 60% enriched uranium stockpile, which could produce weapons-grade material in weeks.
Potential Path Forward
A viable middle ground could resemble the following framework, based on recent proposals and historical precedents:
Phase 1: Confidence-Building (3-6 months):
Iran pauses enrichment above 5% and transfers a portion of its 60% enriched uranium stockpile to a third country (e.g., Russia, as in the JCPOA).
The U.S. releases a limited portion of frozen Iranian assets (e.g., $1-2 billion) and issues temporary sanctions waivers for oil exports.
The IAEA implements enhanced monitoring, including real-time cameras and expanded access to centrifuge facilities.
Phase 2: Implementation (6-12 months):
Iran caps enrichment at 3-5%, reduces its uranium stockpile to JCPOA levels (e.g., 300 kg at 3.67%), and fully adopts the Additional Protocol.
The U.S. lifts sanctions on Iran’s oil and banking sectors in stages, verified by economic recovery metrics (e.g., increased oil exports).
The IAEA verifies compliance through regular inspections and reports, with snapback sanctions as a deterrent.
Phase 3: Long-Term Agreement (1-2 years):
Iran commits to a permanent enrichment cap and no-weaponization pledge, potentially backed by a UN resolution.
The U.S. and EU fully lift nuclear-related sanctions, restoring Iran’s access to global markets.
Continuous IAEA monitoring ensures compliance, with periodic reviews to adjust terms.
Likelihood of Success
Optimistic Factors:
Both sides have shown flexibility. The U.S. has moved away from demanding zero enrichment, and Iran has signaled willingness to limit enrichment and allow inspections.
Oman’s mediation has kept talks alive, with recent rounds described as productive.
Iran’s economic crisis creates strong incentives for a deal, as sanctions relief could stabilize its currency and boost oil exports.
Pessimistic Factors:
Mutual distrust and conflicting red lines (e.g., Iran’s insistence on immediate sanctions relief vs. U.S. phased approach) could stall progress.
Israel’s opposition and potential sabotage, combined with U.S. domestic political pressure, could harden the U.S. stance.
The October 2025 snapback deadline adds pressure, risking escalation if no deal is reached.
Critical Analysis
The establishment narrative, as reflected in Western media and official statements, often frames Iran as a rogue actor with covert nuclear ambitions, justifying sanctions and military threats. However, this overlooks Iran’s perspective: sanctions have crippled its economy, and enrichment is seen as a sovereign right under the NPT. The U.S.’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, despite Iran’s compliance at the time, fuels Tehran’s skepticism of Western commitments. Conversely, Iran’s breaches of JCPOA limits since 2019 (e.g., 60% enrichment) and history of covert activities raise legitimate concerns about its intentions.
A middle ground is not only feasible but necessary to avoid escalation, potentially including military conflict. The JCPOA demonstrated that Iran can accept strict limits and monitoring in exchange for economic relief, but the U.S. must offer credible guarantees against future withdrawals. The current U.S. proposal allowing low-level enrichment is a pragmatic step, but it must be paired with clear, verifiable sanctions relief to win Iran’s trust. Critics of this approach, particularly Israel, may argue it legitimizes Iran’s nuclear program, but zero-enrichment demands have proven unrealistic and counterproductive, leading to a more advanced Iranian program over time.
Conclusion
A middle ground in U.S.-Iran nuclear talks—allowing Iran to pursue civilian nuclear energy under unprecedented IAEA monitoring in exchange for gradual sanctions relief—is achievable but requires compromises. Iran must cap enrichment at low levels, reduce stockpiles, and accept rigorous inspections, while the U.S. must commit to phased, verifiable sanctions relief. Recent proposals and negotiations suggest both sides are open to such a framework, but challenges like mutual distrust, Israel’s opposition, and the snapback deadline loom large. A phased approach, starting with confidence-building measures, could pave the way for a sustainable deal, preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons while addressing its economic needs. Failure to reach this middle ground risks escalation, potentially leading to military confrontation or Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT, with severe consequences for regional and global stability.
The nuclear talks between the United States and Iran in 2025, as reported in recent sources, aim to establish a new agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, with negotiations building on the framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Below is a detailed comparison of the likely terms of the current U.S.-Iran nuclear deal (based on available information as of June 2025) with the JCPOA negotiated under President Barack Obama. The comparison highlights similarities and differences in key provisions, monitoring mechanisms, sanctions relief, and broader implications, while critically examining the context and feasibility of both agreements.
Context and Status
JCPOA (2015): Finalized on July 14, 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (U.S., UK, France, China, Russia, Germany, plus the EU), the JCPOA was a landmark agreement designed to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remained peaceful. It imposed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for lifting nuclear-related sanctions. The deal was implemented on January 16, 2016, but collapsed after the U.S. withdrawal in May 2018 under President Trump, prompting Iran to resume enrichment activities beyond JCPOA limits.
Current Deal (2025): As of June 2025, indirect U.S.-Iran talks mediated by Oman are ongoing, with reports suggesting a new agreement resembling the JCPOA but with modifications. The U.S. has proposed allowing Iran to enrich uranium at low levels (around 3%) under stringent monitoring, with phased sanctions relief tied to compliance. The deal aims to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons while addressing its economic needs, with negotiations driven by the looming October 2025 deadline for the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism.
Similarities
Core Objective:
JCPOA: Aimed to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by limiting its nuclear program and implementing robust international monitoring in exchange for sanctions relief.
Current Deal: Similarly seeks to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful, capping enrichment at levels unsuitable for weapons (e.g., 3-5%) and enforcing strict IAEA oversight to verify compliance.
Uranium Enrichment Limits:
JCPOA: Restricted Iran to enriching uranium to 3.67% purity, sufficient for civilian nuclear power but far below the 90% needed for weapons. Iran’s stockpile was capped at 300 kg of low-enriched uranium (a 98% reduction from its 2015 levels).
Current Deal: Proposes a similar cap on enrichment at around 3-3.67%, preventing Iran from producing weapons-grade uranium. While specific stockpile limits are unclear, the deal reportedly includes measures to reduce Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, potentially through export to a third country.
IAEA Monitoring and Verification:
JCPOA: Mandated unprecedented IAEA access, including continuous monitoring of declared nuclear sites, implementation of the Additional Protocol for inspecting undeclared sites, and oversight of Iran’s nuclear supply chain (e.g., uranium mines, centrifuge production). Inspectors could request access to suspicious sites within 24 hours, with a dispute resolution mechanism.
Current Deal: Emphasizes “stricter inspections” than the JCPOA, likely building on the same framework (e.g., Additional Protocol, real-time monitoring of enrichment facilities). Reports suggest enhanced technologies, such as advanced cameras and sensors, to ensure compliance.
Sanctions Relief Mechanism:
JCPOA: Provided for the lifting of nuclear-related UN, EU, and U.S. secondary sanctions upon IAEA verification of Iran’s compliance (Implementation Day, January 16, 2016). Iran gained access to approximately $50 billion in frozen assets, though non-nuclear sanctions remained.
Current Deal: Proposes phased sanctions relief tied to Iran’s nuclear compliance, potentially starting with access to frozen assets (e.g., $6 billion in Qatar) and waivers for oil exports, similar to the JCPOA’s structure.
Centrifuge Restrictions:
JCPOA: Limited Iran to 5,060 first-generation (IR-1) centrifuges at Natanz for 10 years, reduced from nearly 20,000, and banned enrichment at the fortified Fordow facility, which was converted to a research center.
Current Deal: Likely restricts Iran’s centrifuge capacity, focusing on older, less efficient models, and may maintain limits on Fordow enrichment, though specific numbers are not yet public.
Regional and Non-Nuclear Issues Excluded:
JCPOA: Focused solely on Iran’s nuclear program, excluding its ballistic missile program and regional activities (e.g., support for proxies like Hezbollah), a major criticism from opponents.
Current Deal: Appears to similarly exclude non-nuclear issues, such as Iran’s missile program or regional influence, to keep negotiations narrowly focused on nuclear restrictions.
Differences
Enrichment Policy Shift:
JCPOA: Represented a U.S. concession from a “zero enrichment” policy, allowing Iran to enrich uranium to 3.67% under strict limits, a significant departure from prior U.S. nonproliferation goals.
Current Deal: Builds on this concession but reflects a more pragmatic U.S. stance, explicitly allowing limited enrichment (around 3%) without demanding dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This shift acknowledges Iran’s advanced capabilities in 2025, as it can now produce weapons-grade uranium in weeks.
Sunset Clauses:
JCPOA: Included sunset clauses, with key restrictions expiring after 10-15 years (e.g., centrifuge limits in 2025, enrichment caps in 2030). Critics argued this provided Iran a legal path to an industrial-scale nuclear program by 2031.
Current Deal: Reports suggest extended sunset clauses, potentially lasting 25 years, to address concerns about temporary restrictions. This would delay Iran’s ability to expand its nuclear program significantly beyond the JCPOA’s timeline.
Iran’s Nuclear Advancements:
JCPOA: Negotiated when Iran’s breakout time (time to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon) was 2-3 months. The deal extended this to over a year by reducing Iran’s stockpile and centrifuge capacity.
Current Deal: Faces a more advanced Iranian nuclear program, with a breakout time of 1-2 weeks and enough 60% enriched uranium for multiple bombs. This necessitates stricter limits and faster verification to prevent weaponization.
Monitoring Enhancements:
JCPOA: Provided robust IAEA oversight but faced criticism for not fully resolving Iran’s past military dimensions (PMD) and for delays in accessing undeclared sites (up to 24 days in some cases).
Current Deal: Proposes “stricter inspections” and possibly more intrusive measures, such as real-time monitoring and expanded access to Iran’s supply chain, to address concerns about covert activities. This reflects lessons learned from Iran’s post-2018 violations.
Sanctions Relief Scope and Timing:
JCPOA: Offered comprehensive sanctions relief upon IAEA verification, including lifting UN and EU sanctions and U.S. secondary sanctions, though non-nuclear sanctions persisted. Relief was front-loaded, with Iran accessing frozen assets early.
Current Deal: Emphasizes gradual, phased sanctions relief tied to specific compliance milestones, reflecting U.S. caution after Iran’s post-2018 nuclear advancements. Iran demands immediate relief, creating a negotiation hurdle.
Geopolitical Context:
JCPOA: Negotiated under President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate government, with strong U.S. leadership and multilateral support from the P5+1. It faced domestic opposition in the U.S. and Israel but was celebrated as a diplomatic achievement.
Current Deal: Occurs under President Masoud Pezeshkian’s reformist government, with a weakened Iran due to economic crises and diminished regional influence (e.g., losses by Hezbollah and Assad). The U.S. operates with less multilateral leverage, as the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism nears expiration in October 2025.
Duration and Permanence:
JCPOA: Designed as a temporary framework, with key provisions expiring by 2031, raising concerns about Iran resuming an unrestricted nuclear program.
Current Deal: Seeks a longer-term agreement, potentially 25 years, to provide greater assurance against Iran’s nuclear weaponization. This reflects criticism of the JCPOA’s sunset clauses and Iran’s current proximity to a bomb.
Political Dynamics:
JCPOA: Faced intense U.S. domestic opposition, particularly from Republicans, and was not legally binding, allowing Trump’s withdrawal in 2018.
Current Deal: Negotiated under a Trump administration that previously rejected the JCPOA, yet is reportedly open to a similar framework, possibly to claim a diplomatic win. However, it faces skepticism from Iran hawks and Israel, who demand tougher terms.
Critical Analysis
The JCPOA was a groundbreaking deal that rolled back Iran’s nuclear capabilities but was criticized for its temporary nature and exclusion of non-nuclear issues. Its collapse after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 allowed Iran to advance its nuclear program, reducing its breakout time dramatically. The current deal attempts to recreate the JCPOA’s core structure but adapts to Iran’s stronger position in 2025, with a focus on longer-term restrictions and stricter monitoring. However, the establishment narrative often overstates Iran’s intent to weaponize, ignoring its economic motivations and NPT rights, while downplaying the U.S.’s role in undermining trust by exiting the JCPOA.
The current deal’s similarities to the JCPOA suggest a pragmatic acknowledgment that zero enrichment is unfeasible, but its differences—extended sunset clauses, stricter inspections, and phased sanctions—reflect lessons from the JCPOA’s shortcomings. Yet, mutual distrust, Iran’s demand for immediate relief, and opposition from Israel and U.S. hardliners pose significant risks. The October 2025 snapback deadline adds urgency, but a deal too close to the JCPOA may be seen as a retreat by Trump, while one too stringent may push Iran to reject it.
Conclusion
The 2025 nuclear deal and the JCPOA share the same goal: preventing a nuclear-armed Iran through limited enrichment and robust monitoring in exchange for sanctions relief. Both allow low-level enrichment (3-3.67%), restrict centrifuges, and rely on IAEA oversight. However, the current deal faces a more advanced Iranian program, necessitating stricter inspections and longer sunset clauses (potentially 25 years vs. 10-15 years). The phased sanctions relief contrasts with the JCPOA’s more immediate approach, reflecting caution but risking Iranian resistance. While the JCPOA was a multilateral triumph undone by U.S. politics, the current deal’s success hinges on navigating a weaker Iranian position, U.S. domestic pressures, and a tighter timeline, with less global consensus.
The decision by President Donald Trump to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018 was a pivotal and controversial move with significant consequences for U.S.-Iran relations, regional stability, and global nonproliferation efforts. To assess whether it was unwise, what Trump achieved, and whether it parallels walking out of NAFTA to create something similar, we need to examine the rationale, outcomes, and strategic context of the JCPOA withdrawal, as well as compare it to the NAFTA renegotiation. Below is a concise analysis addressing these questions.
Was Trump’s Withdrawal from the JCPOA Unwise?
The wisdom of Trump’s withdrawal depends on the perspective and goals considered. Below are arguments for and against the decision, grounded in outcomes and strategic implications.
Arguments Suggesting It Was Unwise
Undermined a Functional Agreement:
The JCPOA was working as intended in 2018. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed Iran’s compliance, with its breakout time (time to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon) extended from 2-3 months to over a year due to limits on enrichment (3.67%) and stockpiles (300 kg).
Withdrawal led Iran to resume advanced enrichment, reaching 60% purity by 2021 and accumulating enough material for multiple bombs by 2025, with a breakout time of 1-2 weeks. This made Iran’s nuclear program more dangerous than before the JCPOA.
Eroded U.S. Credibility:
Unilateral withdrawal despite Iran’s compliance damaged U.S. reliability as a negotiating partner. Iran and other signatories (EU, China, Russia) viewed the move as a breach of trust, complicating current talks in 2025.
It alienated allies like France, Germany, and the UK, who upheld the JCPOA, weakening multilateral cooperation on Iran’s nuclear issue.
Failed to Cripple Iran’s Economy or Force Concessions:
Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign reimposed sanctions, devastating Iran’s economy (e.g., 70% currency devaluation, oil exports dropping from 2.5 million to under 0.5 million barrels per day). However, Iran did not capitulate or negotiate a “better deal” as Trump hoped. Instead, it accelerated its nuclear program and deepened ties with China and Russia.
Economic hardship fueled domestic unrest in Iran but also hardened its leadership’s resolve to resist U.S. demands, reducing leverage for negotiations.
Increased Regional Tensions:
Withdrawal emboldened Iran to expand regional influence (e.g., via proxies in Iraq and Yemen) and conduct attacks, like the 2019 Abqaiq oil facility strike in Saudi Arabia.
It heightened risks of military conflict, with Israel threatening strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and the U.S. nearly retaliating after Iranian-backed attacks on its forces.
Arguments Suggesting It Was Strategic
Addressed JCPOA’s Flaws:
Trump and critics argued the JCPOA was flawed due to its sunset clauses (e.g., enrichment limits expiring by 2030), exclusion of Iran’s ballistic missile program, and failure to address its regional activities (e.g., support for Hezbollah). Withdrawal aimed to pressure Iran into a broader, longer-term deal.
The current 2025 negotiations reportedly seek extended sunset clauses (e.g., 25 years), suggesting Trump’s withdrawal forced a renegotiation on tougher terms.
Economic Leverage:
Sanctions weakened Iran’s economy, creating pressure for a deal in 2025 under President Pezeshkian, who faces domestic demands for sanctions relief. This mirrors Trump’s strategy of using economic pain to extract concessions.
Iran’s reduced regional influence (e.g., weakened Hezbollah, fall of Assad) in 2025 may partly stem from economic constraints imposed by sanctions.
Political Messaging:
Withdrawal fulfilled a campaign promise to reject Obama’s legacy, appealing to Trump’s domestic base and allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia, who opposed the JCPOA.
It signaled a hardline stance against Iran, aligning with hawkish advisors like John Bolton, who advocated regime change or military action.
Assessment
On balance, Trump’s withdrawal appears unwise from a nonproliferation perspective. The JCPOA, while imperfect, effectively constrained Iran’s nuclear program, and its collapse led to a more advanced Iranian nuclear capability, with a breakout time now measured in weeks. The “maximum pressure” strategy failed to force Iran into a better deal during Trump’s first term and strained U.S. alliances. However, supporters argue it created leverage for 2025 talks by weakening Iran economically and exposing JCPOA’s limitations, potentially leading to a deal with longer restrictions. The wisdom hinges on whether current negotiations yield a stronger agreement—an outcome still uncertain as of June 2025.
What Did Trump Achieve?
Trump’s withdrawal and subsequent policies produced mixed results, with limited strategic gains offset by significant setbacks.
Achievements:
Economic Pressure: Sanctions crippled Iran’s economy, reducing oil revenues, devaluing the rial, and causing chronic inflation (over 40% annually). This pressured Iran to return to talks in 2021-2025, with a reformist government more open to compromise.
Regional Containment: Sanctions limited Iran’s ability to fund proxies, contributing to setbacks like Hezbollah’s losses and Syria’s collapse in 2025, though these were also driven by broader geopolitical shifts.
Political Capital: Withdrawal resonated with domestic supporters and allies like Israel, reinforcing Trump’s image as a tough negotiator. It set the stage for claiming a “better deal” in 2025, even if resembling the JCPOA.
Failures:
Nuclear Advancement: Iran’s nuclear program grew more threatening, with 60% enrichment and advanced centrifuges, increasing the risk of weaponization.
No Immediate Deal: Trump’s expectation of a quick, broader agreement failed. Iran resisted negotiations until 2021, and talks remained stalled until 2025.
Diplomatic Isolation: The U.S. lost support from JCPOA co-signatories, who continued trade with Iran under EU mechanisms like INSTEX, undermining sanctions.
Escalation Risks: Withdrawal heightened tensions, leading to near-military conflicts (e.g., U.S. strike on Qasem Soleimani in 2020) and Iran’s attacks on U.S. interests.
Comparison to NAFTA Renegotiation
Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA shares some parallels with his decision to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), replaced by the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2020, but there are key differences.
Similarities
Rejection of Predecessor’s Legacy:
JCPOA: Trump framed the JCPOA as a flawed Obama-era deal, withdrawing to negotiate a “better” agreement, much as he criticized NAFTA as a bad deal for U.S. workers.
NAFTA: Trump exited NAFTA to renegotiate terms, branding the USMCA as a tougher, U.S.-centric deal, similar to his push for a stronger Iran deal.
Similar Framework with Adjustments:
JCPOA: Current 2025 talks suggest a deal resembling the JCPOA but with tweaks (e.g., longer sunset clauses, stricter inspections), akin to how the USMCA retained NAFTA’s core free-trade structure with updates (e.g., labor provisions, auto content rules).
NAFTA: The USMCA kept most of NAFTA’s provisions but added stricter rules of origin (e.g., 75% North American content for autos vs. 62.5% in NAFTA) and digital trade rules, mirroring the JCPOA’s core retention with enhanced monitoring.
Economic Leverage as Strategy:
JCPOA: Trump used sanctions to pressure Iran, similar to how he imposed tariffs (e.g., 25% on Canadian steel) to force Canada and Mexico to renegotiate NAFTA.
NAFTA: Tariffs compelled concessions, resulting in a deal Trump claimed as a victory, paralleling his hope for a new Iran deal in 2025.
Differences
Outcome and Success:
NAFTA: Renegotiation succeeded relatively quickly, with the USMCA signed in 2018 and implemented in 2020. It achieved modest improvements (e.g., higher wages for Mexican auto workers) while maintaining trade stability.
JCPOA: Withdrawal failed to produce a new deal during Trump’s first term, and Iran’s nuclear advancements reversed JCPOA gains. A new deal in 2025 is uncertain and may not significantly outperform the original.
Multilateral vs. Bilateral Dynamics:
NAFTA: Involved cooperative partners (Canada, Mexico) with aligned economic interests, making renegotiation feasible despite tensions.
JCPOA: Involved an adversarial Iran and alienated allies (EU, China, Russia), complicating diplomacy. Iran’s defiance and nuclear escalation contrast with Canada and Mexico’s willingness to negotiate.
Risk and Consequences:
NAFTA: Risks were economic (e.g., trade disruptions), but renegotiation posed no security threats. The USMCA maintained regional stability.
JCPOA: Withdrawal increased proliferation risks, with Iran nearing nuclear weapons capability and heightened chances of military conflict (e.g., Israel’s threats). The stakes are far higher than trade disputes.
Intent and Scope:
NAFTA: Renegotiation aimed to tweak trade terms for U.S. economic benefit, with clear, achievable goals (e.g., auto sector rules).
JCPOA: Withdrawal sought a broader deal addressing missiles and regional behavior, but lacked a clear path to force Iran’s compliance, leading to strategic ambiguity.
Parallel Assessment
The JCPOA withdrawal resembles the NAFTA renegotiation in its rejection of a prior deal to secure a “better” one, using economic pressure as leverage. However, the NAFTA-USMCA transition was a controlled process with cooperative partners and low risks, yielding a similar but slightly improved agreement. The JCPOA withdrawal, conversely, was a high-stakes gamble that backfired by strengthening Iran’s nuclear position and isolating the U.S. diplomatically. While the USMCA achieved modest gains, the JCPOA’s collapse left the U.S. negotiating from a weaker position in 2025, with a potential deal likely resembling the original but with harder-won concessions.
Conclusion
Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA was largely unwise, as it dismantled a functional nonproliferation agreement, leading to Iran’s nuclear advancements and increased regional risks without securing a better deal during his first term. Achievements were limited to economic pressure on Iran and domestic political gains, but these came at the cost of a shorter breakout time and strained alliances. The NAFTA-USMCA analogy holds in terms of rejecting a prior deal for a similar one, but the JCPOA’s collapse carried far greater consequences than trade renegotiation, with nuclear proliferation and conflict risks outweighing the controlled economic stakes of NAFTA. Current 2025 talks may yield a JCPOA-like deal with longer restrictions, but its success remains uncertain, underscoring the high cost of Trump’s 2018 decision.
1/ 🧵 The sixth round of U.S.–Iran nuclear talks is set this Sunday, June 15 in Muscat, Oman—mediated by Oman’s foreign ministry. These negotiations follow five prior rounds since April aiming to curb Iran’s nuclear program.
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) June 12, 2025
