Barackface: china

Showing posts with label china. Show all posts

Sunday, July 06, 2025

6: China, Russia

World War III Is Unnecessary
Grounded Greatness: The Case For Smart Surface Transit In Future Cities
The Garden Of Last Debates (novel)
Deported (novel)
Empty Country (novel)
Trump’s Default: The Mist Of Empire (novel)
The 20% Growth Revolution: Nepal’s Path to Prosperity Through Kalkiism
Rethinking Trade: A Blueprint for a Just and Thriving Global Economy
The $500 Billion Pivot: How the India-US Alliance Can Reshape Global Trade
Trump’s Trade War
Peace For Taiwan Is Possible
Formula For Peace In Ukraine
A 2T Cut
Are We Frozen in Time?: Tech Progress, Social Stagnation
The Last Age of War, The First Age of Peace: Lord Kalki, Prophecies, and the Path to Global Redemption
AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism

How China Can Escape the Middle-Income Trap and Reclaim Double-Digit Growth with Clean Energy

How China Can Escape the Middle-Income Trap and Reclaim Double-Digit Growth with Clean Energy

As China stands at the crossroads of economic maturity and geopolitical complexity, the question arises: can it reignite the double-digit growth that once defined its rise without sacrificing sustainability? The answer may lie in bold political and economic reforms that enable a clean-energy-powered transformation. Escaping the middle-income trap—a condition where a country stagnates after reaching moderate income levels—requires more than tweaking the status quo. It demands a new developmental model rooted in innovation, green technology, and governance reform.

Understanding the Trap

The middle-income trap occurs when rising wages and costs erode competitiveness in low-end manufacturing, but a country lacks the institutional, technological, or human capital base to transition to high-value industries. China is perilously close to this scenario. Its once-unbeatable export machine now faces aging demographics, rising debt, environmental degradation, and geopolitical decoupling.

Yet, China's state capacity, vast domestic market, and technological progress mean that it's not stuck—yet. But escaping will require deep shifts.

I. Economic Reforms: From Imitation to Innovation

1. Restructure the Growth Model

China must pivot from investment-led growth to consumption- and innovation-driven development. Infrastructure has diminishing returns. The focus should now be on quality of growth, not quantity.

Boost household incomes through social safety nets, pension reform, and rural land rights reform, so people spend more.
Shift capital from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to more productive private sector players, especially in high-tech and green sectors.
Open financial markets further to allocate capital more efficiently and reduce reliance on shadow banking and local government debt.

2. Accelerate High-Value Innovation

Innovation is the only path to climb the global value chain. China has made progress in AI, EVs, and quantum computing, but to leap ahead, it needs systemic support.

Invest in basic research, not just applied tech. The U.S. university system still beats China in foundational innovation.
Encourage entrepreneurial ecosystems beyond Tier-1 cities by decentralizing capital and talent incentives.
Protect intellectual property rights (IPR) to attract foreign and domestic R&D.

3. Decarbonize the Economy with Industrial Policy

To become a global leader in clean energy and climate tech, China must go beyond exporting solar panels and EVs. It must internalize clean energy across its economy.

End coal addiction by retiring inefficient plants and redirecting subsidies toward renewables.
Electrify transportation and industry, from EV adoption to green hydrogen in steel and cement.
Build a smart grid that can handle renewable intermittency, energy storage, and real-time carbon pricing.

II. Political Reforms: From Control to Capability

While China doesn’t need Western-style democracy to escape the trap, it does need more adaptive and accountable governance.

1. Empower Local Governments with Autonomy + Accountability

Centralized micromanagement from Beijing is inefficient for a diverse economy.

Experimentation zones (like Shenzhen in the 1980s) should be revived for testing labor, tax, and green policy innovations.
Tie local officials’ promotion not just to GDP but to innovation, emissions reduction, and social equity outcomes.

2. Strengthen the Rule of Law and Regulatory Transparency

Foreign capital and domestic entrepreneurs need predictability and fairness.

Transparent regulatory frameworks will reduce risk premiums and encourage long-term investment.
Independent courts and dispute resolution systems are vital to trust in contracts and private property.

3. Enhance Political Feedback Mechanisms

One-party rule can survive if it's responsive. That means:

Allowing civil society to flourish in controlled spaces, especially around local governance, environment, and consumer rights.
Strengthening the media and think tanks that provide feedback on policy implementation without threatening core authority.

III. Demographic and Social Reforms: Human Capital is the New Oil

China’s population is shrinking. Labor is no longer cheap, and productivity gains must now come from human capital.

1. Overhaul the Hukou System

China’s household registration system is outdated and hampers labor mobility. Reforming it would unleash urban consumption and workforce dynamism.

2. Expand Access to High-Quality Education

From vocational training to university STEM programs, China must build a globally competitive talent base. Equitable education access across rural and urban areas is key.

3. Healthcare and Retirement Reform

An aging population needs security. Investing in healthcare infrastructure and expanding pension coverage will reduce household savings rates and boost consumption.

IV. Geopolitical Strategy: Navigate Multipolarity with Economic Diplomacy

China’s global rise is now constrained by its fraying relations with the West. A smart economic strategy must be coupled with deft diplomacy.

Avoid overreliance on domestic circulation and decoupling. Instead, diversify trade partners (BRI 2.0), supply chains, and financial ties.
Promote the yuan cautiously as an international currency without triggering capital flight.
Lead in global green standards—e.g., carbon border taxes, ESG norms, and clean-tech exports.

V. Double-Digit Growth with Clean Energy: Is It Possible?

Yes, but only through a qualitative leap—not just building more factories or pouring more cement.

China’s clean energy sector is already a global leader in solar, wind, EVs, and batteries. If China doubles down on decarbonization, makes its cities carbon-neutral, and becomes the world’s climate-tech factory, it can:

Add millions of new jobs in renewable industries.
Export clean growth models to the Global South.
Lower long-term healthcare and climate costs.
Drive productivity through green innovation.

Conclusion: The Green Leap Forward

China cannot grow forever on the back of steel and concrete. Its future lies in silicon and sunlight. Escaping the middle-income trap isn’t just about avoiding stagnation—it's about reimagining growth in a post-carbon age.

Political flexibility, market liberalization, green industrial strategy, and investment in people are not luxuries—they are necessities.

The world is watching. The dragon must now fly on clean wings. 🐉⚡🌱

कैसे चीन मध्य-आय जाल से बाहर निकल सकता है और स्वच्छ ऊर्जा के साथ दोहरे अंकों की विकास दर प्राप्त कर सकता है

जैसे ही चीन आर्थिक परिपक्वता और भू-राजनीतिक जटिलताओं के चौराहे पर खड़ा है, यह प्रश्न उठता है: क्या वह एक बार फिर से दोहरे अंकों की तेज़ विकास दर हासिल कर सकता है—वो भी बिना पर्यावरण की कीमत चुकाए? इसका उत्तर "हां" हो सकता है—लेकिन इसके लिए साहसिक राजनीतिक और आर्थिक सुधारों की ज़रूरत होगी, जो स्वच्छ ऊर्जा से संचालित एक नए विकास मॉडल की नींव रखें।

मध्य-आय जाल को समझना

जब किसी देश की मजदूरी और लागत इतनी बढ़ जाती है कि वह सस्ती विनिर्माण प्रतिस्पर्धा खो देता है, लेकिन वह उच्च मूल्य वाले उद्योगों में बदलाव के लिए आवश्यक नवाचार या संस्थागत ढांचा विकसित नहीं कर पाता, तो वह मध्य-आय जाल में फँस जाता है। चीन आज उसी स्थिति के करीब है। उसकी कभी अव्वल निर्यात अर्थव्यवस्था अब जनसंख्या वृद्धावस्था, बढ़ता कर्ज, पर्यावरणीय दबाव, और अंतरराष्ट्रीय व्यापार टकरावों से जूझ रही है।

फिर भी, चीन की विशाल घरेलू बाज़ार, तकनीकी प्रगति और सरकारी क्षमताएं उसे इस जाल से बाहर निकलने का मौका देती हैं—यदि वह साहसी कदम उठाए।

I. आर्थिक सुधार: अनुकरण से नवाचार की ओर

1. विकास मॉडल का पुनर्गठन

अब भारी निवेश और बुनियादी ढांचे पर निर्भरता से आगे बढ़ना होगा।

घरेलू खपत बढ़ाएं — सामाजिक सुरक्षा, पेंशन सुधार और ग्रामीण भूमि अधिकारों में सुधार करें ताकि लोग अधिक खर्च करें।
राज्य के स्वामित्व वाले उद्यमों (SOEs) की भूमिका सीमित करें और निजी क्षेत्रों में पूंजी प्रवाह बढ़ाएं।
वित्तीय बाज़ार खोलें ताकि पूंजी का कुशल वितरण हो और छाया बैंकिंग पर निर्भरता घटे।

2. उच्च स्तरीय नवाचार को गति दें

मूलभूत अनुसंधान में निवेश करें, केवल तात्कालिक तकनीकी उपयोग पर नहीं।
स्टार्टअप और उद्यमशीलता को बढ़ावा दें, केवल बीजिंग या शंघाई तक सीमित न रहे।
बौद्धिक संपदा अधिकारों की रक्षा करें ताकि निवेशक और आविष्कारक आत्मविश्वास से काम करें।

3. हरित औद्योगिक नीति के माध्यम से ऊर्जा संक्रमण

कोयले पर निर्भरता खत्म करें, विशेषकर पुराने और अक्षम संयंत्रों को बंद करके।
उद्योग और परिवहन को विद्युतीकृत करें, जैसे ग्रीन हाइड्रोजन और इलेक्ट्रिक वाहनों के ज़रिए।
स्मार्ट ग्रिड बनाएं जो नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा के उतार-चढ़ाव को संभाल सके।

II. राजनीतिक सुधार: नियंत्रण से क्षमता की ओर

चीन को पश्चिमी लोकतंत्र की नकल नहीं करनी, लेकिन लचीले, जवाबदेह और अनुकूलनशील शासन की ज़रूरत है।

1. स्थानीय सरकारों को सशक्त बनाएं

नीति प्रयोग के लिए क्षेत्रीय स्वायत्तता दें—1980 के दशक की तरह शेनझेन मॉडल को दोहराएं।
प्रशासनिक प्रदर्शन के पैमाने बदलें — केवल GDP नहीं, बल्कि नवाचार, उत्सर्जन में कमी और सामाजिक न्याय को भी मापा जाए।

2. कानून का शासन और पारदर्शिता मजबूत करें

नियम स्पष्ट और स्थिर हों, ताकि निवेशकों को भरोसा हो।
न्यायपालिका को स्वतंत्र बनाएं, ताकि अनुबंधों और संपत्ति अधिकारों की रक्षा हो सके।

3. राजनीतिक फीडबैक तंत्र को सुधारें

नागरिक समाज को सीमित लेकिन प्रभावी स्थान दें, विशेषकर पर्यावरण और उपभोक्ता अधिकार जैसे क्षेत्रों में।
थिंक टैंक और स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करें, ताकि नीतियों की आलोचना/समीक्षा हो सके।

III. जनसांख्यिकीय और सामाजिक सुधार: मानव पूंजी ही भविष्य है

चीन की जनसंख्या घट रही है। अब सस्ती श्रमशक्ति नहीं, बल्कि मानव पूंजी से उत्पादकता बढ़ानी होगी।

1. हुकौ प्रणाली को समाप्त करें

यह प्रणाली शहरीकरण और श्रमिक गतिशीलता पर रोक लगाती है। इसे सुधारना आवश्यक है।

2. शिक्षा की गुणवत्ता और पहुंच में सुधार

व्यावसायिक प्रशिक्षण और STEM शिक्षा को बढ़ावा दें।
ग्रामीण और शहरी क्षेत्रों में समान शैक्षिक अवसर सुनिश्चित करें।

3. स्वास्थ्य और पेंशन सुधार

बुजुर्ग आबादी को सुरक्षा दें ताकि घरेलू बचत दर कम हो और उपभोग बढ़े।

IV. भू-राजनीतिक रणनीति: वैश्विक संबंधों का पुनर्संतुलन

घरेलू आत्मनिर्भरता पर पूरी तरह निर्भर न हों; वैश्विक साझेदारियों को भी महत्व दें।
RMB (युआन) के अंतरराष्ट्रीयकरण को सावधानी से करें, पूंजी पलायन से बचते हुए।
हरित मानकों में नेतृत्व करें, जैसे कार्बन टैक्स, ESG नीति और स्वच्छ प्रौद्योगिकियों का निर्यात।

V. क्या स्वच्छ ऊर्जा से दोहरे अंकों की वृद्धि फिर संभव है?

हां, लेकिन केवल तब जब विकास गुणात्मक हो, मात्रात्मक नहीं।

यदि चीन:

कार्बन-तटस्थ शहर बनाता है,
स्वच्छ ऊर्जा का घरेलू उपयोग करता है, और
हरित तकनीकी नवाचार में वैश्विक नेता बनता है,

तो वह फिर से तेज़ी से विकास कर सकता है — और यह विकास स्थायी और पर्यावरण के अनुकूल होगा।

निष्कर्ष: हरित छलांग की ओर

चीन अब सिर्फ इस्पात और सीमेंट से आगे नहीं बढ़ सकता। उसका भविष्य सिलिकॉन और सूर्य की रोशनी पर आधारित है। मध्य-आय जाल से बचने का अर्थ केवल मंदी से बचाव नहीं, बल्कि एक नई आर्थिक कल्पना है।

साहसी राजनीतिक इच्छाशक्ति, बाज़ार सुधार, हरित औद्योगिक रणनीति, और जनता में निवेश—यही उसका मार्ग है।

दुनिया देख रही है। अब ड्रैगन को हरित पंखों से उड़ान भरनी होगी। 🐉⚡🌱

AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism https://t.co/OFT21hoLmW
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

The 20% Growth Revolution: Nepal’s Path to Prosperity Through Kalkiism https://t.co/sv9xIB8J74
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[11/18]

🚀 क्या दोबारा दोहरे अंकों की वृद्धि संभव है?
हाँ, अगर यह हरित विकास पर आधारित हो:
हरित नौकरियाँ

स्मार्ट शहर

क्लीनटेक निर्यात

वैश्विक ESG नेतृत्व
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[17/18]

अगर आपको यह थ्रेड उपयोगी लगी हो तो शेयर करें, RT करें और चर्चा को आगे बढ़ाएं।
आपका क्या मानना है—क्या चीन यह छलांग लगा सकता है?
[18/18]
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[1/18]

China’s growth has slowed. Costs are up, population is aging, the old model is exhausted. To rise again, China needs a new leap—a Green Leap Forward.
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

The 20% Growth Revolution: Nepal’s Path to Prosperity Through Kalkiism https://t.co/sv9xIB8J74
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

AOC 2028: : The Future of American Progressivism https://t.co/OFT21hoLmW
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[2/18]

🔴 The middle-income trap hits when cheap labor no longer works, but a country hasn’t built the innovation capacity to move up the value chain. That’s where China is now.
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[3/18]

✅ The way out? Deep economic, political, and social reforms. And at the center of it: a clean energy-led growth model.
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[7/18]

🏛️ Political reforms:

Give local governments more autonomy with accountability

Reward officials for innovation, sustainability—not just GDP

Create new zones for policy experimentation (like Shenzhen once was)
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[9/18]

📣 Build political feedback loops:

Allow limited space for civil society to engage (e.g. environment, consumer rights)

Strengthen think tanks and policy review mechanisms
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[12/18]

🚀 Can China grow at double digits again—with clean energy?
Yes, if:
It builds carbon-neutral cities

Massively scales renewables

Exports climate tech

Becomes the world’s green engine
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

[17/18]

If you found this thread insightful, like + RT and join the conversation:
Can China make the Green Leap Forward?
[18/18]
— Paramendra Kumar Bhagat (@paramendra) July 6, 2025

Saturday, July 05, 2025

China's De‑dollarization: Steady But Gradual

1. 🛠 De‑dollarization: steady but gradual

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has raised its mandate for yuan trade settlement: banks must now use the renminbi for at least 40% of cross-border trade, up from 25% (reuters.com).
Chinese state banks have significantly shifted loan and trade finance portfolios toward RMB—Chinese global bank lending now includes nearly 40% RMB, compared to under 20% a few years ago .
SWIFT data indicates the yuan is now the fourth most used currency globally, comprising about 4% of global payments, while the dollar remains about 40–50% (reuters.com).

2. eYuan (digital RMB) progress

📈 Usage to date

Since its public pilot in 2020, China has seen over 260 million wallets and around ¥7 trillion (~$1 trillion) in domestic transactions by 2024, spread across retail, transit, welfare and salaries .
Nearly 10 billion worth in transactions and ~140 million wallet downloads reported earlier (bitcoininsider.org).
1.5 million merchants are set up to accept e‑CNY; pilot features include offline NFC, SIM‑card storage, and transport payments (cryptorank.io).

🌐 Cross-border efforts

Pilot programs exist in Hong Kong and select FTA zones, enabling cross-border wallet use (reuters.com).
PBOC has pledged to push e‑yuan internationally, invoking a “multi‑polar currency system” vision (reuters.com).

3. China’s leverage

China is now the largest trading partner for over 140 countries . That large trade footprint gives it natural reasons to promote the yuan and e‑yuan in settlements—whether via CIPS (their SWIFT alternative) or making e‑yuan the default for BRI‑aligned countries. However, trust, liquidity, capital freedom, and legal transparency are still major hurdles .

4. Future roadmap

Scaling pilot zones: expanding testing beyond current FTZs using the “Shanghai model” (reuters.com).
Stablecoins: tech giants (Ant, JD.com) seek to launch offshore yuan-backed stablecoins to deepen global liquidity (reuters.com).
State enterprise drive: PBOC urges SOEs to use RMB/e‑yuan for trade and overseas investment (en.wikipedia.org).
Integration with gold, euro: central banks increasingly eye yuan (+e‑yuan) as part of reserve diversification (reuters.com).
Digital infrastructure ramp-up: continued improvements—offline payments, programmable currency, blockchain integrations .

5. Challenges & headwinds

Dollar dominance remains overwhelming—USD still ~45% of global payments, 80% of trade finance (reuters.com).
Trust and restrictions: limited capital convertibility, geopolitical mistrust, and internet censorship reduce appeal.
First-mover fatigue: domestic mobile platforms (WeChat/Alipay) still dominate. PBOC integration is slow (gsb.stanford.edu, reuters.com).
Global regulatory caution: countries wary of giving China financial surveillance power; partnerships limited.

✅ Bottom line

China has made measurable progress in both de-dollarizing trade and rolling out its digital currency domestically, backed by strong infrastructure and regulatory support. Its vexing challenge is translating this into real international usage. Leveraging its global trade heft helps, but deep, trusted, liquid international usage will require time, openness, and coordination with like-minded economies.

🧭 What to watch next

Area	Indicator
Offshore e‑yuan	Rollouts in Hong Kong/FTZ, stablecoin approvals in HK/Singapore
CIPS reach	Increased counterparties and international bank connections
Trade invoicing	Percent of BRI trade settled in RMB/e‑yuan
Reserve usage	Central bank reserve allocation data (RMB share)

China is laying the infrastructure and incentive framework to challenge dollar dominance—step by step. But until global capital mobility, trust, and scale catch up, the dollar's reign remains unshaken.

Wednesday, July 02, 2025

Where Is Xi Jinping?

Xi Jinping's Potential Successors

Where Is Xi Jinping?

As of July 2, 2025, there is no official report that Chinese President Xi Jinping is missing or absent from public life. However, a notable 16-day disappearance from May 21 to June 5, 2025—during which Xi was absent from public appearances, state media, and official functions—sparked significant speculation about his whereabouts.

Since then, there have been reports of his reappearance, including a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in early June 2025, though the setting was more informal than usual. Xi was also said to have spoken at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024 and reportedly had a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump in early June 2025. Still, his decision to skip the upcoming BRICS summit in Brazil (July 5–8, 2025)—with Premier Li Qiang attending in his place—has reignited questions about his status.

To date, the Chinese government and state media have issued no definitive statement confirming Xi's current location or status. The lack of transparency in China's political system continues to fuel speculation whenever top leaders are not visibly active.

Rumors About His Disappearance

During Xi’s 16-day absence, the vacuum of information led to a flurry of rumors, driven by foreign analysts, intelligence chatter, and social media speculation. Key theories include:

1. Power Struggle or Coup Speculation

Posts on X and media reports suggested Xi might be facing a power shift within the Communist Party. Some pointed to internal factionalism involving reformist leaders like Hu Jintao or Wang Yang, who may be gaining ground.
Unverified claims of a military coup surfaced, with General Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), allegedly taking on a more prominent role. Rumors also claimed Xi's allies in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been purged.
One viral post alleged Xi agreed to resign to protect his family—though no credible evidence backs this.

2. Health Concerns

Some speculated that Xi suffered a stroke and was recovering under house arrest. No confirmation has been provided, and the claims remain purely speculative.
His absence from high-profile events like the June 6 loyalty ceremony—attended by over 50 ministers—fueled these rumors.

3. Purge of Allies and Internal Instability

Xi’s absence coincided with the disappearance of top officials, including former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, former Defense Minister Li Shangfu, and General He Weidong.
Analysts debated whether this was part of Xi’s continued power consolidation or signs of internal resistance and political instability.
The broader context includes economic distress: high youth unemployment (15%), a stagnant real estate sector, and faltering tech investments.

4. Succession Rumors

Reports indicated Wang Yang, a respected technocrat and former vice premier, is being quietly positioned as a potential successor.
Mentions of “Xi Jinping Thought” in official media have reportedly decreased, hinting at a possible shift away from Xi’s ideological dominance.
The marginalization of Xi’s allies without formal dismissals aligns with CCP tactics used in previous leadership transitions.

5. Symbolic and Ceremonial Absences

Xi’s absence from the State Council oath-taking ceremony and his withdrawal from the BRICS summit were viewed as highly symbolic, possibly indicating a weakened position.
Some reports claimed that Xi’s father’s mausoleum had been “un-named” and his personal security detail reduced—though these details remain unverified.

What Is Going On?

Xi Jinping’s disappearance and the rumors it sparked are products of China’s opaque political system, domestic challenges, and sensational foreign reporting. Here's a breakdown:

1. Opacity of the Political System

China’s state-controlled media and limited transparency mean that even short-term absences of top leaders lead to widespread speculation.
The CCP has a history of quietly sidelining senior figures without public explanation (e.g., Hu Jintao, Qin Gang, Li Shangfu), lending plausibility to theories of internal tension.
The lack of state media coverage or official statements between May 21 and June 5 added to the perception of a leadership crisis.

2. Internal Challenges

China faces mounting economic pressures: stagnant GDP growth, high youth unemployment, and ongoing real estate woes.
Simultaneously, a wave of military and political purges raises questions: Is Xi tightening control, or is he responding to threats?
The disappearance of military figures like General He Weidong suggests turbulence within the PLA.

3. Speculative and Biased Reporting

Many of the most dramatic claims originated from Western media, intelligence sources, or social media—often lacking corroboration.
Posts alleging strokes, resignations, or coups should be treated with caution unless supported by verifiable evidence.
While the narrative of regime instability is appealing to geopolitical rivals, it may reflect wishful thinking more than reality.

4. Xi’s Continued Influence

Despite the speculation, Xi retains his official titles: President of China, General Secretary of the CCP, and Chairman of the CMC.
His ideological framework—“Xi Jinping Thought”—was still highlighted in diplomatic settings during his absence.
No formal announcements suggest he has been removed or sidelined.

5. Geopolitical Implications

Xi’s absence has raised concerns among neighbors, particularly India, which is closely watching potential instability across the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
His BRICS no-show may reflect domestic preoccupations, including preparations for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), rather than any retreat from global affairs.

A Critical Perspective

The rumors surrounding Xi's disappearance illustrate how secrecy breeds speculation. While some signs point to internal strife—such as the timing of purges and visible absences—there is no hard evidence of a coup, forced resignation, or incapacitation.

It is equally plausible that Xi took time to restructure party leadership, address domestic crises, or recover from a personal health issue. These are not uncommon in authoritarian regimes, where top-down control thrives on opacity.

At the same time, the Western media’s appetite for stories of Chinese regime collapse should be viewed with a critical lens. Intelligence claims without details, unnamed whistleblowers, and vague “sources familiar with the matter” are not sufficient to declare the end of Xi’s reign.

Conclusion

As of July 2, 2025, Xi Jinping’s whereabouts remain officially unconfirmed, but he is presumed to be in China, potentially focusing on internal matters. His 16-day disappearance (May 21–June 5) sparked global speculation—from health concerns to coups to succession planning.

While real tensions within the CCP and China’s economic troubles are evident, the more dramatic narratives remain unsubstantiated. Until reliable confirmation emerges from within the Chinese system, the global community would be wise to treat the rumors with caution.

For credible updates, follow official CCP announcements, though they are unlikely to offer clarity on factional power shifts or behind-the-scenes purges.

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2: China

AOC: This bill is a deal with the devil. It explodes our national debt. It militarizes our entire economy. It strips away health care and basic dignity of the American people for what? To give Elon Musk a tax break and billionaires the greedy taking of our nation. We cannot stand… pic.twitter.com/fpCVepLvx4
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Stop lying about Assemblyman Mamdani.

He is neither a communist nor a lunatic. And New York City doesn’t need to be saved by a wannabe King.

Besides, you are too busy destroying America with your One Big Ugly Bill to do anything else. pic.twitter.com/CktSeZvpVV
— Hakeem Jeffries (@RepJeffries) July 2, 2025

here's a sentence you don't see every day. https://t.co/d93DgLipOd pic.twitter.com/he5yvlUi2r
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Xi Jinping's Potential Successors

As of mid-2025, succession in China remains a tightly controlled and opaque process governed more by elite consensus within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than by transparent rules. Xi Jinping, 71 years old, has removed formal term limits and amassed immense personal power. However, planning for a successor—if and when it happens—still matters for internal stability.

Here are five potential successors who are often discussed by analysts and insiders:

1. Li Qiang (李强)

Current Role: Premier of the State Council (China's second-highest office)
Born: 1959
Background:

Longtime Xi loyalist and former Party Secretary of Shanghai.
Known for pro-business pragmatism and helped bring Tesla’s Gigafactory to Shanghai.
Promoted to Premier in 2023, bypassing traditional candidates—a signal of Xi's trust.
As Premier, he is nominally in charge of the economy, but under Xi’s shadow.

Strengths:

Loyal to Xi; not seen as a political threat.
Familiar with market reform and foreign business.
Visible national leadership experience.

Weaknesses:

May lack strong independent support base in the party.
His ascent is closely tied to Xi, making him a continuation figure, not a change agent.

2. Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥)

Current Role: First Vice Premier; Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) Member
Born: 1962
Background:

Xi Jinping’s former chief of staff and right-hand man.
Oversees administrative and economic affairs.
Known for his discretion, technocratic skills, and loyalty.
Rose through the ranks of the CCP’s General Office—seen as a gatekeeper to Xi.

Strengths:

Deep trust from Xi; part of his inner circle.
Seen as a low-profile but powerful operator.
Technocratic and cautious, with limited political baggage.

Weaknesses:

Lacks popular or provincial leadership experience.
No strong personal political base.

3. Chen Min’er (陈敏尔)

Current Role: First-ranked Vice Chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
Born: 1960
Background:

Former Party Secretary of Chongqing, once a launching pad for national leaders.
Xi loyalist and a former journalist turned party cadre.
Known for implementing ideological campaigns in line with Xi’s agenda.

Strengths:

Trusted by Xi.
Familiar with propaganda and ideological work.
Experience governing complex cities and provinces.

Weaknesses:

Has faded somewhat from the spotlight recently.
Perceived as a mid-tier loyalist rather than top-tier power contender.

4. Hu Chunhua (胡春华)

Current Role: Deputy head of the CPPCC’s Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee
Born: 1963
Background:

Once seen as a rising star and potential successor to Xi under Hu Jintao’s faction.
Former Vice Premier and Party Secretary of Guangdong and Inner Mongolia.
Speaks fluent Tibetan and has extensive administrative experience.

Strengths:

Technocratic, competent, and clean image.
Had broad provincial experience.
Could appeal to reformist factions or those seeking balance.

Weaknesses:

Marginalized under Xi’s reign; sidelined in the 20th Party Congress (2022).
Affiliated with the Communist Youth League faction, which has lost favor.

5. Cai Qi (蔡奇)

Current Role: Politburo Standing Committee Member; Head of the CCP Secretariat
Born: 1955
Background:

Former Beijing Party Secretary.
Oversees party operations and ideological enforcement.
Architect of COVID-zero policies in Beijing.
Another close Xi ally with loyalty over independent credentials.

Strengths:

Total loyalty to Xi.
Controls internal party communications and ideology.
Experience managing politically sensitive Beijing.

Weaknesses:

Older than the other candidates (turned 70 in 2025).
Unlikely to represent generational renewal.

🏆 Top Candidate: Ding Xuexiang

Why Ding?

He has the strongest combination of proximity to Xi, elevation to the highest decision-making body (the Politburo Standing Committee), and operational oversight in government.
He is Xi’s personal gatekeeper, and his low-key profile makes him less threatening to factional balance.
Ding’s technocratic credentials and inner-circle trust suggest he could be groomed as a “safe pair of hands” to maintain continuity, especially in a post-Xi power-sharing scenario.

Final Thought:

While Li Qiang may appear most visible, Ding Xuexiang’s behind-the-scenes power and deep integration with Xi’s personal apparatus make him the likeliest successor—if Xi decides to retire or designate one. However, given Xi's consolidation of power, it's also possible no clear successor emerges until the very last moment.

There are a few technocratic and competent officials in China’s political system who have governed large provinces or cities effectively, are not core members of Xi Jinping’s inner circle, and are methodically rising through meritocratic performance rather than pure loyalty. These figures represent a quiet but meaningful countercurrent to Xi’s inner-circle politics. If elite consensus begins to value competence and balance over personal loyalty, these individuals could become dark horse candidates for higher leadership roles.

Here are three such rising stars:

1. Ma Xingrui (马兴瑞)

Current Role: Party Secretary of Xinjiang
Born: 1959
Not in Xi’s inner circle; seen as a technocrat and aerospace engineer

🔹 Background:

Ph.D. in engineering; former head of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.
Former Governor of Guangdong (China’s economic engine).
Appointed Party Secretary of Xinjiang in 2021, replacing Chen Quanguo, a hardliner.
Known for reducing the visibility of harsh surveillance tactics in Xinjiang without fully dismantling them.

🔹 Strengths:

Deep scientific and administrative experience.
Credibility with both the technocratic elite and local cadres.
Has run both a powerful province (Guangdong) and a politically sensitive region (Xinjiang).
Popular with reform-minded bureaucrats and economists.

🔹 Weaknesses:

Older (66), though not disqualified for the top job by Chinese standards.
Xinjiang’s international baggage could haunt his prospects.
Not part of Xi’s trusted network, so upward mobility depends on shifting political tides.

2. Yin Yong (殷勇)

Current Role: Mayor of Beijing (since 2022)
Born: 1969
Young, fast-rising technocrat with central and local credentials

🔹 Background:

Educated at Tsinghua and Harvard Kennedy School.
Former deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC).
Became Beijing mayor at age 53—a major city, highly symbolic.
Known for economic reform thinking and digital economy fluency.

🔹 Strengths:

Rare mix of macroeconomic expertise and on-the-ground governance.
Possibly groomed for higher office by meritocratic consensus.
Pro-business and deeply educated, with international exposure.
Clean image and low ideological baggage.

🔹 Weaknesses:

No Party Secretary role yet (mayor is second in command in a Chinese city).
Young and still being tested.
Future trajectory depends on how well he manages Beijing’s complex governance.

3. Zhang Guoqing (张国清)

Current Role: Vice Premier of China (since 2023)
Born: 1964
Former Mayor of Chongqing and Party Secretary of Tianjin

🔹 Background:

Another aerospace industry technocrat (former CEO of Norinco).
Became mayor of Chongqing (an influential city often used as a testing ground for national leadership).
Party Secretary of Tianjin (another politically visible role).
Appointed Vice Premier with responsibilities for industry and defense.

🔹 Strengths:

Deep industrial and military knowledge.
Broad local and central leadership experience.
Charismatic and with some public appeal.
Possible bridge figure between Xi loyalists and institutionalists.

🔹 Weaknesses:

Some ties to the “red elite” via his industry background could be held against him.
Not a PSC member yet—needs a Politburo Standing Committee seat to become a top-tier contender.

🏁 Summary Table

Name	Current Role	Notable Experience	Age	Strengths	Weaknesses
Ma Xingrui	Party Sec. of Xinjiang	Gov. of Guangdong, Aerospace leader	66	Technocratic, proven in difficult posts	Xinjiang baggage, older
Yin Yong	Mayor of Beijing	PBoC, international economist	55	Young, macro expertise, popular	Not yet Party Sec., needs proving
Zhang Guoqing	Vice Premier	Mayor of Chongqing, Party Sec. Tianjin	61	Defense-industry savvy, broad exp.	Not inner circle, no PSC seat yet

👑 Most Promising "Dark Horse": Yin Yong

Why Yin Yong?

He represents the most “modern” profile: internationally educated, fluent in finance, managing Beijing—a highly symbolic and complex role.
He is young enough to be groomed for 2032 or beyond, suggesting continuity and long-term planning.
If China faces economic turbulence and elite circles desire a competent, reform-minded technocrat, Yin could emerge as a consensus candidate.

Final Analysis:

While Xi’s inner circle dominates current power structures, China’s institutional memory for competence and stability is not dead. If the post-Xi era demands more balance, these rising technocrats—especially Yin Yong and Zhang Guoqing—might become key players in a recalibrated collective leadership, possibly under a dual or rotating structure like in the Jiang-Hu era.

Wang Yang (汪洋) is a prominent and well-respected figure in the Chinese political system, though his likelihood of succeeding Xi Jinping has greatly diminished in recent years.

🔹 Quick Profile of Wang Yang

Born: March 1955 (Age: 70 as of 2025)
Recent Position: Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (2018–2023)
Past Positions:
- Vice Premier of China (2013–2018)
- Party Secretary of Guangdong (2007–2012)
- Party Secretary of Chongqing (2005–2007)
- Governor of Chongqing, Party Secretary of Anhui earlier in his career
Affiliation: Known to be aligned with the Communist Youth League faction (tuanpai), historically linked to Hu Jintao
Reputation: Reformist, pro-market, pragmatic, and internationally friendly

🔍 Political Ideology and Strengths

Wang Yang was widely considered one of the most liberal and reform-oriented top officials of his generation.
As Guangdong Party Secretary, he promoted economic liberalization and tolerated greater press freedom than most.
As Vice Premier, he oversaw poverty alleviation and was known for his pragmatism and aversion to populist gestures.
Well-liked among China’s private entrepreneurs, economists, and some reform-minded cadres.

🚧 Why He Is Unlikely to Succeed Xi Jinping

Age Factor:
- Wang Yang is already 70 years old. In modern CCP norms, even flexible ones, this puts him beyond the age range for new promotions.
- Xi Jinping was 59 when he took over in 2012. Most successors are chosen in their 50s or early 60s.
Politburo Exit in 2022:
- In a surprising move at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Wang Yang was not reappointed to the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), despite being eligible and well-qualified.
- Instead, Xi Jinping filled the PSC exclusively with loyalists.
- This move effectively ended Wang Yang’s chances of rising further in the hierarchy.
Factional Marginalization:
- As a senior figure in the Communist Youth League faction (tuanpai), Wang was linked to a group that Xi Jinping has systematically weakened.
- Xi dismantled the institutional base of the Youth League, removing allies like Hu Chunhua from top posts as well.
Reformist Image:
- His pro-market, liberal reputation may be respected among technocrats and international observers, but it is ideologically out of sync with Xi's more statist, Party-centric economic and political agenda.

🧭 Conclusion: Wang Yang Will Not Succeed Xi Jinping

Despite his strong credentials, good governance record, and international respect, Wang Yang is no longer in contention to succeed Xi Jinping. His exclusion from the Politburo in 2022 was widely interpreted as a formal political retirement. His age and factional background further close the door.

If power transitions away from Xi’s inner circle in the future, it will more likely be to younger technocrats such as Ding Xuexiang, Li Qiang, or even dark horses like Yin Yong—not veterans like Wang Yang, who symbolize an earlier era.

Pages

Sunday, July 06, 2025

6: China, Russia

How China Can Escape the Middle-Income Trap and Reclaim Double-Digit Growth with Clean Energy

Understanding the Trap

I. Economic Reforms: From Imitation to Innovation

1. Restructure the Growth Model

2. Accelerate High-Value Innovation

3. Decarbonize the Economy with Industrial Policy

II. Political Reforms: From Control to Capability

1. Empower Local Governments with Autonomy + Accountability

2. Strengthen the Rule of Law and Regulatory Transparency

3. Enhance Political Feedback Mechanisms

III. Demographic and Social Reforms: Human Capital is the New Oil

1. Overhaul the Hukou System

2. Expand Access to High-Quality Education

3. Healthcare and Retirement Reform

IV. Geopolitical Strategy: Navigate Multipolarity with Economic Diplomacy

V. Double-Digit Growth with Clean Energy: Is It Possible?

Conclusion: The Green Leap Forward

मध्य-आय जाल को समझना

I. आर्थिक सुधार: अनुकरण से नवाचार की ओर

1. विकास मॉडल का पुनर्गठन

2. उच्च स्तरीय नवाचार को गति दें

3. हरित औद्योगिक नीति के माध्यम से ऊर्जा संक्रमण

II. राजनीतिक सुधार: नियंत्रण से क्षमता की ओर

1. स्थानीय सरकारों को सशक्त बनाएं

2. कानून का शासन और पारदर्शिता मजबूत करें

3. राजनीतिक फीडबैक तंत्र को सुधारें

III. जनसांख्यिकीय और सामाजिक सुधार: मानव पूंजी ही भविष्य है

1. हुकौ प्रणाली को समाप्त करें

2. शिक्षा की गुणवत्ता और पहुंच में सुधार

3. स्वास्थ्य और पेंशन सुधार

IV. भू-राजनीतिक रणनीति: वैश्विक संबंधों का पुनर्संतुलन

V. क्या स्वच्छ ऊर्जा से दोहरे अंकों की वृद्धि फिर संभव है?

निष्कर्ष: हरित छलांग की ओर

Saturday, July 05, 2025

China's De‑dollarization: Steady But Gradual

1. 🛠 De‑dollarization: steady but gradual

2. eYuan (digital RMB) progress

📈 Usage to date

🌐 Cross-border efforts

3. China’s leverage

4. Future roadmap

5. Challenges & headwinds

✅ Bottom line

🧭 What to watch next

Wednesday, July 02, 2025

Where Is Xi Jinping?

Where Is Xi Jinping?

Rumors About His Disappearance

1. Power Struggle or Coup Speculation

2. Health Concerns

3. Purge of Allies and Internal Instability

4. Succession Rumors

5. Symbolic and Ceremonial Absences

What Is Going On?

1. Opacity of the Political System

2. Internal Challenges

3. Speculative and Biased Reporting

4. Xi’s Continued Influence

5. Geopolitical Implications

A Critical Perspective

Conclusion

2: China

Xi Jinping's Potential Successors

1. Li Qiang (李强)

2. Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥)

3. Chen Min’er (陈敏尔)

4. Hu Chunhua (胡春华)

5. Cai Qi (蔡奇)

🏆 Top Candidate: Ding Xuexiang

Final Thought:

1. Ma Xingrui (马兴瑞)

🔹 Background:

🔹 Strengths:

🔹 Weaknesses:

2. Yin Yong (殷勇)

🔹 Background:

🔹 Strengths: