A Path to Stability: Achieving Strategic Goals in Iran Without Total Collapse

 

A Path to Stability: Achieving Strategic Goals in Iran Without Total Collapse

The United States and its allies have long grappled with how to address Iran’s role in the Middle East, balancing the need for strategic change with the risks of destabilization. An Iraq-style collapse, marked by chaos, sectarian violence, and a power vacuum, is not only undesirable but a nightmare scenario that could leave the U.S. footing a massive bill for reconstruction and stabilization. The goal, then, is to achieve meaningful change in Iran without plunging the country into anarchy. A carefully calibrated middle ground exists—one that could reshape Iran’s political landscape, neutralize its most destabilizing elements, and secure international interests without triggering a catastrophic implosion.

A Vision for Transition

The cornerstone of this approach is a negotiated transition that sees Iran’s Supreme Leader, the figurehead of the country’s theocratic system, agree to go into exile. This would mark a seismic shift, removing the ideological linchpin of the Islamic Republic’s governance without requiring a full dismantling of the state. In parallel, Iran’s president would step into the role of Interim Prime Minister, tasked with steering the country toward elections for a constituent assembly. This assembly would draft a new constitution, laying the foundation for a more inclusive and democratic system.

To ensure stability during this transition, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a powerful and often destabilizing force, must be dissolved immediately. However, to avoid alienating its members or sparking resistance, a one-year cooling-off period would allow former IRGC personnel to reintegrate into society, with options to join the national army or police forces under strict vetting. An interim cabinet, composed of diverse political and social factions, would govern during this period, ensuring representation and reducing the risk of factional conflict.

Denuclearization with Pragmatism

A critical component of this strategy is addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iran must agree to cease all uranium enrichment on its soil—a non-negotiable step to reassure the international community and prevent proliferation risks. However, to maintain Iran’s energy independence and avoid economic backlash, it could continue to develop nuclear energy using imported fuel. This compromise balances Iran’s sovereignty with global security concerns, offering a face-saving way for Tehran to step back from the brink of nuclear weaponization.

The Role of External Powers

For this plan to succeed, international cooperation is essential. Russia and China, both of which maintain significant influence over Iran, could play pivotal roles in applying diplomatic pressure to secure buy-in from Tehran’s leadership. Their involvement would lend legitimacy to the process and counter accusations of Western overreach. By framing the transition as a pragmatic step toward regional stability, rather than a capitulation to Western demands, Moscow and Beijing could persuade Iran’s elite to accept the deal.

Why This Matters

This middle-ground approach avoids the pitfalls of an Iraq-style collapse, which would likely result in sectarian strife, refugee flows, and a breeding ground for extremism—outcomes that serve no one’s interests, least of all the United States. By preserving Iran’s state institutions while dismantling its most problematic elements, the plan offers a path to a more stable, less confrontational Iran. It also reduces the financial and military burden on the U.S., which would otherwise face the daunting task of managing a post-collapse quagmire.

Challenges and Considerations

The road to this outcome is fraught with challenges. The Supreme Leader’s exile would require deft diplomacy and guarantees of safety, possibly brokered by neutral parties. The IRGC’s dissolution could face resistance, necessitating careful management to prevent rogue elements from destabilizing the transition. Moreover, Iran’s hardliners may view any concessions on nuclear enrichment as a betrayal, requiring assurances that the country’s energy needs will be met.

Yet, the alternative—a total collapse or prolonged confrontation—is far worse. A collapsed Iran would empower extremist groups, exacerbate regional tensions, and burden the U.S. with long-term costs. By contrast, a managed transition offers a chance to reshape Iran’s trajectory, align it with global norms, and reduce the risk of conflict.

A Call for Bold Diplomacy

Achieving strategic goals in Iran demands bold but pragmatic diplomacy. By leveraging international partnerships, offering Iran a viable path to reintegration, and avoiding the chaos of total collapse, the U.S. and its allies can secure a more stable Middle East. This middle ground—exile for the Supreme Leader, an interim government, IRGC dissolution, and a nuclear compromise—represents a rare opportunity to achieve transformative change without catastrophic costs. The time to act is now, before escalating tensions force less desirable outcomes.

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This blog post reflects a hypothetical scenario based on strategic considerations. The views expressed are for discussion purposes and do not represent official policy or predictions.

A middle-ground strategy for Iran could achieve U.S. goals without triggering an Iraq-style collapse—a nightmare scenario that’d leave America footing the bill. Here’s how it could work: 1/

— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) June 19, 2025

A Path to Stability: Achieving Strategic Goals in Iran Without Total Collapse https://t.co/rt6vPHp6if

— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) June 19, 2025

The Issues With Calling for a Regime Change in Iran ....... Iran is not Syria, Libya, or Iraq. If President Trump joins the war on Iran and commits the United States to removing the Iranian regime, the results will likely be more catastrophic than the 2003 war on Iraq, which killed more than 1.2 million people, displaced more than nine million Iraqis, contributed to the emergence of the Islamic State, and cost the United States about $3 trillion. America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also contributed significantly to the squandering of its unipolar moment and setting off the decline of the American century. .......... American analysts often underestimate the strength of the Iranian state, which is structured for survival. The Iranian military has a dual architecture designed to resist coups and invasions: Artesh, the regular armed forces of around 420,000 men across ground, naval, air, and air-defense forces, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an elite, ideologically driven military with roughly 190,000 personnel across ground, naval, and air branches. Beyond them is the Basij, a vast paramilitary network with hundreds of thousands of members embedded in every corner of Iranian society—in the streets, in neighborhoods, in schools, and mosques. They aren’t just loyalists of Ayatollah but woven into a deeper idea of the state and committed to the independence of Iran. .......... Despite Israel’s extensive and quite successful campaign of assassinations targeting senior IRGC commanders, the core of this group has not been hollowed out but hardened. A younger generation of more ideologically rigid commanders has emerged. They came of age in a regional military power, see themselves as the stewards of an embattled regional order, and push for more aggressive postures toward the United States and Israel—stances their more pragmatic predecessors, shaped by the war with Iraq, often resisted. This new generation of Iranian military commanders has also been battle-hardened in close-quarter conflict in Syria and understand how wars of state collapse can unfold. .......... If this war morphs into a war of state collapse—and it very well might—then what comes next will likely not be surrender. The Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, which helped organize a patchwork of militias that bled American forces in Iraq for years, is well-positioned to do the same again. These networks—Lebanese, Iraqi, Syrian, Afghan—were built precisely to extend deterrence and sow instability in the event of direct conflict. Israel has deeply weakened Iran’s axis of non-state actors in the region, but Tehran retains the ability to foment militias to fight against American and Israeli troops and interests. ....... ....... Bombing campaigns could significantly destroy military and civilian infrastructure in Iran but to replace the Iranian regime, President Trump has to be prepared to fight not just a standing army but a system with decades of experience in asymmetric warfare. ......... Iran is not governed by a single man or clique that can be decapitated. The Iranian state is a competitive authoritarian system with institutions that have evolved over a century. Even amid crises, the system generates new leaders, factions, and power centers. Even the deaths of some influential figures would not bring the system down—it would renew it.......... Saddam owned the skies. He wielded nerve gas. He had Western and Soviet support. Still, Iran did not fall. ........ The war with Iraq scarred Iran, however it taught the country that survival does not require parity but endurance. In the decades since, the Iranian state has reorganized itself not for peace, but for siege. Its military doctrine is not built for conquest but for resistance. Iran won’t simply absorb aerial bombardment or shrug off sabotage. .......... Iran is a civilizational state. The identity binding many Iranians is not limited to a flag or a government but rooted in a deeper historical memory stretching back through empire, invasion, forced partitions, foreign coups, and colonial interludes. To be sure, the Islamic Republic has inflicted great suffering upon the Iranian people and enraged many Iranian protestors, but to mistake that rage for a longing to be “liberated” by foreign forces is to repeat the catastrophic delusions that defined the Iraq war in 2003. .......... Iran is four and a half times the size of Germany, with 92 million people. There are millions of Iranians who want an end to the Islamic Republic, but there are also millions who would fight any foreign attempt to decide what replaces it. ......... many in Iran’s security establishment are likely to believe that only nuclear deterrence can ensure regime survival. The lesson they are likely to draw from the past two decades is that surrender does not lead to safety. Saddam gave up his weapons. He was invaded. Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program. He was overthrown. ........... The irony is that the most ardent proponents of regime change in Iran may be accelerating the very nuclear program they claim to fear.