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Tuesday, June 24, 2025

Gaza's Crisis



The humanitarian crisis in Gaza is catastrophic, driven by prolonged conflict, blockades, and restricted aid access. Below is an overview of its extent, major donors, and primary aid delivery paths, based on available information.

Extent of the Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza
  • Scale and Severity: The crisis is described as "apocalyptic" by humanitarian organizations, with the entire population of approximately 2.1–2.3 million facing acute food insecurity. As of June 2025, 93% of Gaza’s population (1.95 million people) experience crisis levels of hunger, with 470,000 at risk of starvation. Famine risks persist due to ongoing hostilities and aid restrictions.
  • Displacement: Over 1.9 million people (90% of the population) are displaced, many multiple times, confined to shrinking safe zones. Since the ceasefire collapse in March 2025, over 640,000 have been newly displaced.
  • Health and Nutrition: The healthcare system is near collapse, with 80% of health facilities damaged or destroyed. Over 5,000 children were treated for acute malnutrition in May 2025, a 150% increase from February. Only one medical point is partially functional in North Gaza. Disease outbreaks, including Hepatitis A, are rampant due to poor sanitation and water shortages.
  • Infrastructure: Nearly 89% of school buildings are damaged or destroyed, affecting 547,000 students. Agriculture, fishing, and critical infrastructure (water, electricity, sanitation) are decimated, exacerbating shortages.
  • Casualties and Aid Worker Safety: Tens of thousands have been killed or injured since October 2023, with at least 278 aid workers killed, the highest in any conflict since the UN’s founding.
  • Aid Blockages: An 11-week aid blockade from March to May 2025 halted all supplies, including food, medicine, and fuel, worsening conditions. Even after partial resumption, aid remains insufficient, with UNRWA unable to deliver supplies since March 2025.
Major Donors of Aid
  • United States: The largest single donor to UNRWA, contributing $344 million in 2022 and over $5.2 billion through USAID since 1994. Recent aid includes $417 million for UNRWA and $75 million via USAID, though funding was temporarily suspended in 2024 due to allegations against UNRWA staff.
  • European Union: A long-standing donor, providing humanitarian aid since 2000. In 2025, the EU launched a Humanitarian Air Bridge, delivering 4,700 tons of cargo via 72 flights. Member states like Germany, France, and Spain also contribute.
  • Qatar: Pledged $1 billion at the 2014 Cairo Conference, with $1.3 billion provided since 2012 for construction, health, and agriculture. In 2021, Qatar committed $500 million for reconstruction.
  • UNRWA Donors: In 2022, UNRWA received $1.17 billion from various nations and organizations. Other notable donors include Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, though some paused funding in 2024.
  • Other Contributors: Egypt pledged $500 million post-2021 conflict, though delivery is unclear. Palestinian expatriates and private donors also provide significant funding, particularly to Hamas-run initiatives.
  • NGOs and Charities: Organizations like Anera, supported by over 60,000 individual donors from 130 countries, and groups like CARE USA, Mercy Corps, and Oxfam, play a critical role.
Major Paths for Aid Delivery
  • Land Crossings:
    • Kerem Shalom Crossing: The primary entry point since Rafah’s closure in May 2024, handling most aid trucks. Over 66,000 trucks delivered 1.3 million tons of aid since October 2023, though volumes dropped sharply during blockades.
    • Rafah Crossing: Used until May 2024, when it closed due to Israeli control. During the January–March 2025 ceasefire, 164 trucks passed through Rafah and Kerem Shalom.
    • Crossing 96: A new route opened near Kibbutz Be’eri for northern Gaza, though its capacity is limited.
    • Jordanian Route: Expanded via Allenby Crossing for inspections, directing aid to Kerem Shalom.
  • Air and Sea:
    • Airdrops: Facilitated by the U.S., Jordan, and others, airdrops increased after February 2024 incidents. The EU’s Humanitarian Air Bridge delivered 4,700 tons by May 2025.
    • Maritime Corridor: A Cyprus-to-Gaza route, supported by the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, was used but halted during blockades.
  • Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF): A controversial U.S.- and Israeli-backed initiative launched in May 2025, distributing over 310,000 food boxes via militarized hubs in Rafah and Deir al-Balah. Criticized by the UN and NGOs for violating humanitarian principles, it faces security risks and limited reach.
  • UN and NGO Networks: UNRWA, WFP, and NGOs like the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) distribute aid internally, though restricted access and attacks on convoys hinder efforts. PRCS processed over 22,700 trucks since 2023.
Challenges and Context
  • Blockades and Restrictions: Israel’s blockade, intensified since March 2025, limits aid to far below the pre-war 500–600 trucks daily, with estimates suggesting 1,000–1,500 are needed. Inspections and bans on “dual-use” items delay shipments.
  • Coordination Issues: Poor coordination between Israel, Egypt, the UN, and NGOs, coupled with donor fatigue and political tensions, hampers aid delivery.
  • Hamas and Security: Israel alleges aid diversion by Hamas, prompting restrictions and the GHF model. Humanitarian groups report minimal diversion, emphasizing civilian desperation.
  • Ceasefire Impact: The January–March 2025 ceasefire allowed aid surges, but its collapse reversed gains, leaving supplies stranded.
(https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/humanitarian-aid-gaza-failure-and-success-year)[](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_aid_to_Palestinians)[](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/middle-east-and-northern-africa/palestine_en)











The question of why Israel cannot pursue regime change in Gaza akin to the U.S.-led transformations in Germany and Japan post-World War II, and why ordinary Gazans suffer, is complex, involving historical, political, legal, and practical dimensions. Below, we address these issues concisely, drawing on the context of Gaza’s humanitarian crisis and relevant geopolitical factors.
Why Israel Cannot Pursue Regime Change Like Post-WWII Germany and Japan
  1. Different Historical Contexts:
    • Post-WWII: Germany and Japan were defeated nation-states with centralized governments that surrendered unconditionally after total war. The U.S. and Allies had clear mandates to occupy and rebuild, backed by international consensus and resources (e.g., the Marshall Plan). Gaza, by contrast, is a small, non-sovereign territory under partial Israeli control since 1967, with Hamas as a non-state actor governing since 2006. There is no equivalent total defeat or international mandate for regime change.
    • Gaza’s Status: Gaza is part of the occupied Palestinian territories, not a recognized state. International law, including UN resolutions, views Israel as an occupying power with obligations to protect civilians, not to unilaterally impose governance. Regime change would likely violate these legal frameworks, unlike the post-WWII Allied occupations, which were legitimized by victory and global agreements.
  2. Lack of International Support:
    • Post-WWII, the U.S. led a coalition with broad international backing to rebuild Germany and Japan as democratic states to counter communism. In Gaza, there is no global consensus for regime change. Key players (e.g., UN, EU, Arab states) prioritize Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution over foreign-imposed governance. Many view Israeli actions as exacerbating conflict, not resolving it, reducing support for such a move.
    • Regional dynamics, including opposition from Egypt, Qatar, and others with influence in Gaza, complicate intervention. Unlike post-WWII, where the U.S. faced minimal regional pushback, Israel faces hostility or skepticism from neighbors.
  3. Hamas’s Resilience and Local Support:
    • Hamas, unlike the Nazi or Imperial Japanese regimes, is a decentralized, ideologically driven movement rooted in Palestinian resistance. It won elections in 2006 and retains significant local support, despite its authoritarian rule. Removing Hamas militarily risks insurgency, as seen in past Israeli operations (e.g., 2008–09, 2014, 2023–25). Post-WWII regimes were dismantled with little residual resistance; Hamas’s structure makes this unlikely.
    • Any attempt at regime change would require a viable alternative. The Palestinian Authority (PA), weakened and viewed as corrupt by many Gazans, lacks the legitimacy or capacity to govern effectively. Imposing a new regime without local buy-in would likely fail, as seen in U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  4. Practical and Military Constraints:
    • Gaza’s dense population (2.1–2.3 million in 360 km²) and urban environment make large-scale military occupation logistically challenging and costly, with high civilian casualties. Post-WWII occupations involved vast resources and years of rebuilding; Israel, a smaller state, lacks the capacity for a comparable effort.
    • Ongoing conflict dynamics, including Hamas’s rocket capabilities and tunnel networks, mean regime change would require prolonged occupation, risking escalation with groups like Hezbollah or Iran-backed militias.
  5. Legal and Ethical Barriers:
    • International humanitarian law (e.g., Geneva Conventions) obligates Israel, as the occupying power, to ensure civilian welfare, not to reshape Gaza’s governance unilaterally. Regime change could be seen as annexation or colonization, drawing condemnation and potential sanctions.
    • The U.S. post-WWII model involved denazification and democratization with broad societal reform. In Gaza, imposing a new system risks being perceived as suppressing Palestinian rights, further inflaming tensions.
Why Ordinary Gazans Suffer
  1. Conflict Dynamics:
    • The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly since Hamas’s 2006 takeover, has led to repeated wars (2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2023–25). Israel’s military operations, aimed at neutralizing Hamas’s attacks (e.g., rockets, incursions), often involve airstrikes and ground operations that damage civilian infrastructure. Hamas’s tactics, such as operating within civilian areas, contribute to high civilian tolls.
    • The blockade, imposed by Israel and Egypt since 2007 to weaken Hamas, restricts goods, fuel, and movement, causing economic collapse, unemployment (over 50%), and shortages of food, water, and medicine. The blockade’s broad impact hits civilians hardest, as seen in the 2025 aid blockade, which halted supplies for 11 weeks.
  2. Aid Restrictions:
    • Israel’s security measures, including inspections for “dual-use” items (e.g., materials that could be weaponized), delay or block aid. From March to May 2025, no aid entered Gaza, exacerbating hunger and disease. Even when crossings like Kerem Shalom operate, aid volumes (e.g., 66,000 trucks since October 2023) fall short of the 500–1,500 daily trucks needed.
    • Hamas has been accused of diverting aid, though humanitarian groups report minimal evidence compared to civilian desperation. Mismanagement and corruption within Gaza’s governance also hinder equitable distribution.
  3. Political Stalemate:
    • The lack of progress toward a two-state solution or unified Palestinian governance (Hamas vs. PA) perpetuates instability. Israel’s government, particularly under right-wing coalitions, prioritizes security over humanitarian relief, viewing concessions as emboldening Hamas.
    • International donors, while providing billions (e.g., $1.17 billion to UNRWA in 2022), face donor fatigue and political constraints, limiting aid’s impact. Temporary ceasefires, like January–March 2025, offer relief but don’t address root causes.
  4. Civilian Impact as Leverage:
    • Both sides use civilian suffering strategically. Israel’s blockade aims to pressure Hamas, but it collectively punishes Gazans. Hamas’s refusal to disarm or negotiate sustains the cycle of violence, as it prioritizes resistance over civilian welfare. This dynamic traps ordinary Gazans, who lack agency in the conflict.
Conclusion
Israel cannot replicate the U.S.’s post-WWII regime change due to Gaza’s non-state status, lack of international support, Hamas’s resilience, and legal/practical constraints. Ordinary Gazans suffer because of the blockade, military operations, aid restrictions, and political stalemate, with both Israel and Hamas prioritizing strategic goals over civilian welfare. Addressing the crisis requires coordinated international efforts, a viable Palestinian governance alternative, and a path to de-escalation, none of which are currently feasible.



The proposed framework—outlawing Hamas, granting Gaza autonomy with Israeli oversight, and establishing democratic governance through elections—is theoretically appealing but faces significant obstacles. Below, we evaluate its feasibility and explain why it is unlikely, addressing each component and the broader context.
Proposed Framework and Feasibility Analysis
  1. Outlawing Hamas Like the Nazi Party
    • Concept: Banning Hamas, as the Nazi Party was outlawed in post-WWII Germany, would aim to dismantle its political and military structures, delegitimizing its ideology and preventing its governance.
    • Challenges:
      • Historical Mismatch: The Nazi Party’s outlawing followed Germany’s unconditional surrender and total occupation by Allied forces, with international consensus and resources for denazification. Hamas, a non-state actor rooted in Palestinian resistance, operates in a fragmented, occupied territory without a clear defeat. Its ideology blends political Islam with nationalism, retaining significant local support (e.g., Hamas won 44% of votes in 2006). Eradicating it would require sustained military and ideological efforts, risking insurgency, as seen in Iraq post-2003.
      • Regional Opposition: Unlike the Nazis, who lacked external backers post-WWII, Hamas receives support from Iran, Qatar, and others. Outlawing it would require consensus from regional powers (e.g., Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia), many of whom see Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement or a counterweight to Israel. Qatar, for instance, has provided $1.3 billion to Gaza since 2012, partly through Hamas channels.
      • Practical Issues: Hamas’s decentralized structure, with underground networks and civilian integration, makes it hard to dismantle. Past Israeli operations (e.g., 2014, 2023–25) weakened but didn’t eliminate it. A ban could push it underground, fueling militancy rather than eliminating it.
      • Legal and Ethical Concerns: Outlawing a group with significant local legitimacy risks alienating Gazans, violating principles of self-determination under international law (e.g., UN Charter). Unlike Nazi Germany, Gaza’s status as occupied territory limits external powers’ authority to impose such measures.
  2. Granting Gaza Autonomy with Israeli Oversight
    • Concept: Gaza would gain self-governance, potentially leading to statehood, with Israel controlling defense and foreign policy. A new police force would maintain order.
    • Challenges:
      • Trust Deficit: Gazans view Israel as an occupying power, not a neutral overseer, due to the blockade, settlements, and military operations (e.g., 80% of Gaza’s health facilities damaged by 2025). Israeli oversight would likely be seen as colonization, not autonomy, undermining legitimacy.
      • Regional Resistance: Arab states and the Palestinian Authority (PA) advocate for full Palestinian sovereignty, not partial autonomy under Israel. Egypt and Jordan, key regional players, would likely oppose a framework that entrenches Israeli control, fearing it would derail a two-state solution.
      • Security Risks: Israel’s control over defense and foreign policy could perpetuate conflict. Hamas or other groups could exploit resentment to launch attacks, as seen with 7,000 rockets fired since 2006. Building a police force from scratch, free of Hamas influence, would be daunting in a polarized, militarized environment.
      • Path to Statehood: Autonomy as a stepping stone to statehood assumes agreement on borders, Jerusalem, and refugees—issues unresolved for decades. The collapse of Oslo Accords and subsequent talks (e.g., Camp David 2000) shows the difficulty of aligning Israeli and Palestinian visions.
  3. Free and Fair Elections and Democratic Local Governance
    • Concept: Establishing democratic institutions through elections to ensure accountable governance in Gaza.
    • Challenges:
      • Hamas’s Influence: Free elections could see Hamas or its allies win, as in 2006, undermining the goal of removing its influence. Suppressing their participation would contradict democratic principles, risking accusations of rigging.
      • Institutional Vacuum: Gaza’s governance infrastructure is weak, with UNRWA and NGOs filling gaps left by Hamas and the PA. Building democratic institutions requires stability, resources, and trust, all scarce amid ongoing conflict and displacement (1.9 million displaced by 2025).
      • External Interference: Regional powers (e.g., Iran, Qatar) and Israel could influence elections, as seen in past Palestinian polls. Ensuring “free and fair” voting in a war-torn, blockaded territory is logistically and politically complex.
      • Cultural and Political Barriers: Democratic governance assumes a unified populace and civic culture, but Gaza’s polarization (Hamas vs. PA supporters) and economic desperation (50% unemployment) hinder consensus-building.
Why This Framework Is Unlikely
  1. Lack of Regional Consensus:
    • Regional powers (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Turkey) have conflicting interests. Egypt and Jordan prioritize stability and oppose Hamas’s militancy but reject Israeli dominance. Iran backs Hamas as a proxy against Israel. Qatar and Turkey see Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement. Unlike post-WWII, where Allies shared a clear goal, no unified vision exists for Gaza. The Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation advocate Palestinian sovereignty, not Israeli-led regime change.
  2. Israeli Domestic Politics:
    • Israel’s government, especially under right-wing coalitions (e.g., 2022–25), prioritizes security over Palestinian statehood. Public opinion, hardened by attacks like October 2023, opposes concessions. Agreeing to Gaza’s autonomy or statehood would face fierce domestic backlash, especially if it involves ceding defense control.
  3. Palestinian Divisions:
    • The Hamas-PA rift, unresolved since 2007, prevents a unified Palestinian stance. The PA, weakened and unpopular, cannot govern Gaza without significant reform. Any framework ignoring Hamas’s base or the PA’s aspirations would fail to gain traction.
  4. International Law and Opinion:
    • The UN and international community view Gaza as occupied, with Israel bound by the Geneva Conventions to protect civilians, not impose governance. A regime change effort led by Israel would likely draw condemnation, sanctions, or ICC scrutiny, unlike the U.S.’s post-WWII mandate. Global powers like the EU and China advocate diplomacy, not unilateral action.
  5. Ongoing Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis:
    • The crisis’s scale—93% of Gazans food-insecure, 89% of schools destroyed, 640,000 newly displaced in 2025—makes governance reform secondary to survival. Aid blockades (e.g., March–May 2025) and attacks on aid workers (278 killed) show the environment is too volatile for elections or institution-building.
  6. Hamas’s Resilience:
    • Hamas’s ideological and military entrenchment, backed by external funding (e.g., Iran’s $100 million annually), makes it hard to eradicate without massive civilian cost. Unlike the Nazi Party, which collapsed with Germany’s defeat, Hamas thrives in Gaza’s chaos, drawing strength from resistance narratives.
Could It Be Possible?
  • Hypothetical Conditions: The framework could work only with:
    • A robust international coalition (UN, U.S., EU, Arab League) enforcing a peace plan, akin to post-WWII.
    • Hamas’s voluntary disarmament or defeat, with a viable alternative (e.g., reformed PA) ready to govern.
    • Massive reconstruction aid (far exceeding the $1.17 billion UNRWA received in 2022) to stabilize Gaza.
    • Israeli-Palestinian agreement on statehood terms, including borders and security.
  • Reality: These conditions are absent. The U.S., a key player, is distracted by domestic politics and global conflicts. Arab states prioritize their own stability. Israel and Hamas remain locked in zero-sum conflict. The humanitarian crisis (e.g., 470,000 at starvation risk) demands immediate relief, not long-term governance experiments.
Conclusion
The proposed framework is theoretically sound but impractical due to regional divisions, Hamas’s resilience, Israeli security priorities, Palestinian fragmentation, and international legal constraints. Ordinary Gazans suffer not because such a plan is inherently impossible, but because the political will, trust, and stability needed to implement it are lacking. A starting point would require a sustained ceasefire, massive aid (e.g., 1,000 trucks daily vs. 66,000 since 2023), and inclusive talks, but these remain elusive.




The humanitarian crisis in Gaza, marked by acute food insecurity (93% of the population, or 1.95 million people, facing crisis levels of hunger), widespread displacement (1.9 million displaced), and near-total collapse of health and infrastructure systems, demands urgent action. Below, we outline the fastest ways to provide general relief, the quickest path to normalcy, and identify powers committed to rebuilding, based on available information and the context of your previous questions.
Fastest Way to Provide General Relief to Gazans
  1. Immediate Ceasefire and Hostage Release:
    • A sustained ceasefire, as seen briefly in January–March 2025, is critical to halt hostilities and enable safe aid delivery. The UN, Egypt, Qatar, and the U.S. have pushed for ceasefire agreements, with the ICRC facilitating hostage releases during past truces. Reinstating and sustaining a ceasefire would reduce immediate threats to civilians and aid workers (278 killed since 2023).
    • Action: All parties (Israel, Hamas) must agree to a UN-mediated ceasefire, with Egypt and Qatar as brokers, to ensure safe access for humanitarian operations.
  2. Open All Border Crossings for Unrestricted Aid:
    • The blockade, intensified from March to May 2025, cut off all aid, leaving supplies like food, water, and medicine critically low. Reopening crossings like Kerem Shalom (66,000 trucks since 2023), Rafah (closed since May 2024), and Crossing 96 is essential. The UN estimates 1,000–1,500 trucks daily are needed, far above current levels.
    • Action: Israel must comply with international court orders to allow unrestricted aid, increase inspection capacity (e.g., more scanners, extended hours), and restore basic services like water and electricity. NGOs like Oxfam and UNICEF, already reaching 1.3 million and distributing cash transfers, need safe access to scale up.
  3. Scale Up Humanitarian Operations:
    • Food and Cash Assistance: UNICEF’s cash transfers support vulnerable groups (e.g., female-headed households), reaching one-third of Gazans. The World Food Programme (WFP) has aided 856,700 people but warns of operational collapse without more access.
    • Health and Water: Repairing water pipelines, installing desalination units, and supplying medical kits (e.g., UNFPA’s reproductive health kits) are critical. Only one medical point is partially functional in North Gaza.
    • Shelter and Sanitation: Providing temporary shelters (e.g., mobile homes) and restoring sanitation (e.g., latrines, waste collection) can address immediate needs for 1.9 million displaced.
    • Action: UNRWA, Oxfam, and PRCS should receive increased funding and security guarantees to distribute aid door-to-door and at 400+ distribution points.
  4. Airdrops and Maritime Corridors:
    • Airdrops (e.g., EU’s Humanitarian Air Bridge, 4,700 tons delivered) and the Cyprus-to-Gaza maritime route can bypass land blockages but are insufficient alone. These are high-risk and limited in scale compared to land routes.
    • Action: Expand airdrops and maritime deliveries as stopgaps while prioritizing land access.
Quickest Path to Normalcy
Normalcy in Gaza—defined as restored basic services, economic activity, and governance—requires addressing both immediate and structural challenges. The quickest path involves:
  1. Sustained Ceasefire and Security Framework:
    • A permanent end to hostilities, as proposed in the three-phase ceasefire deal, is a prerequisite. Phase 3 focuses on reconstruction but depends on Phase 1 (ceasefire) and Phase 2 (Israeli withdrawal, hostage releases).
    • Action: Egypt, Qatar, and the U.S. must broker a deal ensuring Israeli troop withdrawal and Hamas’s disarmament, with a multinational force (e.g., Arab-European coalition) for interim security.
  2. Interim Governance and Palestinian-Led Administration:
    • Hamas’s monopoly on power must end, but the Palestinian Authority (PA) lacks legitimacy and capacity to govern Gaza immediately. An apolitical, technocratic council, as suggested in Egypt’s March 2025 plan, could manage reconstruction and services, with PA consultation.
    • Action: Establish a Palestinian-led council, vetted by Israel and the U.S., to oversee aid distribution, rebuild schools (89% damaged), and restore health services (80% facilities destroyed). Local businesses and youth entrepreneurs should be included to ensure community buy-in.
  3. Economic and Infrastructure Revival:
    • Rubble Clearance: Gaza’s 42–50 million tons of rubble must be recycled (e.g., for roads, sea defenses) to clear space for rebuilding. UNOPS and the UN propose two debris sites, requiring environmental studies and Israeli approval.
    • Economic Recovery: Emergency employment programs and grants for small enterprises can address 50% unemployment. Restoring agriculture (50% assets destroyed) and fishing (90% of fishermen impoverished) requires seeds, feed, and access to land/sea.
    • Action: Fund vocational training and micro-grants via ILO and UNDP, and ease Israel’s dual-use material restrictions to rebuild water, power, and sanitation systems.
  4. De-radicalization and Social Rebuilding:
    • Ending Hamas’s ideological influence requires a new social contract, with media platforms (e.g., “Radio Free Gaza”) to amplify moderate voices. Schools must reopen without Hamas’s curriculum by late 2025.
    • Action: Implement a de-radicalization program (DDR) with international support, focusing on reintegrating ex-Hamas members under strict rules.
Powers Committed to Rebuild
  • Qatar: Pledged $1 billion in 2014 and $500 million in 2021 for roads, hospitals, and housing. Qatar’s past investments and mediation role suggest continued commitment, though conditional on a political solution.
  • Egypt: Committed $500 million post-2021 and leads mediation efforts. Egypt’s March 2025 plan excludes Hamas from governance and proposes a Palestinian council, indicating readiness to support reconstruction.
  • United States: Proposed a controversial Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) in 2025, delivering 310,000 food boxes, and supports a PA-led security force. The U.S. may provide logistical support (e.g., airlifts, intelligence) but not troops, with funding possibly from seized Iranian assets.
  • European Union: Delivered 4,700 tons via airlifts and supports maritime corridors. EU member states (e.g., Germany, France) have historically funded UNRWA ($1.17 billion in 2022).
  • Jordan: Provides aid convoys, airdrops, and field hospitals, advocating for a political solution to enable reconstruction.
  • United Nations: UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP, and UNDP are key players, with UNCTAD estimating $50 billion needed for rebuilding. The UN proposes debris management and economic recovery programs but requires donor funding.
  • Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and others may contribute if tied to a broader peace deal (e.g., normalization with Israel), but donor fatigue is a concern.
  • Turkey: Expressed interest in reconstruction to gain regional influence, potentially alongside Qatar.
  • China: Offered to assist with rebuilding, though specifics are unclear.
  • Israel: Some sources suggest Israel may contribute to reconstruction post-Hamas defeat, but this is unlikely without international pressure due to its role in the blockade and destruction.
Challenges and Context
  • Blockade and Restrictions: Israel’s control over dual-use materials and crossings (e.g., Kerem Shalom, Rafah) delays rebuilding. Easing restrictions is critical but politically contentious.
  • Hamas’s Role: Its weakened but persistent control complicates governance transitions. Any plan must address reintegration or isolation of Hamas members.
  • Donor Fatigue: Gulf states and others hesitate without a political resolution to prevent recurring destruction.
  • Regional Politics: Egypt and Jordan fear mass displacement, while Iran’s support for Hamas complicates Arab states’ involvement.
  • Governance Vacuum: The PA’s lack of legitimacy and Hamas’s influence hinder stable administration.
Conclusion
The fastest relief comes from a ceasefire, opening all crossings, and scaling up aid via UNRWA, UNICEF, and NGOs, using land, air, and sea routes. Normalcy requires a Palestinian-led technocratic council, rubble clearance, and economic revival, supported by a multinational security force. Qatar, Egypt, the U.S., EU, Jordan, and the UN are committed to rebuilding, with potential roles for Turkey, China, and Gulf states, but success hinges on a political solution and Israel’s cooperation. Without these, Gaza’s crisis—marked by famine risk and 89% infrastructure damage—will persist.

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