Exploring critics' perspectives on Xi Jinping, especially regarding China’s growth slowdown and missteps under his leadership:
🚦The Critics’ Lens: Xi Jinping’s Economic Slowdown and Governance Misfires
When Xi Jinping assumed China’s presidency in 2013, the nation was enjoying its famed double-digit GDP growth—an era of seemingly unstoppable economic ascent. But critics contend that these golden days faded swiftly under his tenure, and hold Xi responsible for several pivotal miscalculations.
1. From Decades of Blaze to Cooling Flames
Sharp deceleration after Xi’s rise: Growth, once hovering near 10%, fell to official reports of ~5% by 2023. Actual indicators suggest it might’ve been only 1–2% in real terms after COVID lockdowns (foreignaffairs.com).
Long-term drag factors: Analysts attribute the slowdown to heavy-handed state capitalism—rising SOE debts, a bursting real-estate bubble, and low consumer confidence—all intensified under Xi’s rule .
2. Critique of Xi's Economic Strategy
Retreat from market reforms: Xi reined in private-sector dynamism. Purges in tech, restrictions on tutoring and ride‑hailing, and CCP watchdogs on corporate boards have discouraged entrepreneurial confidence (en.wikipedia.org).
Debt-heavy stimulus, but little reform: Critics argue Xi's top-down investments in real estate and infrastructure often resulted in inefficient capital use, swelling local debt while neglecting true structural reform (e.g., property taxes, hukou reform, fiscal overhaul) .
Echo-chamber leadership: Concentration of power made Xi less responsive to feedback, raising the chance of policy errors—some warn his "one-man rule" stokes populist unrest (foreignaffairs.com).
3. Key Missteps Critics Believe Xi Has Made
Issue
Critics’ Concern
Zero-COVID & abrupt reopening
The harsh lockdowns were seen as overly authoritarian; the chaotic reopening triggered health crises (asiasociety.org).
Private sector crackdown
Sweeping regulations on tech, education, and finance have destabilized major growth engines .
Real estate and debt crises
State-led investment binge fueled property collapse and soaring debt among local governments and SOEs .
Stifling consumer confidence
High youth unemployment, lagging incomes, and murky financial markets persist amid weak domestic demand .
Political repression & purges
Harsh anti-corruption campaigns eliminated both rivals and loyalists, creating governing instability .
Centralizing policy control
A tight grip on the economy may suppress innovation and agile responses to challenges .
Critics caution that China risks becoming trapped—unable to transition smoothly to a more advanced, consumption-led growth model due to aging demographics, debt burdens, and weak reforms (marketwatch.com).
They argue that Xi’s reluctance to embrace deeper economic liberalization—land, education, and social welfare reform—could solidify this stagnation.
5. The Political-Economic Tradeoff
Xi's ruling philosophy emphasizes party control and self-reliance. But critics say:
Party strength has grown, yet public trust in the system has weakened under youth unemployment and economic stagnation .
Continuous purges and ideological campaigns may serve political consolidation, but they undermine elite trust and governance stability (asiasociety.org).
🔍 Final Thoughts
Critics of Xi see a paradox: his rule is more centralized than any since Mao, yet his economic record is underwhelming by China’s own recent standards. They argue Xi has replaced Deng-era pragmatism and private-sector vitality with state-led orthodoxy, regulatory crackdowns, and political control, culminating in slower growth, rising debt, and shakier confidence.
Whether Xi’s strategy succeeds—or whether it slides China into a middle-income abyss—remains a defining question of his era. For now, critics warn that the quest for control may have come at the expense of economic dynamism, and that reversing this trajectory will require bold reform choices Xi has so far resisted.
Asia Society analysis of purges and governance risks (asiasociety.org)
MarketWatch coverage on export-led model breakdown (marketwatch.com)
Reuters/Bloomberg on debt, stimulus, and Xi’s priorities (wsj.com)
In essence, critics ask: Has Xi traded China's greatness for greater control—and is that bargain paying off?
1/ 🚨 Under Xi Jinping, China went from blazing economic growth to a serious slowdown. Critics say the golden days ended because of Xi’s choices—not despite them.
Here’s a thread on what they say went wrong 👇🧵
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) June 12, 2025
Is the Chinese Political System a Meritocracy? A Case for the Argument
When people think of political meritocracy, China might not be the first country that comes to mind. It’s often described as authoritarian, opaque, or top-down. But peel back the layers, and one finds a complex, hierarchical political structure that prizes competence, long-term performance, and technocratic skill—arguably more so than many electoral democracies. In this blog post, we’ll explore the case for why China’s political system can be considered a meritocracy.
1. The Cadre Promotion System: Climbing the Ladder Through Performance
At the heart of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system is a bureaucracy where advancement is based on track record, not popularity. Party members begin at local levels and must work their way up through township, county, provincial, and eventually national levels. Promotions are tied to the ability to deliver economic growth, maintain social stability, and meet central policy targets.
Unlike in many democracies, where a single charismatic campaign or media surge can propel someone to the highest office, Chinese officials often spend decades moving up the ranks. Xi Jinping himself spent years governing rural provinces like Hebei and Fujian before reaching the top. The system is structured to reward not only loyalty but also proven administrative capability.
2. Technocratic Governance: Engineers Over Ideologues
China has been governed for decades by technocrats—leaders with backgrounds in science, engineering, and economics. The majority of senior CCP leaders have advanced degrees and extensive administrative experience. In fact, China has one of the highest concentrations of PhDs among top government officials.
This technocratic orientation is reflected in long-term planning documents like the Five-Year Plans and in the implementation of ambitious infrastructure and technological goals. Whether one agrees with their policies or not, Chinese leaders are rarely political novices. They are seasoned administrators and planners, groomed over years to think in systemic, data-driven terms.
3. Policy Continuity and Strategic Vision
Democracies often suffer from electoral short-termism—what's popular for the next election, not what’s right for the next decade. China’s political system, insulated from election cycles, enables leaders to pursue long-range policies with consistency. Programs like the Belt and Road Initiative or the Made in China 2025 plan are multi-decade efforts with clear metrics and phased implementation. Such sustained policy execution is difficult without a trained and competent bureaucracy.
Meritocracy here doesn’t mean infallibility, but it does mean that policy is designed and implemented by people with subject-matter expertise, not just political capital.
4. Anti-Corruption and Internal Evaluation
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has waged a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that has disciplined or removed over 1.5 million officials. While some critics see this as a political purge, many observers agree it has also raised the bar for administrative integrity. Internal CCP evaluations are intense, with data audits, peer reviews, and local satisfaction surveys contributing to promotion decisions.
An official who fails to meet local development goals or is found incompetent is unlikely to advance. Internal feedback mechanisms, although opaque to outsiders, are very real and rigorous within the system.
5. Public Input Without Direct Elections
Contrary to common belief, China’s political system does include mechanisms for citizen feedback. The central government conducts nationwide surveys, collects big data on public sentiment via digital platforms, and tests policy in pilot cities before scaling. This blend of experimentation, feedback, and adaptation allows Chinese leaders to be responsive even without direct electoral accountability.
It’s a different form of legitimacy—performance-based rather than vote-based. And when performance metrics are met, especially in areas like poverty reduction, infrastructure delivery, or technological innovation, the system’s legitimacy is reinforced.
Conclusion: A Different Kind of Meritocracy
China’s political meritocracy is not without flaws—lack of transparency, limited public dissent, and censorship are real and valid concerns. But dismissing the entire system as merely authoritarian overlooks a crucial reality: the Chinese state is run by an elite that, for the most part, has proven its competence over time and risen through a structured merit-based system.
In contrast to systems that prioritize popularity, fundraising, or ideology, China’s model puts a premium on institutional experience, technocratic ability, and delivery of results. Whether one supports or opposes this model, it deserves recognition as an alternative mode of governance—one that claims legitimacy not through ballots, but through outcomes.
Further Reading
Daniel A. Bell’s The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy
Cheng Li’s work at Brookings on leadership transitions in China
Reports on CCP’s cadre evaluation system by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China: A Modern Autocracy Disguised in Bureaucratic Rigor
Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, China has operated under the absolute control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While some describe the system as meritocratic, the undeniable truth remains: China is, and has always been, an autocracy—one where power is centralized, dissent is suppressed, and political pluralism is absent. In this blog post, we’ll outline why China’s political system remains fundamentally autocratic, regardless of its administrative complexity or economic performance.
1. Single-Party Rule: No Competition, No Choice
At the core of any democracy is political competition. China, by design, eliminates this entirely. The CCP has maintained an unbroken monopoly on political power since 1949. There are no meaningful elections for national leadership. Citizens cannot vote out the ruling party, criticize it openly, or form independent opposition parties. All seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee—the country’s highest decision-making body—are selected behind closed doors, not by voters.
The absence of political pluralism is the defining trait of an autocracy. In China, power flows from one party and one party alone.
2. Lack of Press Freedom and Civil Liberties
China routinely ranks near the bottom in global press freedom indices. Independent journalism is heavily censored, foreign reporters face increasing restrictions, and Chinese citizens who post dissenting views online are routinely surveilled, detained, or imprisoned.
Freedom of speech, association, and assembly—pillars of any open society—are denied. The 2015 "709 crackdown" on human rights lawyers, the detention of journalists during the COVID-19 outbreak, and the disappearance of whistleblowers all reveal a system that views freedom as a threat, not a right.
Autocracies don’t allow space for public dissent. China’s tight control of information confirms its autocratic nature.
3. A Cult of Leadership, Not Institutional Democracy
China has a long history of strongman politics—first under Mao Zedong, then briefly tempered under Deng Xiaoping’s more collective leadership model. But in recent years, President Xi Jinping has consolidated power to an extent unseen since Mao.
In 2018, China abolished presidential term limits, allowing Xi to rule indefinitely. His name and political ideology—Xi Jinping Thought—have been enshrined in the constitution, studied in schools, and invoked in every major policy speech. This personalization of power is textbook autocracy.
Rather than a rule of law, China practices rule by leader.
4. Opaque Governance and Lack of Accountability
China’s decision-making process is shrouded in secrecy. The CCP's top bodies deliberate in private, without public oversight, transparency, or media access. Citizens have no way to hold leaders accountable through judicial review, legislative inquiry, or the ballot box.
Autocracies rely on centralized, opaque authority—and China exemplifies this with a governance structure that demands loyalty, not accountability.
Even when policies fail (as seen in the early mishandling of COVID-19 or harsh zero-COVID lockdowns), there are no public reckonings. Internal party loyalty takes precedence over public responsibility.
5. Repression in the Name of “Stability”
From the crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989 to the internment of over a million Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, the Chinese state has repeatedly used mass repression to maintain its grip on power.
In Hong Kong, the promise of “One Country, Two Systems” was gutted by the National Security Law of 2020, which criminalized dissent and led to the closure of newspapers, the arrest of pro-democracy activists, and the silencing of civil society.
An autocracy isn’t just defined by how leaders are chosen—it’s defined by how power is preserved. In China, repression is a feature, not a bug.
6. No Real Checks and Balances
There is no independent judiciary in China. Courts serve the party. The military answers to the CCP, not to the state or people. Legislatures, like the National People’s Congress, act as rubber stamps rather than deliberative bodies.
A system without institutional checks is not just undemocratic—it is autocratic. All power in China ultimately flows upward to a single apex: the CCP leadership.
Conclusion: Administrative Efficiency Doesn’t Equal Political Freedom
While China’s government is often described as efficient, technocratic, or even meritocratic, these traits do not negate its autocratic nature. A competent bureaucracy does not make a regime democratic. The absence of political competition, civil liberties, and public accountability is conclusive.
China today is not transitioning toward democracy; it is deepening its authoritarian model. The fusion of surveillance technology, censorship, and centralized leadership is creating a 21st-century autocracy—smarter, faster, and more data-driven, but no less repressive.
To mistake this for meritocracy is to confuse method with morality. What China has built is not a meritocracy—it is an autocracy with performance metrics.
Further Reading
Freedom House’s Annual Reports on China’s Freedom Score
Human Rights Watch reports on repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong
The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers by Richard McGregor
China's Political System: Between Meritocracy and Autocracy — The Case for Reform
China’s political system defies easy labels. It has elements of both meritocracy and autocracy, blending technocratic governance with strict one-party control. The Communist Party of China (CCP) governs over 1.4 billion people with a model that has delivered remarkable economic results and lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty—yet it has also drawn widespread criticism for repressing dissent, lacking transparency, and concentrating power in a closed elite.
In this synthesis, we examine both sides of the debate—China as a meritocracy and China as an autocracy—and explore what meaningful political reform could look like in a uniquely Chinese context. We argue that reform is not only possible without dismantling one-party rule, but may be necessary to maintain long-term stability and global legitimacy.
The Case for Meritocracy
Bureaucratic Skill Over Popularity
China’s officials must climb through years of service, often starting at the local level. Their promotions are based on performance in metrics like GDP growth, infrastructure delivery, and policy execution. In this sense, China’s political class is trained, vetted, and evaluated—unlike many democracies where electoral charisma can sometimes outweigh competence.
Technocratic Governance
Engineers, economists, and policy wonks dominate the leadership ranks. China’s government plans decades ahead and executes mega-projects like high-speed rail, urbanization, and green energy at breakneck speed. Data-driven feedback loops and digital experimentation zones (like Shenzhen) add to this technocratic strength.
Poverty Reduction and Economic Planning
China's centralized system enabled an unprecedented, state-led campaign to eradicate extreme poverty. The success of this effort underscores the potential of a meritocratic apparatus when aligned with national goals.
The Case for Autocracy
No Electoral Legitimacy or Political Competition
The CCP allows no alternative parties or competitive national elections. Political power is concentrated at the top, and the general public has no formal say in leadership transitions or national policy direction.
Censorship and Control
Freedom of speech, media, and assembly are heavily restricted. Social credit systems, mass surveillance, and repression in regions like Xinjiang and Hong Kong are hallmarks of an authoritarian state.
Personality Cult and Lifetime Leadership
The removal of term limits for Xi Jinping in 2018 marked a regression in institutionalization. China has tilted from collective leadership back toward strongman politics, a trend that increases the risks of internal stagnation and public discontent.
A Balanced View: Dynamic but Rigid
China’s political system is effective but brittle. It produces competent administrators, but limits public feedback and constrains innovation in civil society. It executes policy with precision, but often without consent. This mix of strengths and weaknesses means that while China has outperformed many peers economically, its system faces internal pressures that could make future reform essential.
Why Reform Is Necessary—and Possible
Performance Legitimacy Isn’t Forever
The CCP’s legitimacy currently rests on its performance—growth, jobs, national pride. But what happens when growth slows, inequality rises, or global crises emerge? Without channels for grievance and adaptation, discontent can fester beneath the surface.
Capitalism Has Already Altered the Foundation
China today is not a communist economy in any traditional sense. Markets, private property, entrepreneurship, and billionaires are pillars of the system. The ideological core has already shifted. Political reforms wouldn’t be the first major transformation—economic reforms were.
The CCP Has Considered Reform Before
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms included internal debate over separating Party and state, rotating leadership, and institutionalizing checks to prevent Mao-style excess. Although these efforts largely stalled post-Tiananmen, they show that reform has long been part of the CCP’s internal discourse.
What Political Reform Might Look Like (Within One-Party Rule)
Intra-Party Democracy
Open up CCP internal elections to greater competition and transparency. Allow multiple candidates for Party leadership roles, encourage debates, and let rank-and-file members have a voice.
Independent Judiciary
A judiciary that is loyal to the Constitution, not just the Party, would offer rule of law protections while maintaining Party rule at the top.
Decentralized Governance
Empower local governments with greater autonomy to experiment with policies, thus creating a laboratory of democracy without national-level pluralism.
Public Feedback Mechanisms
Formalize channels for public petitions, deliberative councils, and citizen juries on key issues. This is already happening in limited forms—scale it up.
Media Freedoms Within Boundaries
Allow a professional, independent press to report on corruption, pollution, and mismanagement. This would strengthen the system by exposing flaws early.
Reinstitute Term Limits
Re-establishing leadership turnover rules would reduce the risk of power monopolies and signal a return to institutional governance.
Political Reform as Evolution, Not Revolution
Reform does not have to mean Western-style liberal democracy. In fact, the most sustainable path for China may be gradual evolution within the framework of one-party rule. China can modernize politically just as it did economically—pragmatically, cautiously, and in its own way.
If reforms focus on governance quality, rights protection, and institutional resilience rather than on importing foreign models, they may even strengthen the CCP’s legitimacy. The goal need not be to abandon one-party rule, but to improve the Party’s responsiveness, adaptability, and moral authority.
Conclusion: The Reform Imperative
China’s political system is a paradox of efficiency and repression, of talent and control. The CCP's strength has always been its ability to adapt. That adaptability now demands political reform. Without it, the risks of stagnation, resistance, and legitimacy crisis grow.
The tools are already in China’s hands: data, talent, economic dynamism, and a long tradition of statecraft. Reform is not a concession to the West; it’s an investment in China’s own future. A more open, resilient, and participatory system would not weaken China—it would unleash its full potential.
Further Reading
The China Model by Daniel A. Bell
From Deng to Xi: Economic Reform and the Limits of Authoritarian Adaptation by Barry Naughton
Brookings Institution papers on intra-party reform and governance innovation in China
China: Meritocracy? Autocracy? 🧵👇
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) June 3, 2025
There Are Two Chinas, and America Must Understand Both The technological success that has captured the attention of many in the United States is one aspect of the Chinese economy. There’s another, gloomy one. ....... The other China — gloomy China — tells a different story: sluggish consumer spending, rising unemployment, a chronic housing crisis and a business community bracing for the impact of the trade war. ....... China’s solutions come with a lot of pain ......... Just like the United States, China is a giant country full of disparities: coastal vs. inland, north vs. south, urban vs. rural, rich vs. poor, state-owned vs. private sector, Gen X vs. Gen Z.
The ruling Communist Party itself is full of contradictions. It avows socialism, but recoils from giving its citizens a strong social safety net.
.............. Despite the trade war, the Chinese tech entrepreneurs and investors I talked to over the past few weeks were more upbeat than any time in the past three years. Their hope started with DeepSeek’s breakthrough in January. Two venture capitalists told me that they planned to come out of a period of hibernation they started after Beijing’s crackdown on the tech sector in 2021. Both said they were looking to invest in Chinese A.I. applications and robotics. ............. But they are much less optimistic about the economy — the gloomy China. ........... they believed that China’s advances in tech would not be enough to pull the country out of its economic slump ........ Advanced manufacturing makes up about only 6 percent of China’s output, much smaller than real estate, which contributes about 17 percent of gross domestic product even after a sharp slowdown. .............. When I asked them whether China could beat the United States in the trade war, nobody said yes. But they all agreed that China’s pain threshold was much higher. ............. It’s not hard to understand the anxiety felt by Americans frustrated with their country’s struggles to build and manufacture. China has constructed more high-speed rail lines than the rest of the world, deployed more industrial robots per 10,000 manufacturing workers than any country except South Korea and Singapore and now leads globally in electric vehicles, solar panels, drones and several other advanced industries. ............ China’s top-down innovation model, heavily reliant on government subsidies and investment, has proved to be both inefficient and wasteful. Much like the overbuilding in the real estate sector that triggered a crisis and erased much of Chinese household wealth, excessive industrial capacity has deepened imbalances in the economy and raised questions about the model’s sustainability, particularly if broader conditions worsen. .......... In 2018, the country had nearly 500 E.V. makers. By 2024, about 70 remained. Among the casualties was Singulato Motors, a start-up that raised $2.3 billion from investors, including local governments in three provinces. Over eight years, the company failed to deliver a single car and filed for bankruptcy in 2023. ........... The Chinese government tolerates wasteful investment in its chosen initiatives, helping fuel overcapacity. But it is reluctant to make the kind of substantial investments in rural pensions and health insurance that would help lift consumption. ........ “Technological innovation alone cannot resolve China’s structural economic imbalances or cyclical deflationary pressures” ...... “recent advances in technology may reinforce policymakers’ confidence in the current path, increasing the risk of resource and capital misallocation.” ............ The Chinese leadership’s obsession with technological self-reliance and industrial capacity is not helping its biggest challenges: unemployment, weak consumption and a reliance on exports, not to mention the housing crisis. .......... Youth unemployment is 17 percent. The real numbers are believed to be much higher. This summer alone, China’s colleges will graduate more than 12 million new job seekers. ........... Trump was not wrong in saying factories are closing and people are losing their jobs in China. ......... In 2020 Li Keqiang, then the premier, said the foreign trade sector, directly or indirectly, accounted for the employment of 180 million Chinese. “A downturn in foreign trade will almost certainly hit the job market hard,” he said at the onset of the pandemic. Tariffs could be much more devastating. ........... In April, Chinese factories experienced the sharpest monthly slowdown in more than a year while shipments to the United States plunged 21 percent from a year earlier. .......... Mr. Chen lives in the gloomy China. He stopped taking the vaunted high-speed trains because they cost five times as much as a bus. Flying is often cheaper, too. ........ many local governments, even in the wealthiest cities, are deeply in debt. ............... Because he’s in his late 30s, Mr. Chen is considered too old for most jobs. He and his wife had given up on buying a home. Now with the trade war, he expects that the economy will weaken further and that his job prospects will be dimmer. ........ “I’ve become even more cautious with spending,” he said. “I weigh every penny.”
Prompt to ChatGPT Image Generator: Generate in the style of Artist Leonid Afremov. Topic: walking in the rain.
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) May 16, 2025
I do it. You just do it. Just get started. Make a walk from machine to machine. I think the trick is to not try to lift too heavy. Start light. Do some weight you can do. For a few weeks. Then increase.
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) May 16, 2025
Cancer research has been accelerating and on the news with discoveries, better diagnostics and smarter treatments. It’ll take time to see it all implemented, but I’ve never been more hopeful about what’s coming.
— Peter H. Diamandis, MD (@PeterDiamandis) May 15, 2025
Is this debate time sensitive?
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) May 16, 2025
Do you angel invest?
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) May 16, 2025
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) May 16, 2025
A lot of people that never traveled to China are shocked when they realize their entire perception of China was based on government propaganda. pic.twitter.com/F4MAhwFFoZ
Twitter for many years has been a place for polarized ideas clash, supported by algorithm that loves engagements and arguments. Its a place where commons sense and reality die. I wish I could have followed the advice from this video 5 yrs ago. pic.twitter.com/mYJy3SWIRI
For the past month I debated with many people on Twitter about Tariffs and China. I sadly learned that sentiment in this video is common for progressive left leaning Americans. CCP & Democratic party are closely aligned in their belief that Americans are lazy and cant work. https://t.co/jKCtWLhCnL
Trump strutted into the weekend tariff talks like a peacock, chest puffed, promising to drag factories back to American soil and make Uncle Sam’s economy roar. But what did we get? A pathetic wet noodle of a deal where China just tossed a few tariff cuts our way, like crumbs to a…
Trump capitulated today. China who exports very little and consumes very little from US will lower Tarrifs. And That is it. I support Trump more than Dems. But lets call a spade a spade.... pic.twitter.com/mYxKNY2fYg
(1) Used Smartphones & Electronics (2) Pre-Owned Fashion (Clothing & Accessories) (3) Used Furniture & Home Appliances (4) Pre-Owned Vehicles (Two-Wheelers & Cars) (5) Kids & Baby Products
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) May 16, 2025
it is amazing and exciting how much software one person is going to be able to create with tools like this.
"you can just do things" is one of my favorite memes; i didn't think it would apply to AI itself, and its users, in such an important way so soon. https://t.co/6QrZkV4oo9
Actually what is unfortunate is that with your blind lust to try to score cheap publicity points & please some people sitting across the border, you refuse to acknowledge that the IWT has been one of the biggest historic betrayals of the interests of the people of J&K. I have… https://t.co/j55YwE2r39
While our social media army is urging a boycott of Turkey, Ankara is at the heart of the ongoing Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and placing itself at the centre of the multi polar new world order. Turkish drones were used by Ukraine in war but that hasn’t stopped Russia, our…
— Rajdeep Sardesai (@sardesairajdeep) May 16, 2025
As someone involved in academic research on AI, it is notable to me that most of the key experiments showing the impressive abilities of AI on work, medicine, psychology, and so many other fields were done on GPT-4… a model that is now so obsolete that it is gone from ChatGPT. pic.twitter.com/kt7gatmbEB
There Are Two Chinas, and America Must Understand Both The technological success that has captured the attention of many in the United States is one aspect of the Chinese economy. There’s another, gloomy one. ....... The other China — gloomy China — tells a different story: sluggish consumer spending, rising unemployment, a chronic housing crisis and a business community bracing for the impact of the trade war. ....... China’s solutions come with a lot of pain ......... Just like the United States, China is a giant country full of disparities: coastal vs. inland, north vs. south, urban vs. rural, rich vs. poor, state-owned vs. private sector, Gen X vs. Gen Z.
The ruling Communist Party itself is full of contradictions. It avows socialism, but recoils from giving its citizens a strong social safety net.
.............. Despite the trade war, the Chinese tech entrepreneurs and investors I talked to over the past few weeks were more upbeat than any time in the past three years. Their hope started with DeepSeek’s breakthrough in January. Two venture capitalists told me that they planned to come out of a period of hibernation they started after Beijing’s crackdown on the tech sector in 2021. Both said they were looking to invest in Chinese A.I. applications and robotics. ............. But they are much less optimistic about the economy — the gloomy China. ........... they believed that China’s advances in tech would not be enough to pull the country out of its economic slump ........ Advanced manufacturing makes up about only 6 percent of China’s output, much smaller than real estate, which contributes about 17 percent of gross domestic product even after a sharp slowdown. .............. When I asked them whether China could beat the United States in the trade war, nobody said yes. But they all agreed that China’s pain threshold was much higher. ............. It’s not hard to understand the anxiety felt by Americans frustrated with their country’s struggles to build and manufacture. China has constructed more high-speed rail lines than the rest of the world, deployed more industrial robots per 10,000 manufacturing workers than any country except South Korea and Singapore and now leads globally in electric vehicles, solar panels, drones and several other advanced industries. ............ China’s top-down innovation model, heavily reliant on government subsidies and investment, has proved to be both inefficient and wasteful. Much like the overbuilding in the real estate sector that triggered a crisis and erased much of Chinese household wealth, excessive industrial capacity has deepened imbalances in the economy and raised questions about the model’s sustainability, particularly if broader conditions worsen. .......... In 2018, the country had nearly 500 E.V. makers. By 2024, about 70 remained. Among the casualties was Singulato Motors, a start-up that raised $2.3 billion from investors, including local governments in three provinces. Over eight years, the company failed to deliver a single car and filed for bankruptcy in 2023. ........... The Chinese government tolerates wasteful investment in its chosen initiatives, helping fuel overcapacity. But it is reluctant to make the kind of substantial investments in rural pensions and health insurance that would help lift consumption. ........ “Technological innovation alone cannot resolve China’s structural economic imbalances or cyclical deflationary pressures” ...... “recent advances in technology may reinforce policymakers’ confidence in the current path, increasing the risk of resource and capital misallocation.” ............ The Chinese leadership’s obsession with technological self-reliance and industrial capacity is not helping its biggest challenges: unemployment, weak consumption and a reliance on exports, not to mention the housing crisis. .......... Youth unemployment is 17 percent. The real numbers are believed to be much higher. This summer alone, China’s colleges will graduate more than 12 million new job seekers. ........... Trump was not wrong in saying factories are closing and people are losing their jobs in China. ......... In 2020 Li Keqiang, then the premier, said the foreign trade sector, directly or indirectly, accounted for the employment of 180 million Chinese. “A downturn in foreign trade will almost certainly hit the job market hard,” he said at the onset of the pandemic. Tariffs could be much more devastating. ........... In April, Chinese factories experienced the sharpest monthly slowdown in more than a year while shipments to the United States plunged 21 percent from a year earlier. .......... Mr. Chen lives in the gloomy China. He stopped taking the vaunted high-speed trains because they cost five times as much as a bus. Flying is often cheaper, too. ........ many local governments, even in the wealthiest cities, are deeply in debt. ............... Because he’s in his late 30s, Mr. Chen is considered too old for most jobs. He and his wife had given up on buying a home. Now with the trade war, he expects that the economy will weaken further and that his job prospects will be dimmer. ........ “I’ve become even more cautious with spending,” he said. “I weigh every penny.”
The India-Pakistan conflict, particularly over Kashmir, is a complex and volatile issue with deep historical roots and nuclear risks. Below, we address some pertinent questions systematically, focusing on world leaders best positioned to de-escalate, their potential actions, ongoing efforts, and recommendations for India and Pakistan. The analysis draws on recent developments and the geopolitical context, with a critical examination of the situation.
1. Which World Leaders Are Best Positioned to De-escalate the India-Pakistan Situation?
Several world leaders and countries have the influence, relationships, or neutrality to play a role in de-escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. The following are best positioned, based on their diplomatic leverage, regional ties, and historical involvement:
United States (President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio):
Why: The U.S. has significant influence over both India and Pakistan due to its economic, military, and diplomatic clout. It has historically mediated crises, such as the 1999 Kargil conflict, and maintains strategic partnerships with India (via the Quad and counter-China policies) and Pakistan (through security cooperation). The U.S. can leverage its position to push for restraint and dialogue.
Limitations: The current U.S. administration appears less engaged in South Asian crisis management, with President Trump stating that India and Pakistan should "figure it out" themselves. This hands-off approach reduces immediate influence, but the U.S. remains a key player due to its global heft.
China (President Xi Jinping):
Why: China has close ties with Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and growing relations with India via BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Its regional influence and economic stakes in stability make it a potential mediator. China has expressed concern over escalation and offered to mediate.
Limitations: India’s suspicion of China, especially after the 2020 Galwan clash, limits Beijing’s credibility as a neutral broker. China’s tilt toward Pakistan could also complicate its role.
Russia (President Vladimir Putin):
Why: Russia maintains strong ties with both India (via defense and energy cooperation) and Pakistan (through emerging security ties). Its neutrality in the conflict and history of advocating multilateral frameworks make it a viable mediator. Putin has reportedly offered to help resolve tensions and discuss the issue with Xi Jinping.
Limitations: Russia’s focus on Ukraine and limited regional leverage compared to the U.S. or China may constrain its impact.
Gulf States (UAE’s Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani):
Why: The Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have close economic and security ties with both India and Pakistan. The UAE brokered a 2021 Line of Control (LoC) truce, demonstrating precedent. Their energy supplies and diaspora communities (millions of Indian and Pakistani workers) give them leverage. They are actively mediating, as noted in recent diplomatic engagements.
Limitations: Their influence is primarily economic, not military, and they lack the global clout of the U.S. or China.
United Nations (Secretary-General António Guterres):
Why: The UN provides a neutral platform for diplomacy and has a history of involvement in Kashmir (e.g., the 1949 ceasefire). Guterres has expressed deep concern and offered his "good offices" for de-escalation.
Limitations: The UN’s effectiveness is limited by India’s rejection of external mediation on Kashmir, viewing it as a bilateral issue, and the Security Council’s divisions (e.g., China vs. U.S.).
Iran (President Masoud Pezeshkian):
Why: Iran shares borders with Pakistan and has historical ties with both nations. Its role as a regional power and interest in South Asian stability (especially to counter U.S. influence) make it a potential mediator. Iran is reportedly involved in indirect diplomatic engagements.
Limitations: Iran’s strained relations with India (due to geopolitical alignments) and its own regional conflicts reduce its influence.
2. What Can These Leaders Do?
World leaders can employ a combination of diplomatic, economic, and symbolic actions to de-escalate the situation:
Diplomatic Engagement:
Backchannel Talks: Facilitate secret, high-level dialogues between Indian and Pakistani officials to negotiate de-escalation and confidence-building measures (CBMs). The U.S., Russia, or the UAE could host such talks, as they have in the past.
Public Statements: Issue unified calls for restraint and dialogue, as seen from Guterres, Rubio, and Gulf leaders. These statements signal international concern and pressure both sides to avoid escalation.
Mediation Offers: Propose neutral venues (e.g., Dubai, Moscow, or Geneva) for talks, as Russia and the Gulf states have done.
Economic Leverage:
Incentives: Offer trade or aid packages to encourage de-escalation. For example, the U.S. could expedite economic deals with India or mineral agreements with Pakistan, conditional on restraint.
Sanctions Threats: Subtly signal economic penalties (e.g., reduced investment or aid) for escalation, particularly from Gulf states that host large Indian and Pakistani diasporas.
Military and Security Measures:
Arms Control Advocacy: Push for CBMs, such as hotlines between military commanders or mutual troop pullbacks along the LoC, to reduce miscalculation risks. The U.S. and Russia could lead here, given their arms trade with both nations.
Intelligence Sharing: Provide both sides with intelligence to verify claims (e.g., Pakistan’s denial of involvement in the Pahalgam attack) and reduce mistrust.
Symbolic Gestures:
High-Level Visits: Send envoys to New Delhi and Islamabad to signal commitment to peace, as Rubio has done via phone calls.
UN Resolutions or Meetings: Convene emergency UN Security Council sessions to focus global attention, though India may resist.
3. Are They Making Attempts?
Yes, several leaders and countries are actively attempting to de-escalate, though the intensity and effectiveness vary:
United States:
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has spoken with Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, urging de-escalation and cooperation against terrorism.
President Trump has expressed hope that the situation resolves quickly but has not committed to direct mediation, indicating a passive stance.
The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan issued a security alert advising citizens to avoid conflict zones, signaling awareness of the crisis.
China:
China has called India’s strikes “regrettable” and urged both sides to act with restraint, offering mediation.
Discussions between Xi Jinping and Putin in Moscow reportedly include the India-Pakistan issue, suggesting a coordinated approach.
Russia:
President Putin has advised de-escalation and offered to facilitate resolution, with plans to discuss the issue with Xi Jinping.
Russia’s neutral stance and ties with both nations position it as a potential backchannel facilitator.
Gulf States:
The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are actively mediating through indirect diplomatic engagements.
Qatar’s Foreign Ministry has emphasized open communication channels and diplomatic resolution.
The UAE’s Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed has called for restraint and de-escalation.
United Nations:
António Guterres has expressed deep concern, urged maximum restraint, and offered UN support for de-escalation efforts.
He has engaged with Jaishankar and Sharif to promote diplomacy.
Iran:
Iran is part of indirect mediation efforts alongside Gulf states, though its role is less prominent.
Other Reactions:
Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi condemned terrorism and urged dialogue to stabilize the situation.
The UK’s Foreign Secretary David Lammy has reached out to both sides, building on past de-escalation efforts in 2019.
Israel has supported India’s right to self-defense, potentially complicating its mediation role.
Egypt has called for restraint and dialogue to avoid escalation.
Despite these efforts, the U.S.’s reluctance to lead aggressively, India’s insistence on bilateral resolution, and Pakistan’s need to appear strong domestically limit progress.
4. What Should India and Pakistan Do?
To de-escalate and prevent a broader conflict, India and Pakistan must take pragmatic steps, balancing domestic pressures with the risks of nuclear escalation. Recommendations include:
For Both Countries:
Cease Hostilities: Halt cross-border strikes, drone attacks, and artillery exchanges along the LoC to create space for diplomacy.
Reactivate Hotlines: Use existing military and diplomatic hotlines to clarify intentions and prevent miscalculations, as miscommunication risks escalation.
Engage in Backchannel Talks: Pursue discreet negotiations, potentially facilitated by the UAE or Russia, to negotiate CBMs like troop de-escalation or joint anti-terrorism measures.
Control Rhetoric: Tone down public statements (e.g., Modi’s vow to punish terrorists, Sharif’s retaliation threats) to avoid locking themselves into escalatory commitments.
Address Kashmir’s Humanitarian Crisis: Both sides should prioritize protecting Kashmiri civilians, who face harassment and violence amid the conflict.
For India:
Share Evidence: Publicly release credible evidence linking Pakistan to the Pahalgam attack to justify strikes and build international support, or acknowledge uncertainty to reduce tensions.
Calibrate Responses: Avoid further strikes on Pakistani territory, as they risk provoking a tit-for-tat cycle. Focus on defensive measures and targeted counter-terrorism within India.
Engage Diplomatically: Accept third-party facilitation (e.g., from the UAE or UN) without compromising the bilateral stance, as backchannels have worked historically.
Address Domestic Pressures: Modi should manage nationalist demands for action by emphasizing long-term security over short-term retaliation, leveraging his strong domestic mandate.
For Pakistan:
Demonstrate Anti-Terrorism Commitment: Take visible steps to crack down on militant groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed, addressing India’s concerns and reducing pretext for strikes.
Avoid Over-Retaliation: Refrain from large-scale military responses, as claimed downing of Indian jets could escalate if verified. Opt for symbolic gestures (e.g., border closures) over kinetic actions.
Leverage International Support: Work with Gulf states and China to secure diplomatic backing, but avoid framing the conflict as a religious or nationalist crusade, which fuels escalation.
Address Internal Instability: The military and civilian leadership should prioritize domestic cohesion to avoid using the conflict to deflect from political crises (e.g., Imran Khan’s imprisonment).
5. Critical Analysis and Broader Context
The India-Pakistan conflict is driven by historical grievances, domestic politics, and the Kashmir dispute, exacerbated by nuclear capabilities and misinformation. Key challenges include:
Domestic Pressures: Modi faces demands to act decisively after the Pahalgam attack, while Pakistan’s military seeks to regain public support amid political turmoil. These pressures make de-escalation politically costly.
Lack of Trust: Mutual accusations (India’s claims of Pakistani terrorism, Pakistan’s denial and “false flag” allegations) and no bilateral crisis mechanisms increase miscalculation risks.
Nuclear Risks: Both nations’ nuclear arsenals raise the stakes, with U.S. intelligence warning of potential escalation from miscalculations or terrorist triggers.
Global Distraction: The U.S.’s focus on other crises (e.g., Ukraine, Middle East) and Trump’s disengagement reduce the likelihood of robust mediation, unlike past crises.
However, opportunities exist:
Third-Party Leverage: The Gulf states’ economic influence and neutrality make them effective mediators, building on the 2021 LoC truce.
Nuclear Deterrence: The presence of nuclear weapons may force caution, as both sides recognize the catastrophic costs of full-scale war.
Regional Cooperation: Platforms like the SCO could provide frameworks for dialogue, with Russia and China as facilitators.
The establishment narrative often portrays India as responding to terrorism and Pakistan as a state sponsor, but this oversimplifies the issue. Pakistan’s denials and domestic constraints, combined with India’s aggressive posturing and Kashmir policies, contribute to a cycle of escalation. A nuanced approach requires addressing Kashmir’s humanitarian and political dimensions, not just security concerns.
6. Conclusion
World leaders best positioned to de-escalate the India-Pakistan conflict include the U.S. (Trump, Rubio), China (Xi), Russia (Putin), Gulf states (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar), and the UN (Guterres). They can facilitate backchannel talks, issue calls for restraint, leverage economic incentives, and advocate CBMs. Efforts are underway, with Rubio’s calls, Gulf mediation, and UN offers, but the U.S.’s passivity and India’s bilateral stance limit progress. India and Pakistan should cease hostilities, engage in discreet talks, and address domestic pressures to avoid a nuclear-tinged escalation. The Gulf states and Russia appear most effective due to their neutrality and regional ties, but success hinges on both nations’ willingness to prioritize dialogue over retaliation.
