For the past 7 hours, Russia commited the largest ever missile and drone attack of the war all across Ukraine, launched from ships, land, submarines, bomber aircraft.
What Reforms Would Russia Need to Join NATO? A Roadmap of Political, Economic, and Military Transformation
For decades, Russia and NATO have stood on opposite sides of a geopolitical divide. But what if that reality shifted? What if, instead of antagonism, there was alignment? For Russia to ever join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it would need to undertake an extraordinary and far-reaching series of political, economic, and military reforms. These changes would not only alter its global positioning but would also require deep systemic restructuring. Here's what such a transformation would entail.
1. Political Reforms: From Authoritarianism to Democratic Governance
a. Free and Fair Elections:
NATO is a political-military alliance of democratic nations. Russia would have to transition away from its current authoritarian model, characterized by state-controlled media, rigged elections, and persecution of opposition. Transparent electoral reforms, international monitoring, and multiparty competition would be fundamental prerequisites.
b. Rule of Law and Judicial Independence:
A functioning democracy requires independent courts and respect for legal norms. Russia would need to end the politicization of its judiciary and establish true legal accountability—including for state actors and oligarchs.
c. Civil Liberties and Human Rights:
Respect for freedom of speech, assembly, and press must be institutionalized. Russia would need to release political prisoners, protect journalists and NGOs, and reverse laws that stigmatize dissent or foreign-funded organizations.
d. Anti-Corruption Drive:
Oligarchic networks and systemic corruption distort governance. A NATO-compatible Russia would have to implement sweeping anti-corruption reforms, ensuring transparency in public procurement, judicial conduct, and political financing.
2. Economic Reforms: Embracing Open Markets and Western Norms
a. Market Liberalization:
Russia's economy remains heavily state-directed, with major sectors controlled by the Kremlin or its allies. NATO membership would likely demand a shift toward free-market capitalism, with greater privatization and competition.
b. Diversification Away from Petro-dependence:
An over-reliance on oil and gas exports makes Russia vulnerable and politically rigid. Long-term NATO partnership would necessitate investment in diversified industries such as technology, services, and sustainable energy.
c. Integration with Western Economies:
Joining NATO would likely be accompanied by stronger economic integration with the EU and other Western institutions. This would require harmonizing regulatory frameworks, joining international financial oversight regimes, and ensuring protection of foreign investment.
d. Sanctions Reversal and Debt Transparency:
Russia would need to negotiate the rollback of existing Western sanctions through compliance with international norms and restitution (particularly with Ukraine). It would also need to disclose sovereign debt, off-shore assets, and clean up shadow banking networks.
3. Military Reforms: Realignment and Restructuring
a. End Hostilities and Occupations:
Perhaps the most immediate requirement would be for Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine, Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and any other occupied territories. NATO cannot admit a country actively engaged in aggressive war or military occupation.
b. Civilian Control of the Military:
Like all NATO members, Russia would have to place its armed forces under firm democratic and civilian control. This includes ending the political dominance of the FSB and reducing the influence of warlords or regional militias.
c. Transparency and Interoperability:
NATO members operate under shared military standards. Russia would need to open its defense planning, share intelligence in line with NATO protocols, and restructure its forces to be interoperable with NATO units. This would include joint exercises and reforms in logistics, communications, and doctrine.
d. Nuclear Doctrine Reassessment:
NATO is a nuclear alliance, but only under strict doctrines of deterrence and collective defense. Russia’s current nuclear posturing—including threats of tactical use—would be unacceptable. Russia would need to adopt NATO-aligned doctrines and potentially reduce its nuclear arsenal under mutual agreement.
4. Geopolitical and Diplomatic Alignment
a. Rebuilding Trust:
Russia has spent decades positioning NATO as an adversary. That narrative would need to be completely rewritten, including public diplomacy, media narratives, and academic discourse.
b. Reparative Foreign Policy:
Russia would need to demonstrate a break from past imperialist policies—acknowledging previous invasions, disinformation campaigns, and election meddling. Reparations or truth commissions with Ukraine, Georgia, and others may be part of this process.
c. End Strategic Ties with NATO Adversaries:
It is unlikely NATO would admit a nation closely aligned with China, Iran, or North Korea. Russia would need to pivot its foreign policy away from these alliances and toward transatlantic cooperation.
5. A Transformation of Identity
At its core, NATO membership would require Russia to undergo a shift not only in governance and military posture but in its very sense of national identity. It would mean abandoning its self-image as an imperial counterweight to the West and embracing a collaborative future within a democratic, rule-based global order.
Is It Possible?
Theoretically, yes. In fact, post-Soviet Russia briefly flirted with the idea of NATO partnership in the early 1990s. Boris Yeltsin even hinted at eventual NATO membership. But since then, under Vladimir Putin, the country has moved steadily toward authoritarianism and confrontation. For Russia to join NATO, it would need a post-Putin generation of leadership that is reformist, democratic, and deeply committed to breaking from the legacy of imperialism and militarism.
Conclusion
NATO membership for Russia is not a fantasy—but it is a monumental challenge. It requires political democratization, economic liberalization, military transformation, and a profound cultural shift. If Russia ever walks that road, it won't just change its foreign policy—it will reinvent itself.
1/ What would it take for Russia to join NATO? It would require a historic transformation across politics, the economy, and the military. A complete reinvention. Here's a thread on the reforms Russia would need to make 🧵#Russia#NATO#Geopolitics#GlobalSecurity
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) June 29, 2025
The Minsk Agreements were two sets of accords signed in 2014 and 2015 to address the conflict in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region. Their goal was to establish a ceasefire and lay the groundwork for a political resolution. Here's a concise overview:
Minsk I (September 5, 2014)
Signed in Minsk, Belarus, by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR/LPR), and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). It followed intense fighting, particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in Donbas.
Key Provisions:
Ceasefire: Immediate bilateral ceasefire.
Monitoring: OSCE to monitor and verify the ceasefire.
Decentralization: Ukraine to adopt laws granting special status to certain Donbas regions, including provisions for local self-governance.
Amnesty: Pardon for individuals involved in the conflict.
Prisoner Exchange: Release of hostages and detainees.
Humanitarian Aid: Delivery and distribution of aid to affected areas.
Elections: Local elections in Donbas under Ukrainian law.
Withdrawal of Forces: Removal of illegal armed groups, military equipment, and foreign fighters from Ukrainian territory.
Border Control: Restoration of Ukrainian control over its border with Russia.
Economic and Social Recovery: Measures to restore economic ties and rebuild Donbas.
Outcome: The ceasefire was fragile, with frequent violations by both sides. Many provisions—especially regarding decentralization and elections—were not implemented.
Minsk II (February 12, 2015)
Signed after Minsk I failed to stop the fighting, particularly following major clashes in Debaltseve. It was negotiated by the Normandy Format (Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany) and signed by the same parties as Minsk I.
Key Provisions (13-point plan):
Immediate Ceasefire: Effective from February 15, 2015.
Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons: Both sides to pull back heavy weaponry to create a 50–140 km buffer zone, depending on the weapon type.
OSCE Monitoring: Oversight of the ceasefire and withdrawal process.
Dialogue on Elections: Begin discussions on local elections in Donbas and modalities for self-governance.
Amnesty: Pardon for participants in the conflict.
Prisoner Exchange: "All for all" exchange of hostages and detainees.
Humanitarian Access: Safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid.
Special Status: Constitutional reforms in Ukraine to grant special status to certain Donbas regions.
Elections: Local elections in Donbas to be held under Ukrainian law with OSCE supervision.
Withdrawal of Foreign Forces: Removal of all foreign troops, military equipment, and mercenaries under OSCE oversight.
Border Control: Ukraine to regain full control of its border with Russia after local elections and constitutional reforms (by the end of 2015).
Economic Recovery: Restoration of social payments and economic links with Donbas.
Normandy Format Oversight: Regular meetings to ensure implementation.
Outcome: While Minsk II helped reduce some fighting, it failed to secure a lasting ceasefire. Core issues—such as elections, border control, and decentralization—remained unresolved due to disputes over sequencing. Ukraine demanded border control before political concessions, whereas Russia and the separatists insisted on holding elections first. Ongoing violations persisted, and the conflict continued until Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
Context and Challenges
The agreements were criticized for their vague language and conflicting interpretations.
Ukraine viewed them as steps toward reintegration, while Russia and the separatists interpreted them as legitimizing DPR/LPR autonomy.
Implementation was hampered by mistrust, continued skirmishes, and political deadlock.
The agreements are now widely regarded as defunct following Russia’s 2022 invasion and subsequent annexation of Donbas territories.
The Istanbul Talks of 2022 refer to a series of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia held in Istanbul, Turkey, primarily during March and April 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. These talks aimed to secure a ceasefire and lay the foundation for a potential peace agreement. While they did not produce a final signed treaty, they resulted in a draft framework commonly referred to as the Istanbul Communiqué, which outlined potential settlement terms. Below is a summary of the key provisions, based on available sources:
Key Provisions of the Istanbul Communiqué (March 29, 2022)
According to Ukrainian negotiators and various reports, the draft agreement included the following elements, though none were finalized or mutually agreed upon:
1. Ukrainian Neutrality
Ukraine would adopt permanent neutrality, enshrined in its constitution, prohibiting membership in military alliances like NATO.
Ukraine would not host foreign military bases, personnel, or weapons—including NATO troops and trainers.
Ukraine could pursue European Union membership, which Russia reportedly agreed to "facilitate" in some drafts—marking a shift from its earlier opposition to Ukraine's EU integration.
2. Military Restrictions
Russia proposed substantial limits on Ukraine’s military, including reducing active-duty troops to 85,000–100,000 (from ~250,000), capping tanks, missiles, aircraft, and limiting missile ranges to 40 km.
Ukraine pushed back on these limitations, especially troop caps, and insisted on maintaining a large reserve force.
Discussions on military force size were deferred to a potential future meeting between Presidents Zelenskyy and Putin.
3. Security Guarantees
A multilateral security guarantee system was proposed, involving the five permanent UN Security Council members (U.S., Russia, China, U.K., and France), among others.
Guarantors would be obligated to intervene militarily if Ukraine were attacked again, loosely modeled on NATO’s Article 5.
Russia demanded veto power over such interventions, which Ukraine and Western partners rejected as unworkable and reminiscent of the UN’s veto gridlock.
Critics noted that the proposed guarantees lacked binding enforcement mechanisms, undermining Ukraine’s security.
4. Territorial Issues
Crimea: The status of Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, would be deferred for 10–15 years of negotiations. Ukraine would refrain from using force to reclaim it, while not formally recognizing Russia’s annexation.
Donbas: The future of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions—controlled in part by Russian-backed separatists since 2014—was left for further negotiation. Some drafts suggested autonomy within Ukraine, though Russia reportedly sought full recognition of the regions as Russian territory, which Ukraine rejected.
5. Ceasefire and Withdrawals
A full, unconditional ceasefire covering land, sea, and air operations was proposed—initially for 30 days and extendable.
Russia would withdraw its forces to pre-invasion positions (as of February 23, 2022), retaining control of parts of Donbas and Crimea. Ukraine demanded that such withdrawal not be seen as legitimizing any territorial claims.
Provisions included an “all-for-all” prisoner exchange and the return of deported or forcibly displaced individuals.
6. Other Provisions
Ukraine proposed Russian reparations for war damages, which Russia rejected.
Russia demanded official status for the Russian language in Ukraine and constitutional amendments to formalize neutrality—both opposed by Ukraine.
A potential Zelenskyy–Putin summit was envisioned to resolve remaining issues and finalize any agreement.
Why the Talks Failed
The Istanbul talks collapsed in April 2022 for several key reasons:
Bucha Massacre: Revelations of Russian atrocities in Bucha and Irpin hardened Ukrainian public opinion and made political compromise increasingly untenable.
Western Influence: Reports suggest Western leaders—especially then-U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson—encouraged Ukraine to abandon the talks, promising military support for victory. Ukraine had not consulted the U.S. before issuing the communiqué, and Western powers were reluctant to commit to direct security guarantees.
Russian Demands: Russia’s insistence on veto powers, major Ukrainian military reductions, and territorial concessions was seen as tantamount to demanding Ukraine’s surrender.
Lack of Trust: Ukraine cited Russia’s prior violations of agreements (e.g., the Minsk Accords) and later described the Istanbul terms as a “Russian ultimatum,” not genuine negotiation.
Strategic Shift: Ukraine’s battlefield gains in Kharkiv and Kherson, along with increased Western military support, shifted Kyiv’s calculus toward a military solution over diplomacy.
Context and Aftermath
While some saw the Istanbul Communiqué as a potential breakthrough, critics viewed it as a "blueprint for Ukraine’s capitulation," leaving the country disarmed and vulnerable to future Russian aggression.
Russia later claimed the talks could form the basis for a peace agreement, while Ukraine dismissed them as unacceptable. In December 2024, Zelenskyy publicly stated that the draft amounted to surrender.
In 2025, some U.S. officials (such as envoy Steve Witkoff) suggested revisiting the Istanbul framework, though others—including envoy Keith Kellogg—argued that circumstances had changed too much for the terms to remain relevant.
Note on Sources
This summary is based on draft documents and public reports from The New York Times, Reuters, Foreign Affairs, and other sources, including statements by negotiators. The drafts from March 17 and April 15, 2022, represented competing proposals rather than a finalized deal. Russia’s past violations of agreements, including the Minsk Accords, further eroded trust in any Istanbul-based peace framework.
Relation to the Minsk Agreements
Unlike the Minsk Agreements (2014–2015), which addressed the limited Donbas conflict and were signed under pressure with separatist involvement, the Istanbul Talks focused on the broader 2022 invasion and involved direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Whereas Minsk emphasized decentralization and local elections, Istanbul centered on neutrality and international security guarantees. The failure of Minsk, largely due to Russian non-compliance, influenced Ukraine’s deep skepticism toward the Istanbul process.
Circumstances of Crimea’s Invasion (2014)
The invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia occurred between February and March 2014, following a period of political upheaval in Ukraine. The key circumstances leading to the event were:
1. Euromaidan Protests and Political Upheaval
In late 2013, mass protests—known as the Euromaidan or Maidan Uprising—erupted across Ukraine after President Viktor Yanukovych, under pressure from Russia, suspended an Association Agreement with the European Union in favor of closer ties with Moscow.
The protests, centered in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), called for European integration, democratic reforms, and an end to systemic corruption. By February 2014, violent clashes between protesters and security forces had led to over 100 deaths (the “Heavenly Hundred”).
On February 21, 2014, Yanukovych signed a European-mediated agreement with opposition leaders to hold early elections. However, he fled Kyiv the following day as protests intensified, effectively abandoning his post. Ukraine’s parliament voted to remove him and appointed an interim government, with Oleksandr Turchynov as acting president.
2. Russian Strategic Interests
Russia viewed Ukraine’s pivot toward the West as a threat to its influence in the post-Soviet region, particularly after the Euromaidan movement signaled a rejection of Russian-led alignment.
Crimea held immense strategic value, especially as the home of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, leased from Ukraine until 2042. Losing Crimea would weaken Russia’s naval capabilities and regional presence.
Crimea’s majority ethnic Russian population (about 58%, per the 2001 census) and large Russian-speaking community provided Russia with a pretext for intervention under the guise of protecting Russian speakers.
3. Pretext for Intervention
Russia claimed the removal of Yanukovych was an illegal coup backed by the West, endangering Russian-speaking communities and Russia’s interests in Crimea.
Pro-Russian demonstrations—some orchestrated by Russian operatives—called for secession or Moscow’s protection, laying the groundwork for intervention.
On February 27, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Security Council decided to “begin work on returning Crimea to Russia,” a fact later revealed in a 2015 documentary.
How the Invasion Was Carried Out
The invasion is widely considered a textbook example of "hybrid warfare," combining covert military operations, disinformation, cyberattacks, and political subversion. It unfolded quickly and effectively:
1. Deployment of “Little Green Men”
On February 27, 2014, armed men in unmarked uniforms—later confirmed to be Russian special forces and Spetsnaz—seized key government buildings in Simferopol, including the Crimean parliament and the Council of Ministers.
These “little green men” blockaded Ukrainian military bases, airports (including Simferopol and Sevastopol), and other critical infrastructure, cutting off Ukrainian reinforcements.
Russia initially denied involvement, claiming they were local "self-defense units." In 2015, Putin admitted these forces were Russian military personnel acting under his orders.
2. Control of Strategic Assets
Russian forces, including the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea, quickly took control of military installations, ports, airfields, and communication centers.
Ukrainian garrisons were encircled, cut off from supplies and communication, and pressured to surrender. Many soldiers, under-equipped and demoralized, eventually complied.
By early March, Russia had de facto control of Crimea with minimal armed resistance.
3. Political Manipulation and Referendum
Under Russian military presence, the Crimean parliament appointed pro-Russian politician Sergey Aksyonov as regional leader.
On March 6, 2014, the parliament scheduled a referendum on Crimea’s status, presenting a binary choice that heavily favored joining Russia.
The referendum, held on March 16, 2014, was widely condemned as illegitimate. It was conducted under military occupation, lacked credible international observation, and was marred by coercion and ballot irregularities. Official results claimed 96.8% voted to join Russia, with an 83% turnout—figures disputed by independent observers.
On March 17, Crimea’s parliament declared independence and requested annexation. Putin signed a treaty the next day, formalizing annexation on March 21, 2014.
4. Disinformation and Propaganda
Russia deployed an aggressive propaganda campaign to justify the intervention, portraying it as a humanitarian mission to protect ethnic Russians from “fascist” Ukrainian nationalists.
False claims of persecution and threats to Russian speakers were widely circulated in state-controlled media, though no credible evidence supported these assertions.
Russian-backed militias staged demonstrations to simulate popular support for annexation.
5. International Context
Ukraine’s interim government was politically unstable, and its military unprepared for such a swift operation.
Western responses were limited to condemnation and targeted sanctions against Russian officials and entities. No military assistance was provided to Ukraine at the time.
The invasion violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.
Key Details and Outcomes
Timeline: The operation began on February 27 and concluded with formal annexation by March 18, 2014.
Casualties: The invasion saw minimal bloodshed. A few Ukrainian personnel were killed (e.g., Serhiy Kokurin on March 18), and some activists were abducted or tortured.
Ukrainian Military Response: Ukraine had about 18,000 troops in Crimea. Around 50% defected to Russia, while others surrendered or withdrew. Evacuation began in late March.
International Reaction: The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 68/262 on March 27, affirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and declaring the referendum invalid (100 in favor, 11 against, 58 abstentions). Only a handful of countries—such as North Korea and Syria—recognized Russia’s annexation.
Aftermath: Crimea remains under Russian control. The annexation fueled the war in Donbas and laid the groundwork for Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
Relation to the Istanbul Talks (2022)
During the 2022 Istanbul negotiations, Crimea’s status remained unresolved. The draft communiqué proposed a 10–15-year moratorium on the issue, during which Ukraine would refrain from using force, and Russia would retain de facto control. No agreement was reached. Ukraine has since declared its intention to liberate Crimea, viewing the annexation as a gross violation of international law.
NATO Expansion After 1991
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO underwent significant eastward expansion, incorporating former Soviet-aligned states and former Soviet republics into the alliance. This expansion was driven by a combination of post–Cold War geopolitical shifts, the desire of Eastern European nations to secure protection against potential Russian aggression, and NATO’s open-door policy. Below is an overview of NATO’s expansion after 1991:
1. Context of Expansion
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 created a security vacuum in Eastern Europe. Former communist states sought integration with Western institutions—particularly NATO and the EU—to ensure political stability, democracy, and protection from a resurgent Russia.
NATO’s 1990 London Declaration marked a shift from confrontation to cooperation, encouraging former adversaries to engage through initiatives like the Partnership for Peace (PfP), launched in 1994.
Russia, weakened in the 1990s, initially participated in the PfP and signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, which established a framework for cooperation. However, as Russia regained strength under Vladimir Putin, it grew increasingly hostile toward NATO’s expansion.
2. Waves of NATO Enlargement
1999: The first post–Cold War expansion included Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, all former Warsaw Pact members. They joined on March 12, 1999, seeking NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantees.
2004: The largest single expansion wave added seven countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The inclusion of the Baltic states—former Soviet republics bordering Russia—heightened Moscow’s concerns.
2009: Albania and Croatia joined, consolidating NATO’s position in the Balkans.
2017: Montenegro became a member, extending NATO’s presence in the Western Balkans.
2020: North Macedonia joined, completing the Balkan round of expansion.
2023: Finland joined on April 4, doubling NATO’s land border with Russia (Finland shares a 1,340 km border). This move was prompted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
2024: Sweden joined on March 7, 2024, enhancing NATO’s strategic presence in the Baltic Sea region.
3. Key Statistics
NATO expanded from 16 members in 1991 to 32 by 2024.
The alliance’s borders moved approximately 1,000 km closer to Russia, especially through the accession of Poland and the Baltic states.
Each expansion wave required extensive reforms from candidate countries in the areas of democracy, governance, and military alignment, often taking several years.
4. Mechanisms and Policies
NATO’s Open Door Policy (Article 10 of the Washington Treaty) allows any European country capable of contributing to the alliance’s security to apply for membership.
The Membership Action Plan (MAP), introduced in 1999, outlines the process for aspiring members to meet NATO standards.
Programs like the Partnership for Peace (PfP) helped prepare countries for membership and fostered dialogue with non-member states, including Ukraine and Georgia.
Ukraine’s Constitutional Commitment to NATO and Russia’s Reaction
1. Ukraine’s NATO Aspirations
Ukraine began cooperating with NATO in the 1990s through the PfP program. Interest deepened after the 2004 Orange Revolution, which brought pro-Western leadership to power.
At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members” in the future. However, no timeline or MAP was granted, due to Russian objections and opposition from Germany and France.
Following the 2014 Euromaidan revolution, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the outbreak of war in the Donbas, Ukraine decisively pivoted westward. In 2017, Ukraine’s parliament passed legislation prioritizing NATO integration.
On February 7, 2019, Ukraine amended its constitution to enshrine its strategic objective of joining NATO and the EU, marking a symbolic and legal break from Russian influence.
2. Russia’s Reaction and Historical Context
Strategic Concerns: Russia views NATO’s expansion—especially into Ukraine—as a direct threat to its national security. Ukraine shares a 2,295 km border with Russia, and its accession would place NATO infrastructure close to Russia’s core. Moscow has long argued that NATO expansion violates informal post–Cold War assurances, though no formal agreement prohibited it.
Historical Analogies to Hitler and Napoleon:
Putin and other Russian leaders have drawn comparisons between NATO’s expansion and historic Western invasions—Napoleon’s 1812 campaign and Hitler’s 1941 invasion. Both advanced through territories that include modern Ukraine.
In speeches from 2014 and 2022, Putin framed NATO as a modern-day threat akin to past Western aggressors, asserting that Ukraine's NATO membership would undermine Russia’s “strategic depth.”
In his February 21, 2022 speech, Putin claimed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s constitutional commitment were part of a Western conspiracy to encircle Russia—citing this as a justification for the invasion.
Specific Sticking Points:
Ukraine’s 2019 constitutional amendment was viewed by Russia as a permanent break from neutrality, eliminating the possibility of Ukraine serving as a geopolitical buffer state.
Russia’s 2021–2022 ultimatums, delivered through draft treaties, demanded legally binding guarantees from the U.S. and NATO to halt further expansion, specifically excluding Ukraine. Russia also sought the withdrawal of NATO forces from countries that joined after 1997.
The potential deployment of NATO bases, missile systems, or troops in Ukraine exacerbated Russian fears, especially given Kyiv’s geographic proximity to Moscow (around 500 km).
3. Why Ukraine’s NATO Commitment Became a Flashpoint
Geopolitical Rivalry: Ukraine’s westward alignment threatened Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space and initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union.
Domestic Politics in Russia: Putin has used the perceived NATO threat to bolster domestic support and present himself as the defender of Russian sovereignty.
Military Implications: Ukraine’s NATO membership would invoke Article 5, potentially drawing NATO into direct conflict with Russia. Even without formal membership, NATO’s training missions and arms shipments to Ukraine since 2014 were perceived in Moscow as creeping integration.
Istanbul Talks (2022): During the negotiations, Russia demanded Ukraine abandon its NATO ambitions and adopt constitutional neutrality. Ukraine countered with a proposal for neutrality in exchange for international security guarantees, but Russia rejected this as inadequate, contributing to the talks' collapse.
Relation to Historical Invasions
Napoleon (1812): Napoleon’s Grand Army invaded Russia through present-day Ukraine, culminating in the Battle of Borodino and the burning of Moscow. The campaign reinforced the strategic value of buffer territories.
Hitler (1941): Nazi Germany’s Operation Barbarossa invaded the Soviet Union through Ukraine and Belarus, causing massive destruction and over 20 million Soviet deaths. Ukraine was a central battleground.
While these analogies are used by Russian leaders to evoke fear and justify aggression, NATO is a defensive alliance, not an expansionist empire. Nevertheless, these historical narratives are deeply rooted in Russian memory and political rhetoric.
Current Status (as of June 2025)
Ukraine remains a NATO partner but is not yet a member. At the 2024 Washington Summit, NATO reaffirmed that Ukraine’s path to membership is “irreversible,” but no MAP or timeline was provided due to the ongoing war.
Russia’s 2022 invasion was, in part, motivated by Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, which Putin cited as a casus belli. Ironically, the invasion has strengthened NATO—prompting Finland and Sweden to join, and increasing NATO’s military engagement with Ukraine.
Ukraine’s constitutional commitment to NATO remains intact, and President Zelenskyy has rejected neutrality as a viable concession—especially after Russia’s 2022 annexation of four Ukrainian regions.
Russia’s Political System, Leadership, and Prospects for Change
Below, we address your questions about Russia’s political system, Vladimir Putin’s leadership, the death of Alexei Navalny, the potential for Russia to join NATO, the conditions under which Putin’s regime could collapse, and the possibility of a coup, including key figures who could initiate one. Each section is concise yet comprehensive, drawing on current information and critically examining the context.
Why Is Russia Not a Democracy Despite Holding Elections?
Although Russia holds regular elections, it is not considered a democracy due to the absence of key democratic features such as free and fair elections, political pluralism, an independent media, and the rule of law. Its system is often described as a "managed democracy" or “sovereign democracy”—a façade to legitimize authoritarian rule. Key issues include:
Controlled Elections: The Kremlin manipulates elections through tactics like ballot stuffing, voter suppression, and disqualification of legitimate challengers. For instance, opposition leader Alexei Navalny was barred from the 2018 election due to politically motivated charges. In the 2024 election, Putin secured 87% of the vote in a process labeled a "pantomime," with credible challengers like Boris Nadezhdin excluded.
Suppression of Opposition: Opposition figures are routinely jailed, exiled, or killed. Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) was declared “extremist” in 2021, barring its members from political participation. Other critics, such as Boris Nemtsov (assassinated in 2015), faced lethal consequences.
Media Control: The Kremlin dominates the media landscape, pushing pro-Putin narratives. Independent outlets have been shuttered or forced into exile—particularly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Judicial Subservience: Courts function as tools of the regime, issuing politically motivated convictions. Navalny’s repeated prosecutions and sentences illustrate how the judiciary is used to neutralize dissent.
Constitutional Manipulation: In 2020, constitutional changes enabled Putin to potentially remain in power until 2036, eliminating term limits and undermining democratic accountability.
These features classify Russia as authoritarian. Elections are staged rituals, not mechanisms for meaningful political change.
Why Is Putin Called a Dictator?
Vladimir Putin is widely labeled a dictator due to his consolidation of power, elimination of institutional checks, and aggressive suppression of dissent. Characteristics include:
Centralized Control: Putin dominates all branches of government, security services, and the state-controlled economy. The United Russia party and nominal “opposition” parties are Kremlin-aligned.
Longevity: In power since 2000 (excluding a nominal presidency swap with Medvedev from 2008–2012), Putin has manipulated elections and the constitution to stay in office longer than many Soviet leaders.
Repression: His regime has employed poisoning, imprisonment, and assassination to silence critics—Navalny (2020, 2024), Nemtsov (2015), and Prigozhin (2023) are notable examples.
Cult of Personality: State media portrays Putin as a near-mythic figure and national savior, reinforcing ultra-nationalist and militarist narratives.
Corruption: Putin presides over a kleptocracy. Navalny’s investigations revealed elite enrichment schemes—most famously the “Palace for Putin” exposé.
Putin’s Russia meets the criteria of a personalist autocracy, as confirmed by numerous political analysts and institutions.
Circumstances of Alexei Navalny’s Death
Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most prominent opposition figure, died on February 16, 2024, in the Arctic prison colony “Polar Wolf.” While the Kremlin claims he died of natural causes, strong evidence suggests state involvement.
Official Narrative: Authorities stated Navalny collapsed during a walk and died despite medical efforts. No independent autopsy or investigation was permitted.
Imprisonment Conditions: Navalny was serving a 19-year sentence under brutal conditions—including solitary confinement and medical neglect—after surviving a 2020 Novichok poisoning attributed to Russian security services.
Accusations of Murder: Western governments and human rights groups blamed the Kremlin. His widow, Yulia Navalnaya, called it a state-sanctioned assassination. The timing, just before the 2024 election, suggests a political motive to eliminate dissent.
Aftermath: Despite crackdowns, Navalny’s death sparked public mourning and defiance. Yulia Navalnaya emerged as a leading opposition voice, vowing to carry on his legacy.
The opacity of the investigation and Russia’s history of targeting Navalny strongly indicate his death was deliberate.
Could Russia Join NATO After Reforms?
In theory, a fully reformed Russia could apply to join NATO. However, due to its geopolitical size, history, and adversarial posture, membership is extremely unlikely.
Requirements:
Democracy: NATO requires democratic governance. Russia would need free elections, rule of law, and media independence.
Market Economy: Economic reform would mean dismantling the oligarchic system and aligning with Western norms.
Military Reform: Russia would have to embrace civilian control over its military and abandon aggressive doctrines.
Barriers:
Geopolitical Role: As a nuclear superpower, Russia resists collective security constraints and fears loss of sovereignty.
Historic Tensions: Decades of hostility and mutual distrust—especially over NATO’s post-1991 expansion—complicate any trust-building.
Imperial Mindset: Russian nationalism, territorial disputes (e.g., Crimea), and historical narratives hinder alignment with NATO’s defensive identity.
NATO Skepticism: Current members, particularly in Eastern Europe, would likely veto Russia’s membership.
Conclusion: A democratic Russia might revive cooperation with NATO, but full membership remains unrealistic. A strategic partnership—akin to the 1990s—would be more plausible.
Could Putin’s Regime Collapse?
Putin’s regime is durable but not invincible. Several scenarios could trigger collapse:
1. Economic Collapse
Sanctions and trade disruptions post-2022 have hurt Russia, though ties with China and India provide lifelines.
A significant drop in energy revenues or internal mismanagement could provoke unrest.
2. Military Defeat
A major Ukrainian victory would undermine Putin’s image as a strongman.
The 2023 Wagner mutiny revealed cracks in military loyalty.
3. Elite Fractures
The regime relies on elite loyalty and patronage. If key figures perceive Putin as a liability, they could defect.
A succession crisis due to illness or death could destabilize the system.
4. Mass Protests
Symbolic events like Navalny’s death could spark mass mobilization, though repression has kept protest levels low.
5. External Pressure
Greater Western support for Ukraine or Russian opposition groups could compound internal strains.
Conclusion: While the regime appears stable, a combination of war failures, economic decline, and elite defection—similar to 1991—could lead to collapse.
Could There Be a Coup? Three Likely Organizers (2025)
A coup is possible but unlikely without a major crisis. Putin maintains loyalty through surveillance, patronage, and purges. That said, potential players include:
1. Sergei Shoigu (Security Council Secretary, ex-Defense Minister)
Why: Shoigu has deep military ties and could act if he sees Putin as a strategic liability.
Limitations: His career is tied to Putin. He lacks independent political support.
2. Nikolai Patrushev (Former FSB Head, Security Adviser)
Why: As a key figure among the siloviki, Patrushev could pivot to preserve the system without Putin.
Limitations: Ideologically aligned with Putin; may prefer continuity over change.
3. Sergei Kiriyenko (Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff)
Why: Oversees political management and could rally technocratic elites for a "soft" transition.
Limitations: Lacks military power; operates within Putin’s inner circle.
Alternative Scenarios: An unknown mid-level officer or regional leader could act under crisis conditions, but no such figure has yet emerged.
Conclusion
Russia is not a democracy. It is a highly centralized autocracy where elections are manipulated, opposition is suppressed, and power is concentrated in the hands of Vladimir Putin. His rule is sustained by repression, propaganda, and economic control. Navalny’s death exemplifies the system’s brutality.
While NATO membership for a democratic Russia is theoretically possible, geopolitical and structural obstacles make it unlikely. The regime could collapse due to war losses, economic decline, or elite splits, though the barriers to such an outcome remain formidable. A coup, while possible, would require high-level coordination under crisis conditions—none of which are fully present in 2025.
The Unthinkable Path: A Roadmap to Russia Joining NATO and the EU
In the turbulent theater of 21st-century geopolitics, the idea of Russia joining NATO and the European Union may sound like fantasy. Given the brutality of the war in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and decades of mistrust between Moscow and the West, few would dare to entertain such a proposal seriously. Yet history is filled with unexpected turns—and there was a moment, not so long ago, when this very vision was not only plausible but quietly explored.
In the early 2000s, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed openness to the idea of joining NATO. In interviews and meetings with Western leaders, he floated the idea of integration—on Russia’s terms, of course. The West largely dismissed it, assuming Putin’s ambitions lay elsewhere. That assumption has proven tragically correct. But what if a long-term roadmap toward Russian integration—conditioned on sweeping reforms and genuine reconciliation—were revived? Could this be the key to ending the cycle of confrontation?
Step 1: Ceasefire and Withdrawal
No path forward is possible while Russian forces occupy Ukrainian territory. The precondition for any talks of NATO or EU engagement must be a full ceasefire, verified withdrawal, and reparations framework. This includes negotiations over Crimea and the Donbas under international law, perhaps guided by a multilateral mediation group involving the EU, Turkey, and even China.
Step 2: Normalizing Russia-Ukraine Relations
At the heart of European peace is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. A new foundation of bilateral trade, joint infrastructure projects, and cultural exchange programs could help build trust. A Russo-Ukrainian reconciliation commission—similar to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission—could provide a platform for healing, acknowledging atrocities, and rebuilding narratives of coexistence.
A transitional phase could include Ukraine agreeing to defer NATO membership until both countries are prepared to join together, ensuring that Ukraine’s security does not come at the expense of Russia’s paranoia. Meanwhile, Ukraine remains firmly embedded in the EU, and Russia must begin to align with European norms if it seeks the same.
Step 3: Domestic Reforms in Russia
This is the hardest and most essential part. For Russia to be considered for NATO or EU membership, it would need to undertake massive political and economic reforms:
Democratic revival: Free elections, a free press, independent judiciary, and the release of political prisoners.
Rule of law and anti-corruption: A complete overhaul of the legal system to match EU standards.
Human rights: Alignment with the European Convention on Human Rights, with external monitoring.
These are not modest requests. They are foundational and would require a generational change in leadership or a post-Putin political settlement—one born not from collapse, but from strategic evolution.
Step 4: Gradual Integration
Even after reforms, Russia would not simply walk into Brussels or be handed Article 5 protection. Instead, a phased integration could take place:
Observer status in NATO forums and EU institutions.
Military transparency, joint drills, and de-escalation agreements.
Economic treaties with the EU akin to the European Economic Area model.
Eventual full accession talks, perhaps in the 2040s.
Step 5: A Pan-European Peace and Security Pact
If successful, the final goal would be a unified Europe—one that includes Russia and Ukraine as peaceful, democratic nations. Such a Europe would be capable of finally turning the page on Cold War-era divisions, and instead focus on collective security, economic cooperation, and addressing shared global challenges like climate change, energy transition, and AI governance.
The Realpolitik Obstacle: Why It Might Be Unrealistic
Now, let’s be clear. This roadmap is radical and, under current circumstances, deeply unrealistic. Russia has entrenched itself in the Chinese-led BRICS+ camp, doubling down on its anti-Western rhetoric and cultivating a multipolar vision that sees NATO as an existential threat, not a potential ally.
The Kremlin’s war narrative is premised on resisting Western “decadence” and “colonialism.” Domestically, dissent is crushed. The political class depends on anti-Westernism for legitimacy. Furthermore, any retreat from its current posture would be seen by Russian elites as surrender—a fatal blow in the zero-sum games they play.
But even this realpolitik obstacle should not discourage long-term vision. In the 1950s, the idea of Germany and France sharing currency and military command would’ve sounded absurd. And yet today they anchor the European Union. What changed? Leadership, time, trauma, and economic interdependence.
Why the Proposal is Still Worth Pursuing
History is shaped not just by what is probable, but by what is possible. As climate catastrophes, digital instability, and military escalation loom, the old playbook of containment and confrontation may no longer suffice. A strong, reformed, democratic Russia embedded in the institutions of Europe is not only good for peace—it’s essential to the long-term stability of Eurasia.
Yes, it would require a post-Putin political revolution, a change in national consciousness, and perhaps a decade of internal transition. But diplomacy is about planting seeds, not just managing the weeds.
Conclusion: Vision is not naivety—it is strategy extended across time.
This roadmap isn’t an endorsement of Putin’s Russia. It is a challenge to Russia to reimagine itself—and a challenge to the West to keep the door open, even if only slightly ajar. Peace in Europe will not be won with tanks or sanctions alone. It will require imagination, realism, and the kind of long-term thinking that transcends electoral cycles.
The road to Moscow may not begin in Brussels, but the road to lasting peace might just end there.
If you reject unilateralism, bullying and aggression. If you choose instead cooperation, shared prosperity and security, the EU will always be by your side.
China did not know beforehand that Russia was going to invade Ukraine. India did not.
And while the two militaries clash on Ukrainian territory with the overwhelming damage to Ukrainian lives and property, it is at one level. It is localized war.
Putin can not complain about economic sanctions. For one, they have not been a surprise. And he, on his part, has issued retaliatory economic sanctions.
Nobody owes the Putin regime a world power status. He is not even fighting for second place. Or third, or fourth, or fifth. China is the second largest economy. India is the third largest. And if Russia were not an authoritarian kleptocracy, it migth be a vibrant knowledge economy. Putin is the problem.
These nuclear threats by Putin can not be thought of as empty words. Autocrats are known to commit suicide. The Putin inner circles often get described as a prison yard. You watch your back, I will watch mine.
Putin is not threatening Finland, or Britain. We all know a nuclear threat by either Russia or the US is a threat to the entire planet.
China and India must step in.
By that I do not mean China and India should now do what Britain has been doing, what many NATO countries have been doing. I am not asking that you take sides. But I am asking that you stop staying on the sidelines. Get actively involved in the conversation. Weigh in on both sides.
China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia all need to step into the void and help resolve the situation. This game of brinkmanship has gone too far already.
The Chinese and the Indian leadership need to demand that the heads of states of Russia, the United States, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, Britain, France and Germany meet them for a summit in a neutral territory like Brazil or South Africa, or even Indonesia and hold in person negotiations to walk back from the brink.
Putin's nuclear threats to Finland and Britain are not localized threats. They are immediate nuclear radiation threats to Russia and Europe, and an existential threat to the entire planet. That threatening posture can not be allowed to stand.
China and India should work to impose a no first use policy on all nuclear powers. Nothing less makes any sense.
Settlement in Ukraine Is Not Appeasement Settlement in Ukraine Is Not Appeasement The deep and actionable lesson we take away from Ukraine must be to settle disputes before they become great power wars and humanitarian catastrophes. ....... This year, Russia is projected to earn $320 billion in oil revenues (one-third more than in 2021), and its current account surplus will rise to $240 billion. Even on the back foot, he can continue to fund his war machine. The question is not whether he can eventually be stopped, but what he would settle for in order to hasten an end to his genocidal campaign. To get straight to the point, the answer lies in a clear legal partition of territory (gains for Russia) countered with NATO membership for Ukraine. ...... Putin has frequently spoken about his desire to unite the ethnic Russian “near abroad” under one flag. ....... knowing what we do about Putin’s disturbed psyche, isolated behavior, and delusions of grandeur—and the reality of his political and biological longevity—what diplomatic accommodation could have been sufficient to avert this worst of all possible outcomes? ....... The answer lies in settling borders before tanks cross them. In the case of Ukraine, the 2014 capture of Crimea should have disabused the West of any notion that Putin would either return the peninsula or engage fairly in a peace process over Donbas, where he has relentlessly supported pro-Russian separatist militias. Rather than the past eight years of inevitably futile diplomacy followed by the current campaign of destruction, Crimea and Donbas could have been formally ceded to Russia at the time—and Ukraine promptly admitted into the EU and NATO in response. Give—and take. ...... A country is either sovereign or it is not. Calls for “neutrality” are not conflict resolution but a recipe for further subterfuge. ..... unlike Russia, China’s military capacity is growing by giant leaps. All the more reason then, to settle with China now rather than risk misperception and escalation later. Those islands that China has built up into its own de facto possessions should be recognized as belonging to China—but allied countries should take similar actions to reinforce and defend every rocky outcrop they still possess—with bluntly transparent Western support. China should be told in the sharpest terms that military assistance will mount across the South and East China Seas until it engages in reciprocal and binding recognition. Again: settlement with deterrence. .......... Clarity over borders enables their opening to flows of talent, a competition in which the West prevails hands-down over both Russia and China. Just look at the outflow of Russian and Chinese students and professionals over the past generation, including those fleeing Moscow and Hong Kong today. A generation of talent gained is worth more than a sliver of territory lost. ......... Recent decades have laid bare how great powers can be eager to enter wars but are rarely good at preventing them. That is a dangerous paradox given how many so-called “frozen conflicts” are flaring just below the surface and away from the headlines. From the Balkans to the Caucasus to the Himalayas, unsettled conflicts are perpetual powder kegs. ....... A world of settled borders is a more peaceful world even if it is still populated by authoritarian despots.
And to think Putin is on record wanting Russia to join NATO. That was the song he was singing in the early 2000s. And that might have happened had he been a democrat like Vaclav Havel, or like Zelensky. But NATO is not just a gun, tank and missiles alliance. It is an armor wrapped around democracy. Belarus as it stands today would not be accepted as a NATO member. Because it is not a democracy.
So if Putin's Russia can aspire to join NATO, why can't Zelensky's Ukraine? Or Georgia, for that matter. Is it not for a sovereign state to decide?
If I were Ukraine, I might have aspired for a Switzerland like neutrality. Because a big military is a big expense. But Ukraine got in a hurry to join NATO precisely because Putin misbehaved in Georgia. Like Finland and Sweden are in a hurry now. The Baltic states are apopleptic.
Staying neutral was not an option after Georgia. It is even less of an option now.
The best way to make NATO defunct would be for the Putin regime to fall, and Russia go on the path of true democracy. A vibrant, democratic, federal Russia would make NATO defunct by its mere presence.
Putin went into Ukraine for the reason Saddam went into Kuwait. A dictator can not maintain the constant tension that keeps him in power unless he can keep conjuring up external threats out of thin air. Many argue Saddam might still be in power today if he had just stayed put in Baghdad. Why did he go into Kuwait? Well, he had to. That is what dictators do.
Ukraine might not have the option to militarily take back Crimea, and now Donbas, but that does not mean it needs to stop claiming them both.
It is not like there are ethnic Ukrainians in western Ukraine, and it is all just Russians in Crimea and Donbas. There are easily 100 different nationalities inside Ukraine. There are more than 100 inside Russia. Putin sits atop an empire as it is.
He does not speak for the Russians in Moscow. How can he speak for the Russians in Donbas and Crimea?
Putin's military defeat in Ukraine will lead to a collapse of support all around him in his inner circles. The world will see a new wave of democracy very much like it saw in 1989. The biggest beneficiary of Ukraine's immense sacrifice and suffering has been the United States. When you are a two party democracy, and one of those two parties is hellbent on disenfranchising large swathes of the population, you are not much of a democracy any more.
Trump needed to be beat in the US. Putin needs to be beat in Russia. And Le Pen needs to be beat in France.
Eastern Ukraine braces for onslaught U.S. military analysts are predicting Russian forces will conduct a major attack on eastern Ukraine's Donbas region, between the city of Izium and the strategic hub of Dnipro. ...... Russian airstrikes have already destroyed Dnipro's airport. Meanwhile, local leaders are urging civilians to evacuate. ...... In the aftermath of the Kramatorsk train station attack that killed more than 50 civilians, one shopkeeper told The New York Times, "The town is dead now." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has demanded a tougher global response to the missile strike. ........ Ukraine is pursuing 5,600 war crimes cases ....... The latest EU sanctions include a ban on the import of coal, wood and chemicals from Russia and banning many Russian ships and trucks from accessing the bloc. ....... S&P Global downgraded Russia's currency rating to "selective default" over concerns the country won't fulfill its obligations on foreign debt. ...... Russia has revoked the registrations of 15 foreign organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, that have accused Russian troops of committing war crimes. ......... NATO countries have agreed to send more heavy weapons to Ukraine. ....... Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov admitted in an interview that Russia has suffered “significant losses of troops” in Ukraine, a rare admission by Moscow that the war has not gone to plan. ...... More than 11 million people have been displaced by the war in Ukraine. That number includes 4 million who have fled abroad, half of whom are children. .......... Western sanctions are likely successfully disrupting Russia’s military-industrial base. .
Nepal’s shortsighted view-tower craze Corruption is the driving force behind wasteful spending on construction of view-towers on Himalayan peaks ....... Politicians at all three levels of government in Nepal appear to be racing against time to build a concrete view-tower on every mountain in the country, and a gate outside every town. ........ politicians know exactly what they are doing by putting up these non-essential monstrosities. It is kickbacks that are lubricating these contracts. ....... So, instead of expanding health posts and hospitals, retrofitting school buildings to make them seismic resistant, or ensuring safe drinking water supply, elected people’s representatives are squandering taxpayer money on useless structures. .......... It is not just view-towers, but high rises in the middle of nowhere, enormous statues of gods and saints, outsized cement replicas of fruits and products municipalities are famous for, and elaborate gates at the entrance of every town or village. ........ A 80m high statue of the saint Byas is being constructed in Tanahu district at a cost of Rs450 million in the hope of attracting pilgrims to a place where the holy man was supposed to have meditated. ........ In Morang, the Sundar Haraicha Municipality has started building the world’s biggest statue of a cow, lavishing nearly Rs1 billion in the project. ....... Former prime minister K P Oli set the stage by laying the foundation stone for a Rs2.5 billion view-tower project in Jhapa’s Damak last year. His rival Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the Maoist Centre was not far behind and inaugurated a $6 billion view-tower on a mountain top in Rolpa commemorating guerrillas killed during the insurgency. ....... Bagmati Province has allocated Rs180 billion for over a dozen view-towers projects across central Nepal this year. Gandaki Province has budgeted Rs176 million to develop 44 tourist destinations, most of which will have
view-towers on already lofty peaks
. ....... it appears like local governments have run out of places to dig new and poorly-engineered roads and have been attracted by erecting view-towers to impress voters ...... Kathmandu Metropolitan City is building a 29-floor high rise at a cost of Rs5 billion near Tundikhel that is already an eyesore and will be a white elephant. Not to be outdone, Biratnagar is putting up its own high rise at a cost of Rs4 billion. ....... Federalism was supposed to inject more accountability — at least at the local level. The opposite seems to have happened in the past five years. ........ It could be because view-towers are easy to build, posts can be padded and accord a lot of opportunity for hidden over-invoicing, and the political party gets to show voters it is committed to ‘development’. ........ Many environmentalists and even engineers have pointed out that Nepal’s high mountains are already so high that they serve as view-towers. Adding an extra few metres on them is illogical and adds nothing to the panorama. They say that if it is the vista that the planners want, viewing platforms would be more appropriate. ......... Inspired by the Great Wall of China, Helambu Rural Municipality is constructing a 60km stone trail, dubbed ‘the Helambu Great Trail’. ........ All these view-towers have one thing in common: they are of no help to the local people — they serve no purpose, economic or otherwise. There is no business plan or an analysis of return on investment. .
